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CHUFTER I. 
INTRODUCTION 
In the past two decades» housing production has served as a balance 
nheel for the remainder of the aeonon^f-^^ning in periods of general 
economic stagnation and turning doim in periods of economic eohiliration* 
Downturns in residential mortgage borrowing precede the onset of economic 
recession J often by many quarters. Mortgage borrowing then iims up 
again prior to the pick-up in general economic activity.^ These fluc­
tuations in housing activity have characterized all major classes of 
permanent dwellings: single-family homes and mlti-fanily dwellings 
alike, conventionally financed units as well as federally backed ones. 
Housing production, due to its large size, is vezy important in the 
economy. Throughout the lyoOa reeidential construction accounted for 
twenty-five to thirty percent of gross private domestic investment 
(UU, p. 3). While real gross national product has varied between peak 
and trough by less than five percent over the past twenty years, resi­
dential housing expenditures have varied by twenty to forty percent. 
This cyclical b^avior of the housing sector is not a problem endemic 
to the United States because similar cycles have been recorded in various 
nations almost regardless of the prevailing types of institutional 
arrangements (26, 63). 
^For an assessment of the cycles in residential housing construction, 
see (3, 22, 3U, U9). 
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Going into the decade of the 70*s, it seems a slight possibility 
that the feast^o-famine qrclloal undulations will be ameliorated even 
though a formal national housing policy now exists which opts for a record 
number of units per year* The policy makers of the U«S« have, on occasion, 
been criticized for allowing the housing sector to be the sacrificial 
laid) of the economy. There has been a demand to provide greater stability 
to the housing sector by implementing more pro-bousing fiscal and nonetazy 
poliqr*^ It should be remembered short-run flactuations in residential 
housing have had an important role in overall economic stability, moder­
ating inflationary pressures during periods of excess demand, and aiding 
in recovery from economic contractions* It appears likely that variations 
in the rate of home building activity may have reached proportions that 
are politically and socially unacceptable* If, however, these swings in 
housing activity are dampened, the goal of overall economic stability 
will suffer unless this greater bousing stability is combined with changes 
Hhich force ether sectors te share a greater portion of the burden. 
Whether or not the periodic fluctuations in the short-run housing cycle 
should be ameliorated and the goal of overall economic stability be 
jeopardized is a vaine judgement* No attempt will be made to answer this 
conundmm, but instead, we will singly proceed on the premise that the 
colossal fluctuations in housing production are inherently undesirable 
and policies desigaed to attenaate their magniWdes should be implemented* 
^Qf course, to the degree this is done, other sectors of the econongr 
may be affected more adversely than before. 
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There are a substantial number of housing students who believe the 
home building cycles are primarily caused by the supply of mortgage 
cMdit. The belief is based on the results from empirical studies as 
well as a priori reasoning. The ^ stem through which mortgage money is 
supplied to the housing sector is closely tied to our financial, partic­
ularly thrift, institutions. In recent years, excluding U.S« Goveitunenb 
agencies, the four types of financial institutions—savings and loan 
associations (SLAs), mutual savings banks (^GBs), commercial banks (CBs), 
and life insurance companies (LICs)—have furnished close to ninety-five 
percent of the net increase in residential mortgage money. This seems 
to suggest that one way to study the housing construction cycle is to 
concentrate on mortgage credit flows. This concentration on financial 
variables has not been the route followed by some researchers; they have 
tended to focus on what has been referred to as basic demand variables. 
These variables are such things as population changes, household forma­
tions, vzosncy rates, cost of housing as opposed to rent levels, etc s 
The research undertaken in this exposition will concentrate on 
financial variables because our main interest is in the short-run cycles 
of the housing sector. Demographic factors and the relative price of 
housing, which might be crucially important determinants of housing demand 
and construction in the long-run, ordinarily do not change very much in 
the short-run; therefore, they will not be included in the analysis 
undertaken in this research. Even though the flow of financing through 
depositary institutions is considered to be the most important factor 
generating the short-run housing cycle, the basic demand variables will 
tend to put a floor on cyclical troughs and a ceiling on peaks. The 
h 
connection between the aapply of nortgage credit and building activity 
derives from the fact that residential building is heavily dependent vpon 
outside financing and in periods of tight credit conditions the ilasr of 
savings through financial intermediaries to the mortgage market dries up* 
Contrariwise, in periods of easy credit, long-nm financing necessary for 
building activity is readily available. 
This focus on the short^erm bousing (^ele and financial variables 
leads to a separation of the housing sector by credit supplying inter-
msdiaiy* Me have chosen to s%r%ate the mortgage market into four sub-
sectors consisting of the four major financial intexmediaries outlined 
above, viz., SL&s, I6Bs, CBs, and LlCs. An alternative foxnolation, and 
one followed by some researchers, would have allowed product differentia­
tion in the home mortgages according to loan l^pe, i.e., FHA., VA, and 
conventionally financed.^ %e differentiation by financial intermediaiy 
various intermediaries epecialize in a particular type of loan. Probably 
the ideal approach would be to separate by intermediaiy and loan type, 
for example, FHA. loans from SlAs, etc., but the dearth of good data 
precludes this approach. The intermediary ^ qproaeh was chosen because 
we felt the data were more consistent and whm employing the loan type 
method it is necessary to aggregate across insMtotions whose behavioral 
relationships vary considerably. 
^FHA and VA are Federal Housing Authority and Veterans Administra­
tion, respectively. 
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up until now we bave motioned the flow or aapply of moztgage credit 
vitfaoat discussing the demand* Demand for mortgage credit will not play 
a major role in this research because we feel, along with numerous other 
housing researchers, the stop-aad-go pattern of housing starts is pri­
marily determined on the supply side of the market. It has been argued 
by many that it has been supply rather than demand irtiich has determined 
the volume and price in the mortgage market#^ A basic assumption in 
such an argument is that supply forces have been aore ^ ynamie and easily 
adjustable in that lenders respond to changed market conditions or to 
eoqpected changes more readily than do consumers* The supply orientated 
eqpproach inplicitly assumes the demand for mortgage credit is always 
sufficient to clear the market* ^y assuming an ever present sufficient 
demand, we can determine the scqpply of mortgage credit by looking at 
financial variables given that demand is adequate at all supply levels 
and the market will be cleared* The supply approach was also adopted 
bscssiss of the poor rôêultô wtbar foSe&fvbers hav« obtained when they 
attempted to estimate demand. Actually, an attempt to estimate the 
dmmnd for mortgage credit wuld be very difficult since ac actual 
series exists for ex ante demand, i.e., there is no way to detexnine 
lAat portion of demand goes unsatisfied because of subjective rationing, 
etc. This probably arises becauae on the demand side we are confronted 
with a complex matrix of variables. To most individuals, housing is more 
than an investmeot; ownership is customarily intertwined with the objective 
of occupanqr. Various amenities beyond the realm of investment arise, 
^Supply and deœmd forces of housing aodels are discussed in (U3)* 
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e*g#, social sbatars, privacy, tax advantages, etc.; thus, demand is 
influenced by so aany diverse and tinqoanbifiable "variables that attempts 
to specify it haw failed. Another lass important reason why supply is 
favored over demand is that lAen sui^ly of loanable fhnds is inconstant, 
as it periodically is, intervention to correct imbalances requises an 
understanding of the supply function, i*e», from a policy standpoint, 
supply is more easily manipulated than is demand. To the extent that 
housing activity is not determined h7 the availability of mortgage credit 
flows, the analysis undertaken in this study will be in error. If the 
assuBçtions concerning stqaply and demand are unsuitable, they will emerge 
by generating poor results in our estimation and forecasts. 
This paper will be primarily concerned with nonfarm, residential 
housing. Ibis arises because the financial institutions to be considered 
lend primarily in this market. The inclusion of nonresidential housing 
would require an analysis of other suppliers of mortgage credit and the 
data frss these ssurcss are not as acodssiblô nor are they as reliable 
as what we have chosen. Additionally, the federal credit programs have 
concentrated on the residential sector of the housing sarkst; thus, szy 
assessment of policy tools should focus on the same segment of the market. 
Furthermore, the bulk of the housing research in the past has been con­
cerned with residential housing and the literature is more developed in 
this area. 
The sample period chosen for analysis is 196U:1 through 1972:2. 
This relatively- Aort period was chosen solely because of data limita­
tions. It would probably be better to lengthen the sample period but 
80K& of the data series simply do not exist before 196L:1 and the 
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necessary data to estimate them were also unavailable. The primary 
difficulty associated with a limited sample period is the degree of 
freedom problem encountered in the statistical analysis* It is felt, 
however, that the period is sufficiently long to prevent major statis­
tical problems* The sançle period contains two substantial downturns in 
the housing cycle; consequently, the analysis will be put to a strenuous 
test since the data series are of such short duration* 
In addition to the short sangle span, another data problem exists 
in that the mortgage credit market is constantly undergoing structural 
change which makes it difficult to find a period long enough for statis­
tical analysis* For example, in 1966 the Johnson Administration con­
strained the Federal Home Loan Bank System (FHLBS) 1= its efforts to 
make advances; in 1968 the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) 
was reorganized into a quasi-governmental organization and removed from 
the federal budget which in turn altered its nodus operandi. A host of 
federal agencies take concerted and nonconcefted actions in and out of the 
mortgage market over time so that the magnitudes of economic forces 
operating within the constantly shifting institutional framework becoœ 
very difficult to identify. The problem involved is to reduce the host 
of complex and intricate mechanisms of the mortgage credit market into 
relation^ips involving only a manageable number of strategic variables. 
Hopefully, this reduction process will leave a realistic framework 
capable of explaining the factors at work in the residential mortgage 
market. 
Quarterly data were chosen because this has been the route taken 
other housing research and this data are more plentiful. Additionally, 
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a qaarborly ttas dimension corresponds to the observed seasonal pabter:i 
of variation in many of the relevant flov variables, and the practice 
of quarterly dividend patterns suggest that the short-tenn planning 
horizon could logically focus on this time period* The only other 
plausible altezBative was to use monthly data but it is felt the month 
is too short a time period for response to rapid, substantial changes in 
financial variables#^ There «ill be no attemgpt to disaggr^ate below the 
national level sjnce appropriate data series are nonexistent. 
The most common approach taken by housing researchers has been to 
employ a stock adjustment mechanism. %e research to follow deviates 
from this precedent because it was felt the stock adjustment fqpproach 
would not provide the best results, especially vis-^-vis forecasts* 
The reason for this decision was because a stock adjustment approach 
has at least three undesirable characteristics; (1) almost invariably 
too inich weight is given to the lagged dependent variable, (2) the turn­
ing points in the dependent variable are likely to be missed when fore­
casts are attesçted, and (3) it is necessary to assume the adjustment 
coefficlsst reasiss constant throo^out the analysis* We chose the method 
of determining the independent variables of the gystem a priori and then 
testing them for significance with regression analysis* This approach, 
combined with the exclusion of the demand side of the market, leads to 
a Eystem of equations that are neither structural nor reduced form but 
have been referred to in the literature as quasi-reduced form equations* 
^Sone analysis of monthly data was attempted but the conpllc%ted 
lag structures made this approach unmanageable. 
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This method of estimation does not lead to a formal model of the mortgage 
credit market bat this is unimportant since the primary concern is the 
relatiooahip between credit flows and residential housing activity. 
Many models have not captured in an adequate way the relationship between 
the housing and mortgage markets; hopefully, this research will not be 
so afflicted* The accuracy of the approach adopted will be judged by 
the forecasted results»^ 
An aasessoBsat of the residential housing and mortgage credit 
maxtots requires an examination of the supplying intermediaries becaase 
it is here that the disturbance is first generated# For exaaple, when 
moaqr becomes tighter, institutions that have a wide latitude in invest­
ment choices, e.g., CBs and LICs, put fewer Ainds into residential 
mortgages* Furthermore, other institutions, e.g., SIAs and )BBs, have 
an asset structure which makes it difficult to compete for funds when 
Aort-term market rates rise rapidly. We see then that the four principal 
mortgage lending Inteznediaries are either ânuaiing residential mortgages 
for more profitable investmsnts or are the victims of dlsintenedlation 
which leaves feifer funds for housing purposes• periods of credit 
restraint, further instability is injected into the housing sector as 
businesses enlarge their connand over financial resources, labor, and 
capital, thereby increasing their real output at the expense of bousing 
construction. As a result it is no surprise that changes in the cost 
and availability of credit in general have acute and substantial intacts 
in the housing sector. Fluctuations in the availability of mortgage 
^This ad hoc approach is similar to Brady's (8). 
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credit have increased the basic instability of house building* Many 
recommendations—both good and bad—have been made to improve the mort­
gage credit cycle and thus facilitate a moderated house building cycle* 
The puxpose here is not to judge these various proposals but to analyze 
the role of mortgage credit in the existing economic atmosphere* Admit­
tedly, such institutional and political caveats that may exist should be 
taken into account in any analysis* 
The general plan of this paper is to d«tendne and specify the 
variables that influence mortgage credit flow through the major financial 
institutions serving the housing sector* Each intermediary will be 
considered separately Ixit as nuch synmstzy as possible will be main­
tained. Since each iixtexnediazy acts eomawhat independently in the 
maztat J there is no a priori reason to assume they will all be influenced 
by the same variables* In fact, just the antithesis is expected* Once 
the individual intermediazy flows are analyzed, they will be combined 
into one composite series and employed in the analysis of the residential 
home building activity* This indirect approach to the housing sector 
Aould yield reasonably good results because the demand for mortgage 
credit is derived from the demand for housing stock*^ 
We are ii^licitly assuming, as other researchers have done, the 
factors of input—land, materials, labor, etc*—are in perfectly elastic 
supply and no bottlenecks are forthcoming in these areas* 
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CHAPTER II. 
SELECTED REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Concern about the cyclical ewings in the bousing sector, and a 
growing discrepancy between privately and socially desired and actual 
housing stocks has q)awned a substantial amount of research investigating 
this sector of the economy*^ ]h a stu^y of the sort undertaken here, 
it would be iapossible to review all the research accomplished in the 
past two decades; consequently, the review of the literature will be 
limited to selected models which have similarities of the analysis to 
be undertaken in this paper. On theoretical grounds, no model clearly 
is preferred; each has a unique rationale and advantages. On empirical 
grounds such as goodness of fit or mc post prediction accuracy, it is 
difficult to stake an assessment. The models are estimated over different 
periods and seek to accwplish different objectives; therefore, it is 
hazardous to make coiq)ari8onB. All the models to be reviewed are short-
run in nature and the authors have largely ignored long-run influences 
on mortgage credit flows and housing. Some of the models of the housing 
sector are relatively undeveloped and have performed rather poorly for 
forecasting purposes. This is not to say considerable progress has not 
been made. Both in terms of specification and prediction, iaqprovenents 
^For a partial list of the research conçleted in the housing and 
mortgage credit sectors, see (30, 68)# Recent empirical models are 
discussed at some length in (W)* 
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have been realized and inaccuracies reduced. Hopefully, continued prog­
ress will be forthcoming in the future as better data become available. 
The four models selected for review are all of recent vintage but 
each uses a different technique. Brady's work will be reviewed because 
he deals specifically with housing starts according to the type of 
financing. This model is straightforward and not cluttered with side 
issues as is some of the research reviewed. Huang's model is of special 
interest because he deals with mortgage credit flows as well as housing 
start s j additionally, Huang's research has been widely accepted as one 
of the more important pioneer works. Jaffee's simulation model was 
selected primarily because of his treatment of advance mortgage commit­
ments. Also he segregated his analysis ly intermediaiy which is the 
procedure to be followed in this research. Furthermore, Jaffee's model 
is one of the few sirailation approaches designed to evaluate alternative 
policy prescriptions. Silber's work was chosen for review because he 
concentrated strictly on mortgage credit supplied qy intermediary. 
Even though Silber did not extend his research to include actual housing 
activity, it might be so extended since starts and s»rtgag8 credit flows 
are thought to be positively related. Two of the models chosen for 
review are segregated along intermediary lines whereas the remaining 
two concentrate on the type of financing. Two deal with starts, either 
directly or ly value, and two are concerned with mortgage credit flows. 
Even though these four models represent only a small portion of the total 
research in this area, we feel they are a fairly accurate cross section 
of the research undertaken to date. 
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Brady's Model 
Brady^ develops a short-run econometric model of the U.S. resi­
dential housing market utilizing quarterly data, seasonally adjusted 
2 
at annual rates, and concentrating on financial variables. The sanple 
period is 1960;3 through 1970:2 and the modes of analysis are ordinary 
and two-stage least smiares. The housing market is divided into single-
family dwellings which are conventionally financed, FHA-insured, and VA-
guaranteed, multiple-family dwellings, and mobile homes. This division 
is based on the results of a correlation matrix of the different sectors 
and on the outcome of previous analysis (10, 11), Brady uses three 
starts series the first of which corresponds to all the above five types 
(HTTT series), the second is all starts minus mobile homes (HTT series), 
and the last is all single-family starts (HTUS series). Brady reasons 
that a separation of the overall market into its major components will 
lead to better structural fits and forecasting results. Cur review will 
concentrate on the HTT series since it is the series to be analyzed and 
estimated in this paper. Brady also has a value-of-starts series which 
corre^onds to his HIT series and is analogous to the value series to be 
analyzed in this paper. The actual equations formulated Brady appear 
^The primary model is given in (8), however, additional research 
which is related is (10, 11, 12, 13). 
^he analysis used explanatory equations based on a priori ^ecifi-
cations. Brady finds that basic demand variables do not influence the 
short-run movements in the housing sector even though they may affect the 
long-run behavior. He contributes their insignificance to the generally 
poor quality of the data and/or the fact that supply factors are more 
inqwrtant in explaining the quarterly variation in housing starts than 
are demand variables (8, p. 17). 
in Appendix A along vith a brief explanation of hie Tariables* 
Brady begins bgr estimating the HTT series and also its valae* 
The basio criticism of these estimates is the mixture of sapp]y and 
demand variables in the same equation. For example, the HIT and the 
ICNFI^ equations contain as predetendned variables both the Boeckh 
index and the net change in FHI£S advances* The Boecldi index is a 
variable associated with the demand for housing whereas advances are 
aligned with the supply of mortgage credit* The admixture of variables 
is also a basic weakness of the other estimation equations derived by 
Bra^y and could account for the unusual sign obtained for the BoecW) 
index variable* There also appears to be a canspicious lack of federally 
undezwritten mortgage variables in the aggregate starts and the valne-of-
starts equation* It appears, by observing Brady's results, the federally 
underwritten sector is unimportant in mcplalTiIng either value or volume 
of residential housing starts* This is an uneogpected outcome since 
approximately twenty-five percent of all residential starts are either 
FHA or 7A financed* 
Bra4r next estimates the various subsectors of the housing market* 
Due to the similarity of the cyclical movements in FUA-insored and VA-
guaranteed starts daring the 1960*S; these tHo series sre ccsbinsd snd 
estimated as one* The only additional criticism of these equations is 
the low D-W statistic of 0*79 and possible positive serial correlation 
or mlsqpecification associated with the federally underwritten starts 
^His mobile homes equation will not be reviewed because this 
research is not concerned with this series* 
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equation and the low significance level of the FNMA.-GNMA.^ variable 
(t-statistic of 1,7) in the same equation. Both of these shortcomings 
are important: the former because it violates one of the basic asgamp-
tions of least squares analysis and may lead to biased results^ and the 
latter because Brady later enploys this variable as a policy instrument. 
The negative time trend obtained by Brady for all series except HM, has 
been referred to as an anomaly probably arising from misspecification 
of the equations. This is probably a correct assessment, especially 
for the aggregate equations. 
Brady's summary statistics are reasonable and the equations, with 
the exception of the imltiple-faioily dwellings one, track the actual 
series over the sançle period. The equations capture the downturns in 
housing activity without a substantial delay and this is the strong 
point of the analysis. To verify the independence of the various sub-
sectors of the model, Brady reestimated the equations using two-stage 
least squares. Based on low t-statistics of the exogenously entered 
dependent variables, he concluded the simultaneous equation bias was 
of a negligible magnitude 
Brady's equations allow him to predict any of his starts series 
or the magnitudes of the various sub sect ors. However, our interest is 
^GNMA. is the acronym for Government National Mortgage Association. 
^For the consequences of autocorrelated disturbances, refer to 
(U2, pp. 179-88). 
^In (11) Brady also concluded the two-stage results were not supe­
rior to the ordinaiy least squares analysis. 
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confined to the HTT series* Bra^jr's predictions of this series along 
vitb the actual Talaes and percent error appear in Table 2.1 below* 
%th the exception of 1970:U» these forecasted results are reasonably 
accurate, especially if ve consider that exogenous variables also had 
to be estimated* Brady's estimates are too low in all instances except 
1971 *3 vhcn it is marginally above the actual value. This underestima­
tion could be rooted in positive serial correlation of the residuals 
in the HTT equation since the D-W statistic is in the indetezWnate 
1 
zone, 
TABLE 2*1 
Brady's estimates of housing starts, 
actual values, and percent error 
(In thousands, seasonally adjusted, annual rates) 
Quarter Actual Estimated Percent 
error 
1970:U 205U 1577 23 
1971 193s 1777 
1868 
Ô 
1971:2 2008 7 
1971:3 2029 2071 2 
1971 :U 2hS7 2207 10 
Brady also made estimates of the various demand elasticities for 
subsectors of his housing market* Additionally, be converted the fore­
casting model into a poliqr model* These anciUaxy aqwcts of the 
research are interesting but are not pertinent to the current under­
taking and consequently will not be reviewed* 
^For a list of the D-W values needed to prevent serial correlation, 
see (21)* 
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Hnax)g*8 Model 
%ang*$ model (3$, 36, 37, 38) can be broken into three dlsbinct 
parte oonsisting of the demand side of the maztet, eapply of mortgage 
credit, and mortgage yield adjasbasnts and relatione. This latter 
aibseetor of Huang's model has remained relatively undeveloped due to 
difficulties in apecifying excess supply and demand in the model. 
Since this portion of the model lacks good empirical verification, it 
will not be rerLewed. The demand side of the model nill also not be 
analysed since the nature of this eazwsition «ill be supply oriented « 
No damage is done by s%regating the model and analyzing only the mort­
gage credit sc^yply o<m%pon@mt since the subsectors of Boang's model are 
developed and tested separately. Huang concurs with other researchers 
that the supply of mortgage credit has a controlling influence over 
housing starts and has determined the volume and price in the postwar 
mortgage market (35, p# 122$); thus, the supply portion of the model 
is the best developed and could probably be referred to as the heart of 
the model. Huang's model has evolved over time, gradually becoming more 
c(»pl0te as it Incorporates better data and zmdergoes additional scrutiny. 
The last work cited ie doubtless the most conplete to date and will be 
the aabjôôt of this but it will sôsâBtinss be necessary to znake 
references to the earlier research. 
Huang's division of the mortgage credit maztot is by type of loan 
instead of intermediaxy. This alternative is chosen because according 
to Huang (37, p. Iiii2) federal participation in the postwar mortgage 
market has been an ijçortaxit factor in shaping the mortg%e and housing 
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aaztot as a wbola so that for policy purposes it is desirable to see 
hov each type of mortgage activity takes place in response to changing 
money and capital market conditions* His model uses seasonally unad­
justed quarterly data for the period 1953* L through 1970:2* The analy­
tical mode is ordinary least squares* I&iang first estimates the total 
mortgage credit supplied*^ His equation eaq>lains about ninety-^hree 
percent of the variation in the dependent variable but the low D-w 
statistic indicates some minor problems* Huang included in this abro­
gate supply all variables which achieved significmce in the disaggre­
gated equations for the subsectors* This procedure results in four of 
his independent variables having a questionable significance level, 
Tis«, mortgage rate and short-term market rate lagged one quarter, long-
term corporate bond rates lagged two quarters, and the new purchases 
of fNMH* No doubt the problem associated with the interest rates can 
be traced to the ailtlcoUinearity of these terms* Even though the 
HOA variable is insignificant, it is interesting to note the apparent 
inverse relationship it has with total mortgage credit supplied* Comntt-
msnts are not included and are never discussed as a possible candidate 
for inclusion* It would be difficult to include commitments in an aggre­
gate equation because of the varied commitment structures of the supplying 
intermediaries* It is puzzling, however, bow commttments have been 
important in other research efforts, especially disaggregated s^qproaches, 
and yet not incorporated into Btang's analysis* The long lag associated 
with net increases in saving deposits at selected institutions is unique 
Vnis e<^ation and others formulated by Huang appear in Appssàix A 
along with an eaq^lanation of the variables* 
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to Huang's analysis and has not been duplicated elsewhere. Most would 
argue the lag stnicture is shorter and, ja fact, ftiang himself finds 
the unlagged version of this variable to be significant in explaining 
supply in his earlier vork (37). The unlagged version of the aonebazy 
base variable is somewhat suzprising in light of the fact that a lag is 
usually associated with the transmission of monetary policy to the 
capital and aortgags aarbsbs. This iaeasdiabe impact of monetaxy policy 
could be a reflection of advance commitments activity but its high level 
of significance all but rules out this possibility. It could be that the 
historical increase in the monetary base variable and the aggr^ate supply 
of mortgage credit has been more coincident than causal. Huang's justi­
fication for the unlagged version of the monetary base variable is based 
on an experimant lAere it proved superior to a one and two period lag. 
Huang has included only supply related variables in his aggr%ate supply 
equation and, in general, his findings parallel those of other researchers. 
aûssg saxv dLottggiii^atQo his model into three subsectors corre^nd-
ing to loan type. He contends the FHA. and VA subsectors of the market 
indicate a high d%ree of substitution and can be treated as one govern­
ment underwritten sector.^ The subsector equations contain essentially 
the same variables as the aggr%ate equation. The mortgage rates associ­
ated with the given type of loan is substituted for the general rate used 
in the overall SGqpply equation. The FNMA variable is excluded from the 
conventional mortgage equation because it was insignificant and diqxlayed 
^He justifies this combination on the basis of elasticity estimates 
which he derived. Huang (36, pp. 10-12) concurs with Brady that the two 
markets have moved in unison only sisoe the early 1960*8. 
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a negative sign* 
The govemnant underwritten sector explains sixty-five percent of 
the variation in the dependent variable* The D-W value of 0*8? indicates 
the existence of positive aerial correlation, or left out variables, or 
wrong functional form, or any oondbination of these in varying degrees* 
The problem becomes serious if the estimation equations are to be used 
for forecasting, and, realistically, aakss the results of the regressions 
less reliable since a basic assuzgxtion of the least squares technique 
has been violated* The three quarter lagged saving inflow coefficient 
is not significantly different frmm zero and could have been safely 
excluded from the equation* Its unijqoortance is probably rooted in the 
fact that intermediaries which make FHA and VA loans have some latitude 
in their portfolio choices; consequently, inflows go to those items 
which are most profitable and this may or may not be mortgages* The 
Importance of this variable in the aggregate and conventional equation 
m m  A  W  ^  1 O  •  e « «  *  I »  A  1  m  i w  J l ' t   m a  i  i *  •  warn wwv VMAW WAJAO OMO wwv vgagv v&'vua.w 
Ing intenaediaxy and they effectively have no portfolio diversity* It 
is interesting to note that the FHLBS advances achieved significance in 
the government underwritten equation whereas FNM did not* This is the 
exact opposite of what would be anticipated on a priori grounds because 
FNMA's activity is confined to FHA. and VA instruments whereas FHLBS 
advances go predomiaately to SLAs whidx make mostly conventional loans* 
This is a queer outcome which has not been duplicated by other researchers* 
The conventional sector supply equation explains ninety-four percent 
of the dependent variable's fluctuations* The interest rate terms fail 
to achieve a reasonable level of significance; this probably results 
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because the lack of portfolio diversity of SIAs make own and altemabiva 
yields TUioportanb* The one quarter lagged value of FHUBS advances is 
somewhat of a novelty because during most of the sample period the FHLBS 
has been characterized as a lender of first resort (7» pp* I60-I and $8, 
p. 70)* The lagged version of this variable has not been verified by 
other research and, on a theoretical levels its U8« Is questionable* 
No housing starts equations were included in Huang's most recent 
research because he feels mortgage credit flows stand as proxies for 
real variables, such as housing starts (36, p, h). In his 1969 model, 
the value of housing starts and the supply of mortgage credit was fore­
casted for 1966. These predicted values along with actual values and 
percent error are ^ *n in Tables 2.2 and 2.3 below. It is an injustice 
to take these earlier results as representative of Huang's efforts but 
he offered no forecasts from his latest work and the exact data to fit 
his variables were unavailable; thus, no independent predictions were 
possible from the latest eouatijons 
TABLE 2.2 
Huang's estimates of bousing starts values, 
actual values, and percent error 
(In millions of dollars) 
Quarter Actsal Estimated Psrcsat 
error 
1966:1 U799 h79k 2.02 
1966:2 5001 h69h 6.32 
1966:3 3926 W67 11.23 
1966:U 3795 3016 20.55 
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TABLE 2.3 
Haang's aotioates of the supply of mortgage credit j 
actual values» and percent error 
(In «1111 onm of dollars) 
Quarter Actual Estimated Percent 
error 
1966:1 3li88 3593 3.01 
1966:2 373U Wit 20.08 
1966:3 3386 1:930 hS.S9 
1966:U 32U9 W6 37.77 
Aian^s forecasts are soasabat less than desirable but 1966 witnessed 
a nasslTB dovntuzn in mortgage credit supply activity. Biang contributes 
his poor forecasts to structural changes in the mortgage market b%inniag 
in 1966. For whatever reason, the quality of the forecasts was low but 
should improve as the 1971 modifications of his model are included. 
The main criticism of Huang's research is his consistent tendency to 
discuss and draw conclusions from variables which failed the usual 
significance tests. It is hazardous to base poliqr decisions on vari­
ables whose partial regression coefficients are not significantly differ­
ent from zero. It almost seems he incozporates the variables he needs 
for policy irrespective of their statistical isqportance. 
Jaffee's Model 
Jaffee (Ul) estimates a structural model eaqalaining mortgage 
corndtaents and mortgage credit flows by the major financial institutions 
in the mortgage mutot. On the mortgage credit supply side of the model 
he estimates gross mortgage flows for SLAs, IGBs, and LICs and net change 
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In mortgage loans outstanding for CBs. Jaffee develops supply, demand, 
and interest rate equations in his model but since our concern is supply 
oriented, only the supply part of the model will be reviewedJaffee's 
model was developed as a component sector of a complete model of the 
economy; consequently, he was constrained to use data endogenous to the 
larger model whenever possible. Additionally, the model of the mortgage 
sector was prepared with particular concern for the lags in the affect 
of variables and the quantitative effects of the available policy instru­
ments. The sangle period employed for the estimation was the second 
half of the 19508 through 1968jU, Seasonally adjusted data were used 
except the interest rates were unadjusted. Ordinaiy least squares was 
used to formulate the equations and all equations di^laying serial 
correlation of the errors were adjusted to condensate for it. Jaffee 
did not bother to analyze or adjust for simultaneous equation bias by 
using higher level least squares because the more sophisticated tech­
nique did not yield better results for other researchers. The distrib­
uted lags estimated by Jaffee were derived using the Almon technique 
(U). The final estimation equations and sn Interpretation of the vari­
ables employed b7 Jaffee may be found in Appendix A. 
^The supply side of the model is more developed and disaggregated 
than is the demand side. The importance of the supply portion is exem­
plified by Jaffee since his model implicitly assumes the market is 
never in a situation of excess supply and demand adjusts to an essen­
tially predetermdned supply (Ul, pp. 1^2-3). 
p 
The coefficient of serial correlation, p, for those equations 
estimated with the iterative procedure of Cochrane and Orcutt appear, 
along with the sumnazy statistics, in Appendix A* 
2U 
Jaiffee's analysis starts with a modified stock adjustment approach, 
A variant of a stock adjustment model was needed to take into account 
the institutional arrangements for advance commitments of mortgage 
credit. The available data on advance commitments is used to estimate 
directly an equation for the supply of commitments. For SIAs, iCBe, 
and LICs, Jaffee derives the gross flows of mortgages as essentially 
realizations of commitments made earlier. For CBs, the absence of 
commitments data forces him to estimate the mortgage flow directly. 
Constants were added dn the gross mortgage flow equations, but not the 
net change equation for CBs, to allow for misspecification and data 
scaling in the estimated commitments equations. Generally gwaking, 
Jaffee ' s summary statistics are good and the model tracks the actual 
values of the endogenous variables quite well, Jaffee made no forecasts 
because his primary concern was simulation. By "shocking" the model, 
bis simulation approach allows an assessment of the impact of various 
policy instruments. 
Jaffee's use of the stock adjustment approach calls for the inclu­
sion of the lagged dependent variable as an independent variable in the 
regression equations. ]ji all equations the lagged endogenous variable 
was statistically significant and displayed the correct sign. The 
inclusion of this variable is an inherent weakness of the stock adjust­
ment approach because it makes current quarter estimates depend upon 
past quarter flows; thus, a type of extrapolation is being used and the 
model may perform poorly at turning points in the series. Jaffee's 
results are not substantially hobbled by this shortcoming because the 
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coefficients of the lagged dependent variable are quite small for a 
stock adjustment approach.^ 
Jaffee's model failed to track the actual dependent variable 
during I960 and he attributes this to a structural shift in the mortgage 
market probably related to the uncertainty of the effects of tight money 
on deposit flows following the unhappy experiences of 1966, No attenqpt 
was made to judge the source or Importance of this effect bit instead 
it was neutralized by adding a dumny variable for 1968. The one unique 
and innovative feature of Jaffee*s research is his use of coaadtments 
data to estimate mortgage flows. Many researchers have ignored this 
variable because of data difficulties, collinearity problems, added 
coiqplexity of the model, etc*, but Jaffee shows that conmitments are 
important and their inclusion leads to better estimations. The Simla-
tion nature of Jaffee's model may have led to added complications of the 
comdtments variable because be was constrained from eliminating recent 
commitments from his equations. It seeras prudent to aesiune that for 
LICs the immediate past consnitments do not influence current quarter 
mortgage credit flows because this interaediary rars3y uses shcrt=tsrs 
conaitments; however, Jaffee found that recent commitments of LICs were 
2 the most important. On the other hand, be contends that mortgage credit 
flows of SIAs are influenced by coanLtnents made up to six quarters past. 
^The possible exception occurs with the aost important credit 
supplying intemediazy, SIAs, «here the coefficient is approximately 
0.30. 
partially refutes his own finding by showing that the mean 
length of Lie comdtments is 2.7 quarters. Another source (27, p. 2) 
Indicates that this may be an underestiasate of the mean len^h. 
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In view of tbe yery ehort-term nature of SLA. coimaltmBntSj this result 
appears a bit farfetched* Li fact, Jaffee*s cum equation has the six 
quarter lagged value of commitments inversely influencing current quarter 
flows. A very curious result lAlch has little Intuitive appeal. The 
ICB equation also «ppears to stress current and immediate past conmit-
oents too heavily* ^ toto, Jaffee should be commended for his iaclu-
sLon of commitasxxts even though he seoas to become over zealous in 
estimating the lag structure. 
All the usually included financial variables cqppear in the SLA 
supply equation with the exc^ion of credit terms. This absence is 
probably overcome by the distributed lag structure of outstanding commit­
ments which reaches back six quarters. There Is no explicit mention of 
a variable to measure aggregate monetazy poliqr. This lack is doubtless 
rectified partially hy the commitments variable and also by including 
a unique deposits variable which measured the deposit inflow variation 
from a four quarter moving average. This deposits deviation variable 
is indigenous to all the equations except the one associated with CBs* 
The FKLBS advances variable was sot highly significant but it was never­
theless included since it is one of the policy instruments which Jaffee 
seeks to analyze* 
The ecpation for LICs and >6Bs are analogous to the one for SLAs 
as far as variables are concerned* The repaymmte vmriable In tbe LIC 
equation was not statistically significant but to keep the equation 
fiiynnetrical, it was retained as an independent variable. The coefficient 
attached to repayments in the equation was constrained to be 0*U on 
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the grounds that it implied a reasonable coefficient for repayments 
in the I6B commitments equation and that this magnitude was t^pprozi-
•atelj the mean of the estimated repayments coefficients for LICs and 
SIAs*^ This ad hoc «^proach is qaestionable and could raise difficulties 
if the ec^otion is used to estimate flows outside the sample period* 
The activity of FNMH-GNMA. is not included in the inteimediaxy equations 
but instead enters the model as a separate entity. The rates on sub­
stitute portfolio items enter the mortgage flow equations indirectly 
"Via the commitments equations. 
The CB equation is relatively sixple since it includes only 
deposits and the lagged dependent variable on the right hand of the 
regression equation. Time d^sLts are entered once as a distributed 
lag by themselves and again as a distributed lag but scaled by the 
interest rate difference of mortgages and the commercial loan rate. 
Demand deposits have a vexy small partial regression coefficient %Aich 
is not significantly different from 2«r-G| aa^^halsss, for cosplsts-
ne88 it was incorporated into the equation# It is interesting to observe 
that tiss deposits reach their apesc of iiçostasoe after a one or two 
period lag which indicates that CBs may practice a wait and see attitude 
toward .mortgage credit supply activity. The CB equation mi^ be 
improved if an index of monetazy movement were included, especially 
since no connitaBnts variable a|^)ears in the estimation equation. 
^The primazy reason for fiadng this coefficient was the substandard 
results obtained from the initial regressions. 
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As previoaely mentioned, Jaffee aade no forecast a of the dependeot 
variable8 or of boasLng staxta bat instead concentrated on simlated 
Aocks to judge the efficient of policy variables.^ Even though these 
are of adaor concern to this research, we feel compelled to cornent that 
Jaffee carried his sioalotions farther into the future than could be 
justified. For example, in many instances he «as commenting on the 
influence of a diock that had occurred some thirty-two quarters previ­
ously* This seems particularily Irrelevant since his model is prinarUy 
A@rt-run and probably not capable of handling such long-run changes. 
Basically, Jaffee*s supply estimation equations are vezy good and could 
probably be used to make reasonably accurate forecasts of Aort-run 
future activity in mortgage credit flows. The model of the mortgage 
market developed Iqr Jaffee differs ssst notably from other studies in 
its emphasis on the effects of poliqr controlled variables and the lags 
in timing introduced by advance commitments for mortgages* 
Silber's Model 
Silber ($9) attempts to apecifjr and estimate an econometric model 
describing the behavior of the participants in the mortgage credit 
market. The model is divided into supply and demand forces. Our primazy 
concern is with the mortgage credit scQjply part of the model which 
analyzes the four major financial institutions participating in the 
^This occurs because Jaffee's mortgage credit model is a subset 
of a larger model of the entire economy. %is larger model, by using 
Jaffee's results, is designed to make forecasts of credit flows as 
well as actual housing starts* 
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mortgage market* Ibis model doee not attanpt to eeparate mortgages ty 
type of financing but instead conecntrates on the sapplying intermediary, 
Silber uees eeaeonaUy unadjaated, qaarterly data to analyse the period 
1953:1 through 1965tU and then forecasts the 1966x1 aggregate mortgage 
credit outstanding by intermediaiy. He ie interested in total mortgage 
loans out standing and not thi» flow of new fonds into the mortgage market. 
The model includes mostly finaacial variables; consequently* it 
can be dabbed a short-term model, A stock adjustment mechanism is employed 
and all structural equations include the lagged valne of the endogenous 
-variable* Silber specified the estimation equations using ordinaiy 
and two-stage least squares analysis and he adjusted for serial correla­
tion «hen it was a serious problem.^ The summary measures of the equa­
tions appear to be vezy good but this is probably attributable to the 
2 
stock adjustment structure of the model* Silber analyses each inter­
mediary in turn and then aggregates tham into one mortgage credit supply­
ing entity* It seems appropriate to review his analysis by considering 
3 
each intermediazy separately* 
^The final equation for ISBs was estimated by ordinary least 
squares lAweas the final equations of the other three intermediaries 
were derived by two-stage least squares* 
large importance attached to the lagged dependent variable, 
which determines the adjustment coefficient in a stock adjustment type 
model, leads to future predicted values which are linear extrapolations 
of past movements; thus, the models fails lAen it is most needed, 
namely, at turning points in the series* 
"5 Silber aleo estimated a mortgage credit demand equation for the 
hous^ld sector of the economy but this portion of the model is excluded 
from this review because of the supply determined nature of the research 
to be formulated in this exposition* 
30 
S liber found that the retain on other portfolio items, aostly 
government secarlties, did not influence SM credit eupply behavior* 
He diose to use the rate on advances rather than the volume and did 
find it significant, albeit at a low level. Deposits and lagged credit 
outstanding were significant and properly signed. %e difficulty with 
the SLA equation is not what was inclnded but rather Wiat was «zeladed. 
Consfd-ciously sLssixig are credit term variables associated with mortgages, 
i.e., interest rate, loan-to-vmlne ratio, and amortization length. 
Silber contends these are unimportant becaase SIAs have no portfolio 
divers!^ and thcgr mast invest in mortgages or not at all. Ibis may­
be relevant in the long-run but in a short-term model such as this, 
credit terms dwold be i^pozta^st. Also absent from the SLA equation 
are cooBttments and repajments; these may be rationalised avagr in a 
"levels" concerned stock adjustment model but thej are doubtless ijqpoxv 
tant in explaining movements in a "change" type model. In sommazy, 
Silber's SLA equation is determined by three real variables, one of 
which has a questionable signifioance and another which is the lagged 
dependent variable." 
In the Lie equation, mortgage repayments are explicitly exclnded 
hot are. no dmbfe. iaplicitly Saeieded in the total agmat# vmPimble. 
Silber claims the signs of the interest rate difference variables indi­
cate mortgages and cozporates are substitutes lAereas mortgages and 
^Silber adjusts for serial correlation among the residuals because 
the statistic indicated its presence; however, the D-W statistic 
maqr be unreliable when the estimation equation contains the lagged 
dependent variable, see ($3, p. 23S). 
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governaeata ar* eoaplnmits* The aet coefficient of the differential 
terme is poaLtive and iadieatee the coefficient of the oortgage rate* 
Loan-^o-ralae ratio is incladed but Silber exeSaded aaortisation length 
on the gronads it is highly colUnear with the former* He had a two 
quarter lag of mortgage commitmrnate which iqppeare dxort on a priori 
grounds as well as on evidence of other eiipirical studies* Even though 
Silber's equation tracks during the period, it is nicely to 
perform awkwardly as a foreoastixig tool because of the large coefficient 
associated with the lagged dependmot variable* On the basis of the 
t-statistiCj only three of the seven independent variables in the LIC 
equation are highly significant* The rate differentials and the loan-
to-value ratio are probably coUinear which accounts for their low 
significance but it is parlous to base intexpretatione on a variable 
whose significance is questionable. 
]h the MSB equation, there is no explicit mention of fozward 
commitments, repayments, or noninterest credit terms. This equation 
has the same weaknesses as the previous two even though it tracks rather 
well. Silber does not atteapt to inclade FNKà-dnîà activity into this 
equation because he treats govenamsnt intervention, along with other 
nonintermediazy supply, as a resickial* 
The CB equation reported by Silber is surprisingly simple for 
such complicated financial institutions* The equation has only three 
exogenously determined variables, and the two deposit variables are 
likely coUinear* Mssing from the CS equation are credit term variables, 
rates on alternative portfolio items, and mcmetazy variables* Curiously 
enough, the coefficient associated with tiaa d^aits is roughly twice 
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that of demand deposits; this* as we dxall later see, is @ppro%imabe]y 
the same result obtained from an entirely different «çproacb. 
The basic criticism of Silber's approach is the stock adjustment 
nature of his model. His summary measures of goodness of fit are 
excellent but these no doubt arise because most of his explanatory 
power lies in the lagged dependent variable# There is a «uprising 
lack of lagged independent variables. It seems that most decisions of 
financial intermediaries are baaed on current quarter magnitudes. This 
carious outcome conforms neither to observed practices nor to the results 
of other studies. 
To assess Silber's success, let us analyse his forecasted results. 
He attempted a forecast for 1966:1. The actual and predicted values for 
this quarter are shown in Table 2 J;. A cursory examination of this Table 
TABLE 2.U 
Silber-â astlaatas of the total aorteaga credit 
outstanding, actual values and percent error 
(In billions of dollars) 
Actual 112.00 U5.36 50.20 61.26 
Estimated 112.23 U5.8U 50.S8 61.60 
Percent error 0.2 1.06 0.76 0.55 
might lead one to believe Silber's model is near perfect because of the 
small differences in actual and predicted values. However, if we take 
the change in the variables during 1966:1 and coa^are them with the 
difference in the actual and predicted values for 1966:1, a different 
33 
picture emergee. Table 2*5 Aows thla coqparlaon* It «gxpeare that 
Sllber*8 estimates are good only because he is wozidng with large mnbers 
and if we consider his forecasts in terms of net changes in mortgage 
credit flows, the model performs rather poorly*^ 
TABLE 2.5 
Net change varsus the aotaal-estimated 
error for 1^66:1 
(In millions of dollars) 
*1 
Net change daring 1966*1 1678 769 Ii35 112k 
Difference in estimated and 
actual from Table 2.U 
230 L80 380 3W 
Percent error 13.7 62.5 87 «U 30.2 
The Important variable in predicting short-term housing starts 
from the st^ply of mortgage credit is the amount of new fùnds flowing 
into the housing sector. Silber's model will yield this variable if 
me take the predicted value of and subtract from it Table 2.5 
Aows that sach a derivation is likely to yield poor results; therefore, 
the model is not acceptable for predicting short-run changes in mortgage 
credit outstanding and assessing the volume of new housing starts. 
Silber's model, however, predicts rather well what it is designed 
^The estimates of Tables 2.U and 2.5 are greater than the actual 
values for all financial intermediaries. Tils is no doubt a Amotion 
of the stock adjustment form of Sllber's model because the large weight 
assigned to the lagged dependent variable had a tendenpy to propel the 
estimates along the past trend when in fact housing activity started a 
decline at this tiss. 
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to predict, 1.*,, oatfbandiag credit* The point is, how could the model 
miss since he is forecasting a vexy mall change in an exceedingly large 
mariber? Eq>eeiall7 since his forecasting equations use the last large 
noaber in the series as the prims independent variable* Ootside of the 
stock adjustment approach, Silber, like Ifciang, has erred hy including 
ind^iendent -variables whose coefficients are not significantly different 
from zero at a reasonable lewl of confidence* Forthenure, this error 
has been compounded since Silber treats the questionable variables as 
if they are very important from a policy standpoint* This pitfall, when 
combined with the stock adjustment s^proach, leaves Silber's analysis 
less than optimal. 
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CHAPTER ni. 
THE SHORT.RW DETERMINANB OF ICRTOAGE CREDIT 
SUPPLIED BY SAVINQS AMD XiQAN DISSOCIATIONS 
The honaing sector of the eeano^jr is Ineoctricably bound np with 
the financial sector because ox the long^enm financing reqaireasnts 
of oost home buyers. In this ch^er, one of the financial intermedi­
aries supplying mortgage credit to the residential mortgage maztot is 
considered^ tLs*, savings and loan associations (SlAs)« If the mort­
gage credit supplied by SIAs can be estimated* it Aould be possible 
to assess the role these intermediaries play in overall residential 
construction activity. Furthermore, SIAs siqiply the bulk of conventional 
mortgage credit;^ thus, an estimate of their activity should serve as 
a proxy for the convœtionally financed sector of the mortgage market. 
The purpose of this section of the paper is to develop an equation 
whose variables eiplain the morbgage credit supply behavior of SL&s. 
In formolating the mortgage credit supply equation, variables thought 
to be relevant on a priori grounds will be postulated and then accepted 
^At year-end 1971 > fifty-one percent of all the home loans in the 
private sector were held by SIAs; eighty-one percent of all the home 
loans fbr one-to-four-family xmits was attributable to SIAs* Throughout 
tbe i960*s about ninety-six percent of tbe loans made by SIAs were 
conventional but the FHA.-7A component has been increasing recently 
and by year-end 1971, conventional loans accounted for eighty-six 
percent of tbe portfolio (57). 
or rejected on the basis of ordinary least squares analysis*^ No attempt 
has been made to analyse the portfolio mixture, or the balance sheet 
constraints of the financial intermediaries.^ The objective here is to 
estimate the amount of funds flowing into the residential mortgage 
credit market. Implicitly, we are assuming the individual portfolio 
is rationally balanced and institutional, legal, and risk constraints 
of the industry are taken into account when portfolio adjustment occurs. 
Supply Variables 
In what follows, supply is construed to be the volume of mortgage 
credit offered to the residential housing sector of the economy in a 
given time period. For the lack of a better measure, the change in 
total nonfarm mortgage loans outstanding of all insured SLA.s is taken 
as the measure of net new funds supplied by SL&s during the period. 
The change in total nonfarm mortgage loans outstanding, the dependent 
variable to be estimated in this analysis, is a nst change variable and 
was used because the gross change value was not readily obtainable. 
This form of the dependent variable dictates that the independent vari­
ables should also be in a net change form; there is doubtless some 
question about whether or not this has been achieved. Due to data 
scarcity and sheer nonavailability, some variables are not true net 
change values» For exasçle, conanitments refer to all new mortgages 
^ Insured SLA.s were used because the data are more accessible and 
reliable than it is for all operating SMs. In 1971, seventy-seven 
percent of all associations were insured hy the FSLIC but this group 
held ninety-seven percent of all the assets of the industry (57i p# $8). 
^For an analysis of portfolio behavior, see (62, 65). 
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made and ttaas have some attrltutea of a gross change variable. This 
problem 8ij^)l7 could not be avoided and it is recognised as a short­
coming of this analysis; nevertheless, the weakness should not Jeopardise 
the overall results* 
It would eqppear the volume of mortgage backed loans SlAs are willing 
to make diould depend upon the expected inflow of Amds, prior coandtments, 
an index of expected mortgage market conditions, and the expected profit­
ability of the loans.^ Naturally, other mjjior forces are at woric infla-
encing SlA eapply behavior but these four broad cat%ories should explain 
sqpply reasonably well. Admittedly, the siacdtaneity of the variables 
can present problems but their individual interaction 8iiq>ly cannot be 
2 
evaluated in a generalized study such as this one. To analyze the 
particular ramifications of each variable would carry us far afield, 
adding more confusion than clarity. A suggested area for future research 
is the detailed analysis of the compomants of the above categories, 
including their interaction and a postulation of causal orderings.^ 
%e following analysis assumes that mortgage credit lending inter­
mediaries a^ not constrained by an insufficient demand for mortgage 
credit, i.e., the mortgage market will absozb all available funds supplied 
without substantially disrupting the market. For a documentation of the 
existence of excess demand for mortgage credit during the saaple period, 
see (61, pp. 18-20). 
exsmple of simultaneously detexvined variables would be conmit-
meots and e3q)ected mortgage market conditions. No doubt the latter 
influences the former, but measurement is hazardous. 
^0 conplete and detailed study of the variaU.es determining 
mortgage credit mçplied by SLAs has, to the author's knowledge, been 
undertaken as a fully integrated exposition. The closest substitute 
for such an esqposltion is the Friend Study (29). Substantial work 
in this area has been undertaken by varions researchers. 
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For the paxpose of this stn^, it will be assoaed that the sinaltaneity 
problem is of second order magnitude, not seriously biasing the reailts* 
Inflow of funds 
Inflow of fonds come primarily from additions to saving deposits 
(share accounts), outstanding mortgage loan repayments (scheduled 
iixberest and principal payments as well as unscheduled principal payments), 
and advances from the Federal Hons Loan Bank System* Additionally, 
selling presently held mortgages in the secondary mortgage market is a 
source of funds# lu the tise interval spannsd this 8tu(%r* the Fédéral 
National Msrtgage Association and the Government National Mortgage 
Association^ have been the major participants in the secondary mortgage 
maztot* Fancy May and Qinny May deal almost exclusively in the FH&-
insored and VA-gnaranteed mortgages; therefore, an active secondary 
market existed only for federally undexwritten mortgages during the 
2 
period of this gt%Hye In view of the relatively limited volume of 
FHA and VA mortgages held hy SLA's, it would be surprising if secondary 
market activity has a significant ijq)act on the mortgage credit supply 
behavior of SIAs*^ If the secondary mortgage market affects the mortgage 
^ I&xnm in financial circles as Fanny May and (tinny May, respectively* 
^Fanny May dealt in conventionals for the first time in March 1972. 
The newly created Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation is designed 
to establiA a secondary market for conventionals tat, it too, acted 
for the first time in March, 1972 (16, 1(0). 
^Some of the studies undertaken in the past (e.g., 8, 36, 59) have 
failed to find Fanny May-Ginny May secondary market activity significant 
in e:qplainlng movements in the conventional mortgage market. 
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credit supplied by SMs, we would expect an inverse relationship, i.e., 
the regression coefficient will have a negative signe A quid pro quo 
results when SIAs participate in the secondary market, viz., mortgages 
are traded for liquid assets, and it seems unreasonable to think that 
all, or more than all, of the funds obtained from the secondary market 
transactions would be channeled into new mortgages. However, unless 
all the funds obtained from the secondary market are reinvested in new 
mortgages, an inverse relationship between the change in outstanding 
mortgages and secondary market activity will prevail. 
Intuitively, it is expected that all other inflow of funds mentioned 
previously will have a positive influence upon the mortgage credit 
supplied SIAs» The unscheduled prepayment of mortgages should be 
influenced to some degree by the general monetaiy conditions of the 
economy. For example, if mortgage rates are low and credit availability 
ea^, prepayments can be expected to rise because some homeowners may 
capitalize on the opportunity to refinance their houses at a lower interest-
rate. Furthermore, some individuals will use these favorable financing 
terms to change residences. In general, however, expected mortgage 
repayments should be relatively stable as well as having a preponderant 
and positive influence upon the credit supply activity of SLAs. 
Historically, saving inflows have been volatile and the least 
predictable of the above. It is reasonable to surmise that SLA managers 
will base their estimates of future saving inflows upon the trend of 
the recent past; consequently, a lagged saving inflow variable is hypoth­
esized to have the most influence. In fact, some of the studies reviewed 
have documented the importance of lagged saving inflows. 
ho 
The FHLBS advances are usually available to associations in need 
and serve to buttress mortgage lending activity. Advances could be 
segregated as to maturity but to do so seems unnecessary since all 
maturities should positively influence mortgage credit supplied and the 
maturity structure did not change appreciably during the time interval 
being considered. Of the inflow variables, advances should have the 
least influence on mortgage credit supplied because their predominant 
role is to provide liquidity and facilitate other short-term adjust­
ments. If the present trend of longer tenu advances continue, their 
importance vis-à-vis mortgage credit supplied could be enhanced; however, 
advances have been treated as homogenous here on the assunption their 
maturity structure will remain materially unaltered in the immediate 
future. 
Commitments 
The second general derfcerminant of mortgage credit supplied by 
SLA.S is the volume of advance commitments made these institutions. 
Loan commitments made by SIAs are not binding upon the potential mort­
gagor but are, as a matter of policy, upon the association. The sequel 
of this phenomenon is that once commitmaits are made, SIAs will honor 
them at some future date; therefore, past commitments must influence 
future mortgage credit supplied. Naturally, the proportion of commit­
ments taken down depends upon the mortgagors and their expectations 
regarding future mortgage market developments. For exanple, if easy 
mortgage credit is expected, the potential borrowers may not utilize 
the commitments but instead opt for lower rates and/or other favorable 
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terms at inker- or intraindastry competitors. Generally, it could be 
argued that the expected trend of the inortgage credit market is reflected 
in the present conraitment take-dow ratio. If comitment take-down is 
relatively high, this is indicstivs of an expected tight mortgage market 
and rising interest rates whereas a low take-down ratio iaçlies the 
antithesis. 
One might argue that advance contcLtanats should not be used as an 
e3q)lanabox7 variable in an equation containing interest rates and other 
supply variables because these are the factors determining advance commit­
ments. Suôh an argument, however, doubtless overstates the case since 
advance commitments are made basically to coordinate the future inflow 
of funds, "Az.; savings deposits and reps^ynsnts, with future outflow 
of funds to facilitate the mortgage portfolio maintenance. This inflow-
outflow coordination management via advance commit ment s is relatively 
independent of supply variables; therefore, it can be cogently argued 
that the sissiltaneity isçîied above is not as serious as might initial]^ 
be thought (12, p. 277). 
Some argoB that advance commitments by SIAs simply set a floor 
for the volume of mortgage credit supplied. This argument usually runs 
as follows: the majority of SLA mortgage loans are uncomiited, i#e., 
over-the-counter, and consequently highly susceptible to r£^>id adjust­
ment. When associations over or under commit due to unrealized e:q)ec-
tations, the error is rectified by altering the volume of over-the-
counter loans. The hypothesized floor materializes since over«^he-
counter loans can never be less than zero; therefore, when SIAs seriously 
over commit and outstanding commitments exceed the level of total desired 
U2 
loans, the connitaBnts nasfc be honored. This canses the associations 
to make more loans than actually desired and the floor mentioned above 
becomes operational* 
Granted j this floor phenomenon may be a real possibility hut when 
would advance commitments greatly exceed desired loans SIAs vish to 
make? Indubitably, only in uncommon times euch as the credit crunch 
of 1966* Even in dire times, the floor may be short-lived because 
advance corndtments by SLAs are mostly for the immediate Axture and 
adjustment to over consitments should occur rapidly* On the basis of 
the maturity structure of advance comdLtments of SIAs, equilibrium 
between actual and desired loans Aould be established in one quarter (2U)» 
In general, advance comitments have not been seriously considered 
by most researchers^ due to one or both of the reasons cited above. 
It is contended here that conedtmsnts are important and nist be included 
as an e3q>lanator7 variable in the SIA residential mortgage credit supply 
squat ion. Tt is Isft to ths regression results to fsL» 1 the evidssicsw 
A priori it is anticipated that commitments will have a positive infln-
esce upon the supply of mortgage credit but the relationship ëiould be 
each that comitments made at time period t will affect mortgage credit 
supplied at t->n* 
Expected mortgage market conditions 
The third major determinant of mortgage credit supplied by SIAs, 
e3q>ected mortgage market conditions, is not directly observable. Since 
the housing qycle (and consequently the mortgage credit ^ le) moves 
Vor exceptions, see (W, US). 
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connterqrc]ical]y to the general business cycle, an indicator of business 
conditions Aould serve as a proxy for eoq)ected mortgage market conditions. 
Interest rates, excess reserves, the size of the money stock, or some 
index based on these bas ordinarily been used in housing stadies* Interest 
rate indices have especially been incoxporated because the general 
consensus among bousing researchers seems to be that interest rates 
are the prise movers due to the long-ten nature of mortgages* Both 
the Heltzer index, ^ which is based on excess reserves and interest rates, 
and the Saint Louis Fed monetaxy base, a measure of the money stock 
magnitude, will be tried in the regression analysis. 
H the Heltzer index of nanetazy stringency is used, one might 
eaqpect a positive r%res8ion coefficient. This follows if as monetaiy 
conditions become tight, the Ifsltzer index rises due to increasing inter­
est rates and/or falling free reserves. The rising interest rates 
should indicate a more profitable mortgage loan; thus, a positive 
relationship bètirawn the Haltzer isdsx and sortgsgc credit ssppHsd^ 
On the other hand, if net free reserve are allowed to rise, ceteris 
paribus, this is indicative of excess ligzidity and should imply a greater 
willingness to supply additional funds to the mortgage market. Note, 
however^ lAen net free reserves increase the index decreases; therefore, 
a negative relationdiip between supply and the index is possible, albeit, 
somewhat remote. There are some researchers, especially monetarists, 
who would argue interest rates do not measure monetary movements and 
consequently should not be used to indicate ease or stringent* This 
^See Appendix B. 
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question, however, is not an issue in the present exposition* 
If the change in the Saint Louis Fed monetary base index is 
utilized, the sign of the coefficient is also difficult to predict* 
This arises becanse of the variability in the lag and affect of monetary 
policy* StqpposedSy, an increase in the rate of change of the monetary 
base measure is indicative of easier monetaxy conditions and easing 
credit conditions. Easier credit for the borrower iiçlies less profit­
ability, ceteris paribus, for the lender; therefore, as the monetary 
conditions ease a la the nonetazy base index, SlAs may be more reluctant 
to make mortgage backed loans* Unfortunately, the complicated lag and 
the variable affect associated with monetary base movements makes it 
virtually impossible to anticipate accurately the sign of the coeffi­
cient of the monetazy base variable even though it seems plausible to do 
so on an a priori level. The only definitive statement which can be 
made about the two monetary indices outlined above is that their signs 
should be opposite or substantially different in magnitude when they are 
separately entered in the otherwise same regression ecpation. 
The sign of a monetary variable is vezy much dependent upon the 
state of ezpectations.^ For example, if interest rates are rising 
(falling) but SLA. managers expect the present trend to continue, they 
may be less (more) willing to make mortgage loans now in hopes of obtain­
ing a higher rate (now) in the near fttbure* It is parlous to say much 
about the expected signs of the monetary coefficients, especiaUy in 
^The exC,emt to which expectations are unrealized determines the 
significance of this variable; the closer e^^eeted are to actual condi­
tions, the higher ràould be the significance, ceteris paribus* 
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the abort-run, becsnse of the myriad force# operating eoncorrently* 
These opposing forces may fonction such that the monetazy measures, 
the prosy for general mortgage market conditions, are insignificant* 
Again #e leave the outcome to the regressions. 
Loan profitability 
The fourth broad detexsinant of SLA lending b^avior is the ex­
pected profitability of the loading* In general, there are three fbrces 
operating siaaltaneously to determine profitability: (1 ) interest 
rates, (2) loen-to-valae ratio, iee«, a aeasore of the loan donnpaymsnt, 
and (3) the length of amortization of the mortgage* The loan-to-vaHxie 
ratio, length of amortisation, and the interest rate have a fixed 
relationship with one another and consequently are highly colli near* 
For example, lAen mortgage credit is relatively tight. Interest rates 
are usually above normal, loan-to-value ratios are below normal, and 
the length of mortgages relatively Aort* As the mortgage credit market 
eases the interest rate usually falls, loan-to*value ratio rises, and 
amortisation length increases* The fixed nature of the colllnearity 
of these variables precludes their separate entry into a regression 
equation iSh» pp# 1^6-52)• One method, albeit incorrect, used to cir­
cumvent this colUnearity problem bas bêêâ to coôôôë gûô variable, 
usually the interest rate, to reflect the movement of all of the credit 
term variables* This «^^xroacb ijqùicitly assumes the interrelatlonsbips 
between the set of coUinear variables is ea^ieeted to remain unchanged 
over time. This is, of course, a heroic assumption given the dynamic 
nature of the mortgage credit market and the associated institutions* 
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Ât least orne reeeareber atteqpted a coafx>8ite credit term index^ bat this 
method was critiqued and found in error by Brady# To capture adequately 
all the credit terme a coqposite index is abeolately neceeeaiy. To that 
problem we now tun* 
A composite credit term vas oonétructed by dividing the product 
of the loan^to-value ratio and the length of the mortgage amortisation 
into the effective rate on mortgages*^ This cwposite credit ten can 
also be criticised for reasons to the one Brady offered in cri­
tiquing Lee* lîf however, we realise that extreme vaines for the three 
separate parts of the co^Msite index simply do not materialise in 
reality, the index outlined above can be operational, la essence, Ire 
are sacrificing theoretical el%anee for operstionallsm. As long as 
the individual credit terms are not excessively diverse from their usual 
parameters, it seems a trade off between terms is realistic. 
What ^ould be the esqpected sign of this credit term's coefficient? 
To âoè this, ifê eapress toe crodii taxa as Equation 3.1 and then analyze 
a change in each conponent part while the other two remain unchanged. 
As the sort gage rate rises, cstes^s ^ sr^^Rs, the coLçositd credLt tessu, 
CT°, will also rise. Because of profitability, SLAs should want to make 
^Lee (ho) used the product of the contract interest rate and the 
length of the anorbization. He treated the loan-to-valne ratio separately. 
Basically, Brady's criticism was that by Lee's composite index 
a borrower would be indifferent between say an interest rate of ten 
percent on a twenty year mortgage and a rate of fifty percent on a four 
year mortgage. %is, Brady contends^ is patently absurd. 
^All three individual credit terms were computed by taking the 
conventional, FHA, and VA values for each and weighting them according 
to their importance in the SLA industry portfolio. 
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more mortgage loans; conaequeobly, the relationship between mortgage 
credit sappUed and the composite credit tern is positive when on]y 
the interest rate is allowed to vary. As the loan-to-valae ratio de­
creases, SIAs flboold desire to make more mortgage loans because their 
foreclosure ride has decreased* As the loanJto-valae ratio decreases, 
CT° increases; again we see a positive relationship between the coi^site 
credit term and the mortgage credit supplied by SLAs* By analogous 
reasoning we observe the same positive relationsAiip when the amorti­
zation length is varied. Thus, it is concluded that the relationship 
between the composite credit term and mortgage credit sculled by SIAs 
should be positive because of the above outlined relationship of the 
individual credit terms. 
It is putative the absolute level of the composite credit term 
%iH be rsléïtiTs^y vnispcrtsnt in 1 Tîf 1» ssrtgsgs crsuit supplisd 
because SIAs are siagls-iinnt, single-output concerns.^ When the inflow 
of funds is positive, they must invest Ia mortgages or add to their 
liquidity; thus, the absolute level of the coq)ositd credit term should 
be basically ianaterial because of the dearth of good mortgage substitutes 
in their portfolios* A better indicator of possible loan profitability 
is probably the change in the coifwsite crédit term. For exanple, if the 
absolute level of the composite term is presently high but eomected to 
^ SIAs are severely limited in their portfolio mixes and can l%al]y 
invest only in governments and mortgages* Mortgages and saving deposits 
are their principal assets and liabilities, respectively* For a summary 
balance sheet of the industry, refer to (57, pp* 93-8). 
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increase further, mortgage credit supplied may be partially curtailed 
for a Aort time in anticipation of even better lending conditions* 
In the meantime, inflow of funds may be added to liquidity reserves or 
eoployed to reduce outstanding debt, e«g., repay advances* Once more, 
esqpectations play a paramount role in the mortgage credit lending process* 
SlAs are constantly faced with the dilema of borrowing abort and 
lending long since their primary liability is short-term and their prin­
cipal asset is long-texn; thus, association managers probably desire to 
place long-teim funds at the most favorable credit tenas* On the basis 
of the forgoing, it is hypothesized that relative credit terms are all 
important and first-differences in the absolute level of the composite 
credit tezn depicts relative levels, furthermore, present decisions will 
likely be partially founded on previous period movements; hence, it seems 
prudent to suxicLse that changes in the composite tezn should be impor­
tant when lagged. 
Further considerations 
The secular trend of mortgage credit outstanding by SIAs has been 
upward. The genesis of this trend is the absolute growth rate of the 
industzy* Since the change in total nonfarm mortgage loans outstanding 
is the dependent variable, and no general secular trend is observed in 
this data, there is no need for a time trend adjustment of the raw data*^ 
The Toward trend in the latter part of the period is probably reflected 
in other variables such as saving inflows, and commitments. The seasonal 
^ There is no noticeable trend in the dependent variable until 
1970:3, then it moves upward rather r^idly* 
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variation in the variables discussed above is sabstantial as can be 
ascertained by observing the raw data or bgr analysing the seasonality 
of the residesbial housing constzvction çycle# The seasonal fluctua­
tions are normal occurrences and mast be accounted for in the regression 
analysis to prevent a aLsqpecifieation of the supply equation* To 
account for cyclical variations in the raw data, quarterly seasonal 
dumy variables will be added to the estimation equation. The dumiy 
variable for the fourth quarter is not explicitly included but is 
measured as -(S.^ + Sg + S^). 
The preceding analysis can be summarized as: 
3.2 - »(, • «1»°^  * 
* ayPGP + ag&i + a^Sg + ®io^3 * 
An explanation of each variable in Equation 3«2 may be found in Appendix 
B "Kith the sxssptisn of MM above %hlch is a ssaaars of monetary sferin-
gency. The subscripts on the variables denote time periods. No doubt 
some of the nonlagged variables included in the generic form of Equation 
3.2 will have to be lagged to achieve significance. The coefficients 
of the independent variables are eoqiected to have the following signs: 
a^>Oj a2>0; a^>0; a|^>0; a^lOj a^>0; a^<0; ag#0; a^|0; 
The coefficient a^ is indeterminate because the Nsltzer index and the 
monetazy base variable may have opposite signs. The coefficients of the 
seasonal duany variables, ag through a^Q, may take on either positive 
or negative values. 
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âipirical Raaalts 
Equation 3*2 vas estimated using ordinary least squares and 
seasonally unadjusted data. The estimation equation performing best 
_2 
with respect to R , the Ihrbin-Watson statistic > and standard error 
of regression wast 
3.3 - 3728 + .590+. + .55(f i + .89R? + .28A. + 1278i|ACPÎ , 
(3.61) (1.36) (3.25) (2.82) (2.37) (2.W) 
- 390S, + 15.IS2 - 272S3 + 277MIt_i 
(2,12) (0,11) (2.62) (U.57) 
- .977 
D-W - 1.7k 
SEE - 271.0 
The subscripts denote time and the t-statistie are in parenthesis below 
the coefficients. All the data variables included in the estimation 
Equation 3*3 have the hypothesized sign and are significant, based on 
a two tail t-test,^ at the five percent level. %e Dnrbin-Watson sta­
tistic does not indicate the presence of serial correlation among the 
residuals. The coefficient of multiple determination, adjusted for 
degrees of freedom, is .977 which is by many researchers' standards 
embarrassingly high. The standard error of the regression estimate, SEE, 
io $271 înillioû mîich iô roughlj ten percent cf the arsrsge %]=e of the 
dependent variable and well within the realm of expectations. The only 
variable hypothesized in Equation 3.2 which failed to be significant in 
Equation 3.3 was secondary mortgage market purchases by Fanny May and 
^ La the remainder of the paper, all significance references are 
based on the t-statistic and a two^ail test unless stated otherwise. 
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Ginqy May; the insignificance of this variable was not unanticipated. 
Ik seems appropriate to analyze Equation 3.3 by considering each 
variable individually. Simultaneously, alternative forms of the inde­
pendent variables will be presented and their performance discussed. 
Alternative forms of Equation 3.3 which include some of the excluded 
variables will be shown and the reasons for their rejection given. 
This mode of presentation allows others to view what was attempted but 
failed to perform as well as the form actually chosen. 
The seasonal dumngr variables, through were included in 
Equation 3.3 because to exclude them decreased the increased the 
SEE, and generally made the reliability of the other variables less 
significant. Thus, to improve the tracking power of the equation and 
to condensate for the seasonal gyrations of the raw data, seasonal 
dummies are sine qua non. Only S^ and are significant in tenns of 
the t-statistic but, as the precedent of the literature dictates, all 
dummies are included. 
The two measures of monetary movements did not diqaley opposite 
signs but their absolute magnitudes were highly dissimilar. Itore spe­
cifically, the partial regression coefficient associated with is 
rsbher large whereas the coefficient is relatively small; since 
the two indices have similar absolute values for the observations, the 
absolute difference in the coefficients is analytically iaçortant. The 
general behavior of the equation when both variables were included 
indicated one of them was superfluous, i.e., a anlticoUinearity problem 
exists. When the monetary base variable was substituted for the Meltzer 
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index. Equation 3.U was the result. The results are basically the same, 
3.U - - U732 + .U6D®.^ + .583C®_^ + .783RJ + .27A^ + 1U038ACT®., 
(3.18) (2.79) (3.22) (2,3U) (2.10) (2.12) 
- 305S^ + 38.55% - 259S3 + U3^t-1 
(1.U8) (0.27) (2.31) (3.92) 
- .97U 
D-W - 1.7li 
SEE - 293.0 
the only real difference being the larger constant tern In Equation 3.U. 
Equation 3.3 is considered slightly better because of its generally 
higher t-statistic vaines, its lower SEE, and the lower constant term. 
It was deemed more logical to retain the Msltzer index because its 
conposite nature makes it more stable over time than the monetary base. 
Both indices performed best when lagged one period. 
The net savings capital inflow lagged one period (D°_^ ) is correctly 
signed and significant at the one percent level* This variable was always 
highly significant in all variants of Equations 3-3 and 3*ù, unlagged 
savings inflow were not always significant and led to a generally poorer 
estimation equation; a two period or more lag of the variable was always 
insignificant; a distributive lag structure of the saving inflow variable 
failed to perform as well as the single one quarter lagged value; hence, 
the lagged value for net savings capital inflow was chosen because it 
performed best. 
The explanation for the significance of only the one quarter 
lagged value lies in the fact that SLA managers probably commit newly 
acquired funds from new deposits only after they are reasonably assured 
the ftmds are not transient. To commit new fùnds immediately upon 
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receipt mi^t Jeopardize liquidity and to hold fùnds idle longer than 
necessary could impair profits; therefore, it seems logical the lagged 
value of saving deposits inflows would have the greatest explanatory 
power J It could be said that SlAs are willing to commit funds to long-
texm mortgages only after they are sure the funds are "permanent*" 
Apparently, the time lag associated with this permanency decision is 
is the neighborhood of one quarter* 
p 
Current mortgage repayments are significant at the one percent 
level and display the correct sign. Various lagged values and structures 
were attençted but none were significant, In fact, when the variable 
was lagged in excess of one quarter, the coefficient became negative 
although still insignificant* The unlagged version of the variable is 
probably significant because it is readily predictable* S Ms know 
approximately the volume of repayments th^ will receive in amy given 
time period and plan their supply of mortgage credit accordingly* To 
exclude repayments from Equations 3*3 and 3*U seriously impairs their 
ability to explain the supply of residential mortgage credit by SIAs* 
The change in FHLBS advances outstanding (A) is signed correctly 
and significant at the five percent level* The significance of the 
unlagged. as opposed to the lagged, values of this variable is probably 
because associations are confident advances can be obtained when needed* 
^McElhone (L8) discounted the importance of saving inflows in her 
monthly analysis because current inflows were insignificant * This author 
tried a distributive lag function of monthly saving inflows and found 
the three, four and five month lagged values e:q)lained the most* 
^Repayments were not segregated on the basis of scheduled and 
unscheduled because separate series do not, to the author's knowledge, 
exist* 
This was no doubt less true prior to 1968 but the FHLBS policy since 
then has been more conducive to obtaining needed advances (2U> 67)« 
When advances were lagged one quarter thgy became insignificant even 
though the sign remained correct* Generally, lagged advances caused 
a higher constant term, a lower D-V statistic, and a high SEE; however, 
all other variables remained correctly signed and significant. The 
significance of FHLBS advances is no anomaly in housing resarch because 
many housing studies have included this important poliqr variable in 
a lagged or an unlagged fashion. The significance of advances in the 
mortgage credit supply behavior of SIAs allows the FHLBS to have some 
control over the housing industry via the advances mechanism* It seems 
that control of advances could be io^lemented either through interest 
rates on advances or by direct surveillance; however, this debatable 
question is not an issue here. It has been àxnai that advances are 
important, how thoy are controlled is irrelevant for the purposes of 
this exposition. 
Unfortunately, Fanzqr May and Ginziy May secondazy market purchases 
failed to be significant in any fozm. This, however, came as no surprise 
since only FHA. and VA instnuaents had a secondary mwket during the 
period of this study and these types of mortgages are not- held in sub­
stantial amounts by SLAs. Both current and lagged values of secondary 
market purchases were tried but the coefficients failed to be signif­
icantly different from zero and were not consistently signed. As was 
mentioned earlier, the secondary mortgage market may become vitally 
important to SL&s in the ftrture since the newly created Federal Ifome 
Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHUC or Freddie Mac) and Fanny May are now 
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dealing in Conventional instrumenta. An assesanent of the future impact 
of the secondary market on SLA.8' mortgage credit supply behavior would 
be sheer conjecture due to the modicum of data now available* Therefore, 
no such assessment will be undertaken here, however, this is a potential 
topic for future research. 
The coefficient associated with the change in outstanding comnit-
asnts lagged one quarter (C°_^ ) is of the assumed sign and highly signif­
icant. This variable was not significant when entered at its current 
values or when lagged more than one quarter. A distributive lag structure 
was attempted but abandoned due to poor results. When this variable 
was excluded from either Equation 3*3 or 3.U the general quality of 
_p 
the equation deteriorated since the R and the D-W statistic decreased 
while the value of the constant texv and the SEE increased. 
A simple correlation coefficient of 0.66 exists between lagged 
commitments and r^ayments. This, however, is considered unii^ortant 
because the exclusion of either of these variables leads to less desir­
able results and their simultaneous inclusion does not the pres­
ence of high multicollinearity (5U> p. US). Thus, ws see that commit-
ments s^pear to be important and mst be included as a determinant of 
SLA mortgage credit scQ>p3y. The arguments against connitmBnts outlined 
above have not been refuted, only weakened because the regressions have 
not "proved" coarndtaants are ioportant, but have only failed to prove 
their unimportance. 
The composite credit tent (CT^) was not significant «ten entered 
as its absolute values, either lagged or unlagged. This lends credence 
to the hypothesis that SLAs do not consider the absolute level of mortgage 
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crédit profitability important since th«7 have vezy little selectivity 
of investaeot alternatives. In short, SIAs usually iznrest in mortgages 
or not at all. The greatest latitude they have in their portfolio 
management is the timing of their investments. They may invest now or 
if profitability is expected to improve they may defer new investment 
for a tine* This expect at ional approach causes the relative credit 
terms to be vexy important. 
The change in the composite credit index, a proxy for relative 
credit terms, vas tried in the regression and found to be correctly 
signed and significant at the five percent level «hen lagged one quar­
ter. The change version of the variable was not important when unlagged 
or lagged more than one period. This points out that relative credit 
terms are Important and that associations do no hold funds in taqoro-
ductive hoards for any length of time. ^ using the cooposite credit 
term and establishing its significance, all three of the measures of 
mortgage credit profitability, viz., interest rate, loan<^o-value ratio, 
and amortization length, have been incozporated in the mortgage credit 
suR)]y equation. It is contended here that this ^ prosch is ssperior to 
selecting a single measure, e.g., interest rate, and allowing it to 
represent all credit terms. 
As an eog>eri«ent, a measure of the effective interest rate on 
conventional mortgages was used to replace the composite credit ten 
in Equation 3*3# To make the interest rate variable analogous to the 
composite credit tern, it was entered in first-difference form and 
lagged one quarter. The result of this experiment appears in Equation 
3#$. Even though Equation 3*5 shows basically the same results as 
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3.5  ^' U391 + .50E|^ ., + •65cJ_i + + .175\ 
(U.89) (U.25) (3.55) (U.02) (2.15) 
+ 1207Aig - 268s, - 3.1 BSg - 337S^ • 286MIt_i 
(2.2U) ' (1.51) (0.02) (3.15) (3.90) 
- .978 
D-W - 2.12 
SEE - 265.0 
Equation 3.3, the latter is more complete in that it eootaina the other 
two credit terms and it more accurately tracks the actual series over 
the sample period. The change in the effective interest rate (ùi^) 
was tried unlagged in Equation 3.5 but was clearly insignificant (t value 
of 1.01). %en the interest rate was entered at absolute values it 
failed to achieve significance. This outcome also lends validity to 
the argument that SIAs consider relative instead of absolute credit 
terms because of their one-item portfolios. 
A simple correlation matrix of the exogenous variables of Equation 
3.3 would suo# a phase relatlonship betwsan sssss of the data ssriss. 
However, It Aould be realised that sixple correlations are only elements 
of the the entire correlation matrix and, hence, may or may not contribute 
to problems of nulticolUnearity. One should not, a priori, rule out 
estimations of any regression equation because of high cozrelations 
between amy two variables (5U, p. U8). %en aoltlcolllnearlty is 
present, the exclusion of one of the variables from the regression will 
not appreciably reduce the explanation of the dependent variable. Since 
exclusion of any of the variables in the estimation equations given above 
reduces their explanatory power, it is concluded here that malticollin-
earity is not a burdensome problem. It appears that even though housing 
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researchers blame many econometric problems on malticoUinearity, it 
may often be largely a theoretical nigibtmare rather than an empirical 
reality. Even if the sample correlation coefficients are taken as 
Indicative of mlticoUinearity, the exclusion of any variable may 
still be unwise. This evolves becanee if forecasting is a primary 
objective, then intercorrelation of explanatory variables may not be 
too serious, provided it may reasonably be expected to continue in the 
foreseeable futvre ih2, p. 207). Since the institutional structure 
of SlAs is not expected to tmdergo drastic changes in the iauediate 
foture, amy intercorrelation now present should exist in later time 
periods. 
Equation Performance and Forecasting 
Equation 3.3 presented above should be amendable to short-run 
forecasting because it contains only two nonlagged independent variables. 
Ab îsssticned earîler^ repayasat-g are relatively stàbls and accorHte 
short-run forecasts should be possible. Advances can also be accurately 
anticipated; thus, all the predetermined variables in the SLA siqmly 
equation are lagged or easily predicted which indicates the possibility 
of an accurate data ijqxut for a ^ rt-run forecast. Additionally, the 
supply equation does not include the lagged endogenous variable which 
should allow a prediction of turning points in mortgage credit applied 
by SLAs. The one quarter lags so frequently observed above dtould not 
come as a surprise because, intuitively, th^ seem natural considering 
the fact SLAs plan quarterly due to their quarterly dividend payments. 
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The saaple period chosm to estiaate mortgage credit aupplled 
Iqr SLAe inclxides tvo violent contractions of mortgage credit activity, 
viz., in 196613 through 1967:1 and 1969*3 through 1970:2 J If the 
estimation equation for can track during these unusual periods, it 
should perform reasonably well when forecasting outside the saille 
period* The estimated and actual values of the dependent variable 
a{^>ear in Table 3.1 • The general performance of Equation 3*3 is vezy 
good and even when the estimated value deviates substantially from 
the actual value, the error is not repeated in the following quarter. 
The performance of the equation after 1971:1 is especially encouraging 
since there was what appeared to be a substantial and permanent Aift 
in the dependent variable, jb toto. Equation 3.3 performed satisfacto­
rily over the sample period and should continue to do so in iimaediata 
future periods. 
An appropriate conclusion to this chapter is a forecast of the 
ddpâïidênt variable in a time period outside, but tençoraùLly close, to 
the saiqple period. The last two quarters of 1972 have been chosen 
because the actual values of the dependent variable are available for 
these quarters and can be compared with the estimated values. Table 3.2 
Aows the forecasted values of the dependent variable yielded by Equation 
3.3 above. These forecasted values are well within the realm of expecta­
tions for a first-differenced variable such as the net change in mortgage 
credit outstanding. The forecasting error for total mortgage credit 
outstanding would be practically nil and, additionally, the absence of 
Vor an eaqplanation of the cause of these downtuxns, see (31)# 
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TABLE 3.1 
Estimated, actual, and residual values of M® 
(In millions of dollars) 
Quarter Actual 
(From Eq. 3.3) 
Estimated Residual 
1961i:l 2187 2135 52 
2 2936 2k05 531 
3 2765 2196 569 
li 2280 2256 2li 
1965:1 1798 1561 237 
2 2635 2513 122 
3 2392 2202 190 
il 1910 2078 -168 
1966:1 1678 1693 -15 
2 1623 2212 -589 
3 38U 525 -111 
U 172 312 -IliO 
1967:1 509 617 -108 
2 207I1 2030 hh 
3 2552 2197 55 
k 2328 2130 -102 
1968:1 1803 1537 266 
2 2682 2i|26 256 
3 2385 2229 156 
U 21:21*. 221+9 175 
1969:1 2175 1861 311i 
2 3271 33U6 
-75 
3 2355 2L2? -72 
h 1616 1682 -66 
1970:1 658 911 -253 
2 2337 2038 299 
3 323Ù 3276 -1+2 
h 3938 3709 229 
1971:1 2795 3195 -loo 
2 7207 7319 -112 
3 7799 7890 -91 
h 6118 5790 148 
1972:1 5682 5385 297 
2 8569 10318 -1779 
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TABLE 3.2 
Forecasted values of 
based on Equation 3*3 
(In millions of dollars) 
Quarter Actual Estimated Residual 
Percent 
error 
1972:3 8813 8988 -175 1.5 
1972:1 8#2 86# -129 1*5 
the lagged dependent variable increases the probability of forecasting 
future turning points of the aggr^ate data series. This potential 
ability of the equation to track at the tuzning points is its major 
advantage over a stock adjustment approach* 
The variables included in Equation 3*3 should be brought up to 
date whenever possible in order to inprove the quality of short-run 
predictions* In no way should the above analysis be construed to remain 
static in the lcng=run because pcHciss, Isstituticss, and attitudes 
randomly change over time and only an omniscience soothsayer knows their 
pattern. Since mortgage credit supplied is a necessazy forexninner of 
residential housing purchases, the ability to predict mortgage credit 
should aid in forecasting housing activity* This connection with housing 
activity is the raison d'etre for the above analysis* 
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CHAPTER IV. 
THE SHORT-RUN lETERKmANTS OF MORTGAGE CREDIT 
SUPPLIED BY MOTUAL SAVINGS BAN IB 
In this chapter a second group of financial intermediaries supply­
ing credit to the residential Mortgage market is examined. This group 
is the liitTzal Savings Banks (!6Bs). Almost all I6Bs, or savings banks 
as they are sometimes called, are concentrated in New England and the 
fCLddle Atlantic states* Seven other states, Alaska, Indiana, Minnesota, 
Ohio, Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin, as well as Puerto Rico have 
I66s, but thirty-two states and the District of Columbia have none* 
Over ninety percent of the savings bank industxy's total assets are 
concentrated in five states, viz*. New York, Massachusetts, Connecticut, 
Psnsi^lrania, and Nss? Jersey in the order of their isçortsscec^ Even 
though the bulk of these institutions are geogr^hical]y concentrated, 
th^ rank first, nationwide, among institutional lenders in holdings 
of both VA-guaranteed and FHA-insured loans on regular owner occupied 
For a sunmaiy of the operation, location, and sbzucture of )6Bs 
see (6, pp. 19-2];). All the pertinent statistics of the industry are 
contained in ($2). 
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hones J In many of the 16B states, their deposits exceed the total 
savings accounts at savings and loan associations, commercial banks, 
and credit unions combined. 
The savings bank indastxy has invested approximately seventy-five 
percent of its assets in mortgages of which about eighty-five percent 
are residential, FHA.-insared and VA-guaranteed mortgage loans make up 
roughly sixty percent of the residential mortgage loans made by fGBs. 
%e importance of fGBs cannot be denied and they doubtless have a sub­
stantial inexact upon the macroeconomic, residential mortgage credit 
market, especially the government undexmltten portion. Since I6Bs 
are the most iji^rtant supplier of funds to the government supported 
sector of the housing market, an assessment of their activity should 
be indicative of the FHA-VA financed sector of the market in general. 
The purpose of this chapter is to formulate an equation whose 
independent variables explain the mortgage credit sui^lied by I6Bs. 
Again, variables felt to be isyortant a priori vill bs cut lined and then 
tested by means of ordinary least squares sultiple regression. The 
general fcraat of the previous chapter will be duplicated and identical 
proceAires only mentioned, not explained in detail. %is motif should 
minimize redundancy as well as lead to some econony of space. Further-
^ According to recent Federal Reserve Bulletins the primary finan­
cial intexnediaries hold the following perôent of ^iôtal FHA and VA 
residential property mortgages outstanding: 
Institution FHA VA 
IBBs 25 31 
SLAs 21 27 
LICs 16 13 
CBs 13 8 
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more, the various assumptions and data difficulties outlined in the 
previous chapter also apply for IGBs. 
Supply Variables 
The net mortgage funds supplied to the residential mortgage credit 
market is taken to be the change in total nonfarm mortgage loans out­
standing of all !6Bs, It is realized the ICBs do not equally influence 
all geographical markets but to make an assessment of the impact they 
have in particular areas of the nation is beyond the scope of this 
paper. Their geographic concentration should not unduly attenuate 
their macroecononLc significance because a substantial portion of their 
mortgage loans are made on out-of-state properties*^ We id.ll proceed 
as if their influence is felt nationwide even though realistically their 
iapact is felt only remotely in some areas. 
Intuitively, mortgage market credit supplied by h66s should be 
—• ^ TL • • X j Jt MK A»* A ^ «91 M «a •)% M VUO OA^OWCIVt 1 «" V* «LUXIWIO5 J^XJLV/X VMJQAAW 
profitability of the lending, and an index of mortgage market conditions. 
Again there is no doubt soma siiailtaneity aiaong the above rubrics twt it 
should not be cause for alarm. In vhat follows, the broad classifications 
outlined above will be dissected and the constitntent parts scrutinized. 
In 1971 approximately twenty-six percent of their mortgage loans 
were on out-of-state properties, whereas in 1965 over one-half of the 
loans were on out-of-state property. This percentage has been decreas­
ing in recent years and some predict the decline to continue (51, pp. 
11-12). 
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Inflow of funds 
The influx of additional funds to î6Bs come mainly from additions 
to saving deposits, prepayrnsnts and repayments of presently held mort­
gages, the sale of government underwritten mortgages in the secondary 
mortgage market, and possibly from advances by the FHLBS, Because of 
the low membership of KBBs in the FHLBS, it is expected that advances 
will not appreciably influence the mortgage credit supply behavior of 
these institutions;^ however, if they have an influence, then it should 
be positive, i.e., mortgage credit supplied should increase as advances 
increase. îBBs also belong to the Federal Reserve System and may use 
the discount window; however, discounts and advances from the FRS would 
be inappropriate—as well as frowned upon by the Fed—for mortgage lend­
ing due to their relatively short-term nature. 
The secondaiy market sale of FHA and VA mortgages by HBBs should 
be significant as a determinant of mortgage credit supplied because of 
the relative inpcrtanos cf thsss in st ruinant s in the total portfolio. 
However, the influence of secondaiy market activity is probably not 
what is intuitively expected. It might be hypothesized that as î6Bs 
sell mortgages in the secondaiy market, the funds are used to support 
the purchase of newly issued mortgages. Such reasoning might lead to 
the conclusion that secondaiy market sales and mortgage credit supplied 
are positively related. The measure of mortgage credit supplied by î6Bs 
used here is the net change in value of nonfarm mortgage loans outstand­
ing; therefore, when mortgages are sold from the portfolio, mortgage 
^Only about nine percent are members (52, p. lU). 
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loans outstanding decrease. Unless all the proceeds obtained from the 
secondaiy market sales are reinvested in new mortgages, the value of 
mortgage loans outstanding will diminish. Consequently, it is hypothe­
sized that M5By will not necessarily reinvest all the newly acquired 
funds—at least rot within the short-run—and the relationship between 
secondary market activity and mortgage credit supplied by )GBs will be 
inverse. This hypothesis rests upon the belief that savings banks 
engage in the secondaiy market for reasons other than singly obtaining 
funds to support new mortgages, e.g., to increase liquidity or take 
advantage of other favorable investment opportunities. Again, it is 
left to the regression results to support or invalidate this hypoth­
esis. 
An increase in saving deposits and/or a surge in repayments should 
lead to a larger volume of mortgage credit supplied by MSBs. The reason­
ing here is identical to that given for SLAs. Additionally, some or all 
of the inflow variables may have to be lagged to achieve significance 
due to an expect at ional psychology on the part of MSB managers. The 
basic difference expected to prevail between î6Bs and SIAs is the role 
played by advances and secondaiy market activity by Fanny May-Ginny May. 
The regressions for SIAs failed to prove that an importance is attached 
to secondaiy market activity but did indicate that FHLBS advances have 
a significant influence on mortgage credit supplied by these institutions. 
It is hypothesized in this chapter that the opposite will prevail for î6Bs. 
These phenomena do have policy iuplications and will be further expounded 
in a later chapter. 
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Commitments 
Advance conraltrasnts should influence the mortgage investment 
behavior of îCBs as they do SIA behavior. It appears that l6Bs make 
longer term commitments than do SLA.S as well as committing a relatively 
larçer volume of their available funds, i.e., 16Bs make relatively 
fewer over-the-counter loans.^ Undoubtedly, this longer maturity 
structure associated with xcB commitments will lead to a greater lag 
of the commitment variable. It seems reasonable to surmise that a 
distributive lag structure of commitments may be important in explain­
ing the behavior of î6Bs. 
The general comments presented for SLA conmitments in the previous 
chapter are applicable to savings banks. It seems there is a stronger 
intuitive reason for including comnitments in the )6B equations because 
of the greater use they make of them. Consequently, small is the number 
of researchers arguing against their inclusion as was done for SLAs. 
The relationAip between commitments and the dependent variable 
is esqpected to be positive as it was for SLAs. Unfortunately, total 
commitment data for the savings bank industry are not available and a 
proxy oust be utilized in its stead. Oonmitment data for the New York 
2 
state network of I6Bs are available and will serve as this proxy. It 
is contended this proxy is reliable since New York savings banks account 
^ See the Federal Reserve Bulletin for the mortgage loan conmitments 
of îBBs classified fay maturity. Other authors (5, 2)x) agree that the 
maturity structure of !6Bs is longer than that of SLAs. 
^At least one other individual (U1) has been similarly forced to 
such a conproBdse. 
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for approximately fifty-seven percent of the assets of the indnstzy 
(52, p. 17). 
Expected mortgage market conditions 
Once again the Hsltzer and the Saint Louis Fed monetaiy Indices 
will be used to proxy expected mortgage market conditions. ICBs have 
more latitude in their portfolio composition because they are legally 
allowed to hold corporate stocks, bonds, notes, and debentures, obliga­
tions of state and political subdivisions, as veil as other assets which 
are forbidden for SL&s.' In view of this more diversified investment 
menu, ISBs may have a limited interest in general monetary indices 
such as the two previously mentioned. Instead, they should display 
more interest in the return or esqpected movements in substitute port­
folio items, e.g., the interest rate on corporate bondsw If this 
behavioral pattern is followed, general monetaiy conditions may be unim­
portant for îSBs. PurthsrsKîrs, siraltanecus inclusion of a monetary 
index and portfolio return variable may give rise to coUinearity and 
all its daaeging problems. This caveat should not be interpreted to 
mean monetary conditions are unimportant to the housing industry. It 
is simply being said that our indicators of monetaiy ease and stringent 
may be implicitly incorporated in other variables. If this suspected 
intercorrelation is present, one of the conçebing variables will be 
superfluous and no irrepairable damage will be done by excluding it. 
Nevertheless, a measure of monetaiy stringency will be included and 
Vor an aggregate portfolio of the industry, see (52, p. 10). 
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hopefully the regressions can provide an answer to this conundrum* If 
significant, the monetazy indices should behave as th^ did in the SLA 
equations* 
Loan profitability 
The savings bank is not usually a single-asset concern as is the 
SLA.; thus, the relative profitability of a mortgage loan depends upon 
the return from plausible alternative investments* The presence of 
substitute opportunities considwably coiqplicates the picture because 
the residential mortgage credit a MSB is willing to supply depends upon 
the return from other potential portfolio items* This effect is enured 
by including the return from alternative investments as independent vari­
ables in the regression equations* A difficulty may arise since malti-
coUinearity appears inevitable* 
From examination of the )6B industry balance sheet, it appears 
the most likely suwstltutGG for aortgags loans ars corporate securities 
and government bonds Unfortunately, the rate of return on mortgages 
and these two general classes of substitutes is probably excessively 
coUinear* To overcome partially the eaqpected intercorrelation, the 
three rates of return will be reduced to two by differencing* The sign 
of the coefficients appended to these interest rate difference variables 
is expected to be positive if they are substitutes and negative if they 
^Corporate securities include stocks, bonds, notes, and debentures* 
Government bonds are obligations of the federal government or an agency 
thereof and may be guaranteed or not guaranteed* Obligations of state 
and political subdivisions play a minor role in the typical Î6B port­
folio. 
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are complements*^ 
Intultive]y, two portfolio Items might seem to be substitutes, 
but in reality function as complements. The mechanism could operate 
as follows; let the rate on government bonds rise; this rising rate 
Aould lead to the purchase of additional government bonds but only at 
the expense of the other portfolio Items, ceteris paribus» E^irther assume 
the increased purchase of govemasnts was financed hy liquidating only 
corporate bonds. The portfolio is now more liquid than before the 
asset swap, i.e., highly liquid governnaits have been substituted for 
less liquid corporate bonds. The manager may now desire to reduce 
liquidity of the portfolio by purchasing relatively illiquid mortgages. 
The result is that the rate on govenunents (and consequently the volume) 
and the increased mortgage lending are positively related which implies 
conplements even though governments and mortgages may be regarded as 
substitute portfolio items (59, p. 100). The relationship is ccnqple-
mentazy because in the above example (ig,-ig) will have a n%atlve 
coefficient. 
The interest retnm on mortgage loans is only one component of 
their profitability. We must also contend with the loan-to-value 
ratio and the amortization length of mortgages when assessing the 
"retiim" of mortgage loans made T?y )6Bs. To account for aU the aspects 
^If the coefficient of (i^-ig) is positive, this implies that as 
ig falls, ceteris paribus, the value of (ig^-ig) increases and if the 
two instruments in question are substitutes, the dependent variable, 
mortgage credit supplied, should rise; thus, a positive sign ijqplies 
substitutes in demand whereas a negative signed coefficient indicates 
coaplements. 
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of the mortgage loans, a composite credit term for IGBs will be used* 
This conqposite index is identical in construction to the one used for 
SIAs and the results should be the same; the only difference is the 
component values used here are those associated with !6Bs, A fortiori « 
it is eocpected that the relative composite credit term, as reflected 
by the first-difference in the absolute values, will be more important 
to MSBs in view of their wore diversified portfolio. Due to this greater 
Investment choice, I6Bs miay not be as reluctant to make portfolio adjust­
ments based on the composite credit texm as SIAs apparently are; therefore, 
a lagged value of the composite credit term may be less significant for 
fGBs than it was for SIAs* 
Further considerations 
There appears to be no general secular trend of the dependent 
variable; consequently, it will mot be necessary to detrend the series. 
Tc ccuiMoHoate for the seasonal fluctuations of the rsw data, seasonal 
dummies will be included as they were for SIAs* Due to the simdlar 
aggregate supply behavior of SIAs and }6Bs, the signs of the seasonal 
dummies are expected to be the samie for both intermediaries. 
The above analysis of I6Bs' proclivity to supply residential 
miortgage credit is summarized in generic Equation 1**1. A description 
U.1 - tj, * b,Dj • * b^CT™ * 
* ^8(^-^g)t ^0^1 + ^ 11^2 + ^>12^3 * « 
of the new variables used may be found in Appendix B. Ihdoubtedly, 
some of the variables in the generic equation above will have to be 
lagged to achieve significance. The coefficients are hypothesized to 
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have the foUoidsg signs: 
bi >0; b2>0; b^>0; b|^>0; b^^Oj b^>0; by<Oj bg^Oj b^%0; 
^1ol®5 b^2i®* 
Coefficients bg and b^ are indetexvinate becanse each of these vari­
ables Bay be complements or substitutes in demand; however, it is ex­
pected that if either te%* is significant, it will be a substitute and 
thus have a positive sign. It shocld be rearndbered that Equation 1;«1 
is in generic form and some of the variables included will no doubt 
fail to attain significance and be excluded from the analysis# The 
empirical analysis will be used to ferret out those above mentioned 
variables which are unimportant in eaqplaioing the residential mortgage 
credit supplied by ICBs. 
Bapirical Results 
Equation U*"! was sstiz&tsd by usisg ordinary least squares laiitiple 
regression analysis* Those predetermined variables failing to achieve 
a reasonable level of significance were excluded. The equation perform­
ing the best with respect to the usual criteria is shown as Equation 2t.2, 
U.2 = - 783 + .338DJ * + I.IRj • hSll CT^ - .OBBPCff^ ^ 
(3.2) (6.51;) (U.85)' (U.81) (2.23) (2.09)'"' 
+ 626(i^-ig)t - 5U.3Si + 62.552 - 70.3S3 
(6.1*7) (1.U8) (1.69) (1.88) 
• .86 
D-W « 1.85 
SEE - 89.5 
All the variables included in Equation 1*.2 have the hypothesized sign 
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and are statistically significant. The SEE is eighty-nine million dollars 
which is approximately ten percent of the a'verage value of the dependent 
variable; this standard error is not felt to be excessive. The D-W 
statistic does not indicate the existence of autocorrelation among the 
residuals. The coefficient of multiple detendnation indicates that 
Equation accounts for about eighty-six percent of the variation of 
the dependent variable. The esplrical results vill be examined by first 
discussing the excluded and then the included variables. 
The general monetaxy indices failed to add explanatoxy power to 
the estimation equation; consequently, they were excluded from farther 
analysis. Again, the exclusion of these variables should not lead to 
the deduction that monetary policy is immaterial; the complicated lag 
in affect, its variability and elusiveness, makes monetaiy policy very 
difficult to measure. The indicators used for monetazy policy may be 
poor and/or a simultaneity problem may exist; whatever, the indices had 
to be excluded since their coefficients were not significantly different 
from zero. Equations U*3 and display the results when the two 
indices were separately included. In terms of equation statistics and 
partial regression coefficients, all the above equations are similar. 
ll=3 - - 52U + =30<D^ +.1}01CÇ.2 * + 36U9/CTÏ -
(1.71) (5.it7) (U.71) {k.75) (1.96) (2.29) 
+ 59l*(i^,-ic)t - W.OMIt-1 - ^9.78^ + 55.732 - 67.22^ 
(6.10) (1.37) (1.36) (1.53) (1.81;) 
f - .87 
D-W • 2.03 
SEE - 87.3 
7Ji 
1.1 iÇ - - 767 + .3391ç + .W1C^_2 + I.IIrJ + làOSAcrJ - .09FŒ'^_^ 
(2.92) (6.36) (U.37) (U.59) (2.01) (2.06) 
+ 6l7(i„-ig)^ - - 5U.0S^ + ÔOJiSg - 70.7S-
(5.82) (0.2u) (1.u1) (1.55) (1.8u) 
^ - .85 
D-W • 1,90 
SEE - 91.9 
Advances of the FHLBS were always insignificant, regardless of 
whether they were lagged, tmlagged, or first-differenced. view of 
the small MSB menter^ip in the FHLBS, this outcome was not unesqpected. 
The regression reailts did not seem to indicate coUinearity between 
advances and secondazy market purchases as some have advocated.^ The 
fact seems to be that 16Bs sizply do not consider ?HX£S advances an 
ingwrbant influence in shaping their mortgage credit supply behavior. 
The variable reflecting the difference in the mortgage and the 
government bond rates, (ig^-ig), was not important as an explanatozy 
variable- This could have been because of intsrccrrslaticn bstwsai it 
and other variables but the behavior of the regression equation did not 
seem to substantiate this position. The (i^-ig) variable did not appear 
to Influence the siçply behavior of MSBs even when (ij^-iç) was excluded 
from the estimation equation. This result could arise because govern­
ments are considered a foxn of liquidity, i.e., a substitute for cash, 
and not an alternative to mortgage investment. Since the mld-19L0*8, 
I6Bs have reduced their holding of government securities from about 
^Silber (61, p. 23) contended the colUnearity between advances 
and secondazy market purchases precluded their simultaneous entry into 
an estimation equation. The above analysis plus a siiQ)le correlation 
coefficient of 0.!^5 seems to contradict this contentiono 
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sixty-three to approximately four percent of total assets ($2, p* 9)* 
This qnanbuin decrease indicates that government security holdings were 
being reduced^ iirespective of mortgage lending movements* The regression 
equation including the (i^-ig) variable is shown below. 
li.5 - - 8U7 + .3l5Dt + +1.091^ + U536ÛCT?_2 - .12FQP^^ 
(3.27) ($Jt2) (U.75) (U.78) (2.17) " (1.99) 
+ $88(i^-ig)t + 83.0(1^,-1 )^ - UKUSi + 60.6S2 - 85,283 
(5.u8) (0.85) (1.02) (1.62) (2.05) 
^ - ,86 
D-W - 1,88 
SEE - 90.2 
The corporate securities return variable, (1^,-1^), is highly 
significant in Equation U,2 and signed as hypothesized. This variable 
was unimportant, but still correctly signed, when lagged one quarter. 
From the regression analysis it may be concluded that corporate secu­
rities are substitutes for mortgage loans.^ %e high level of signif­
icance attached to this variable is no doubt based on the fact that 
MSBs increased their holdings of coiporate securities from $3,777 million 
in 1965 to $10,1*35 million in 1971 (52, p. 32). 
The conQMsite credit term performed as expected; however. It does 
not scppear to be more ingwrtant for IGBs as hypothesized above. The 
variable was conslotently insignificant vhen entered In its absclsts 
formas was the SLA credit term. To be significant, the variable had to 
be fir St-differenced and ttnlagged. The explanation of this outcome 
probably rests upon the greater portfolio choices available to fGBs as 
^Thls, however, is not suiprising because an examination of the 
industry balance sheet reveals that corporates are the second most 
important asset in the portfolio. 
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compared with SLA.S» This conposite credit term has made possible the 
inclusion of the interest rate, amortization length, and the loan«^o> 
value ratioj ipso facto, this is considered vezy imgwrtant. 
The volume of current quarter repayments was significant as eaqpected. 
The insignificance of the lagged version of this variable sizply eluci­
dates the realization that ^GBs can accurately predict their volume of 
repayments* The saving deposit inflow variable appears to be very 
important in fntplninlng I6B mortgage credit supplied. When the saving 
inflow was lagged one quarter it remained correctly signed but bad a 
lower significance level (a t-statistic value of 1.6$). The signifi­
cance of unlagged saving deposit inflows suggests that KBs are less 
hesitant to commit newly acquired funds than are SIAs* This lack of 
reluctance doubtless stems from the more liquid portfolio of I6Bs* 
The greater liquidity derives from the availability of a secondary 
market for federally underwritten mortgages and the holding of corporate 
securities, A distributive lag function also proved unable to explain 
more than the single, unlagged version of the variable; therefore, the 
less complicated form was chosen. 
The proxy variable for total 16B comgitments performed exceptionally 
well when lagged two quarters. A distributive lag of the variable 
showed that its importance increased up through a two quarter lag and 
then deteriorated rapidly. Only the two quarter lag was significant 
and the more involved structure of the variable provided no more e:q)lana-
tory power than the simple lag.^ The )BB is forced by policy to honor 
^The t-statistlc values for C^, and were 1.31, 0.89, and 
0.15, respectively. 
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advance commitments and this leads to the logical conclusion they mst 
be inpoitant; thus, the findings of Equation it«2 are unsurprising* 
Nevertheless, some researchers have failed to consider commitments* 
The seasonal dumiy variables diq)layed the sane signs as they did in 
the SIA equations* This identical pattern points out that both inter­
mediaries are affected by the seasonality of the housing construction 
industzy* The dumiy variables are not an elixir, but their exclusion 
does deteriorate the quality of the estimation equations* 
Equation Performance and Forecasting 
Equation can be used to make short-iun forecasts of mortgage 
credit sullied by I6Bs* Unfortunately, some of the exogenous variables 
in the estimation equations are unlagged and data inputs needed for 
forecasting mst themselves be estimated* The additions to saving 
d^wsits is the one unlagged variable most suscc^ible to estimation 
error; the others are relatively stable and/or ê&sily predictabls* 
By drawing on previous investigations of saving deposit inflows, an 
accurate estimate of this variable should be possible « 
Table U*1 depicts the tracking of Equation U*2 over the ôanple 
period* The equation performed satisfactorily during the sazple period 
and should remain valid for short-run forecasts outside the sample 
q)an. Such a forecast was attenuated for 1972:3 and 1972tU« The fore­
casted results appear in Table U«2* The predictions are well within 
the realm of expectations since they compare favorably with those of 
the sample period* In toto. Equation U*2 esqplains the mortgage credit 
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TABLE U.I 
Estimated, actual, and residual values of if 
(In millions of dollars) 
(From Eq. U»2) 
Quarter Actual Estimated Residual 
1961:1 927 892 35 
2 1038 1071 -36 
3 117? 1102 73 
U 118? 122li 
1965:1 937 929 8 
2 883 958 2li 
3 1118 1151 -33 
h 1107 1173 -66 
1966:1 769 7Ù3 26 
2 508 5Wi -36 
3 75Ii 638 116 
h 76U 722 h2 
1967:1 780 759 20 
2 792 789 3 
3 786 825 -38 
h 732 826 -9l 
1968:1 551 196 55 
2 573 $85 -12 
3 701 769 -68 
U 9U2 1006 —6U 
1969:1 719 76I1 -U5 
2 653 657 -U 
3 511 665 -151 
U 633 603 30 
1970:1 297 380 -83 
2 $25 U50 7U 
3 558 565 -7 
h 599 573 26 
1971:1 728 827 -99 
2 1007 1075 -68 
3 1077 908 169 
U 11à7 I3îil 106 
1972:1 878 908 -30 
2 1386 1161 225 
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supplied by (GBs and should, along with the equations of the 
other intermediaries, provide a basis for short-term forecasting of 
total residential mortgage credit supplied* 
TABLE U*2 
Forecasted values of if 
based on Equation 1|*2 
(In millions of dollars) 
Quarter Actual Estimated Residual 
Percent 
error 
19?2;3 Mi.93 l!t02 91 6.1 
1972:U 1h91 1U55 36 2.U 
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CHAPTER V. 
THE SHORT-RUN DETERMINANTS OF MORTGAGE CREDIT 
SUPPLIED BY COMMERCIAL BAN 16 
The third group of financial inteimediaries supplying credit to 
the residential mortgage market is commercial banks (CBs). The purpose 
of this chapter is to formulate a supply equation whose independent 
variables eaqilain the volume of mortgage credit supplied by these 
institutions. The dependent variable of the supply equation will be 
the seasonally unadjusted change in residential mortgage loans out­
standing held all commercial banks.^ Even though CBs hold less than 
nine percent of their total assets in the form of residential mortgage 
loans, the absolute value of this portfolio item is second only to 
that of SLAs (57; p, 5o)s One glance at the GB industry balance sheet 
shows a myriad of portfolio items; consequently, there will be many 
interrelationships and complexities encountered in the fomulation of 
a mortgage credit supply equation. Some of the atteiiçjts to derive an 
estimation equation to e:q)lain mortgage credit supply have circumvented 
these complexities by concentrating only on the deposits of CBs and 
ignoring the other items (U1, 59, 62). lb is the contention here that 
the supply behavior of CBs is extremely coiqplex and any simple approach 
to explain the dependent variable is doomed from its inception. 
^ See ^^jpendix 6 for the source of this and the other variables. 
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CBs make FHA-insured, VA-guaranteed, and conventional mortgage 
loans but the overwhelming majority of their mortgage funds are allo­
cated to the conventional sector.^ These institutions are heavily 
engaged in supplying construction loans to contractors and builders 
but this aspect of their operation has been excluded here; however, 
it should be realized that CBs are probably more important to the 
housing industry than the supply of mortgage credit indicates. 
The general approach in this chapter will be similar to the pre­
vious two but because of the uniqueness of CBs, the format will be 
altered slightly. In the immediately following section, the variables 
thought to be relevant will be outlined and hypotheses of their ex­
pected behavior formulated. The commercial banking industry is ana­
lyzed in the aggregate and attempts to relate the findings to a micro-
economic level are likely to be frustrating. 
Supply Variables 
The forthcoming supply of mortgage credit from CBs should be 
dependent upon their anticipated inflow of loanable funds, an index of 
ejected monetary conditions, and the expected profitability of mort­
gage lending. This last classification includes as assessment of sub­
stitute and conçlementary Investment possibilities. Commitments are 
^ At the end of 1971 CB loans for FHA, VA, and conventional 
mortgages accounted for 16.0, $.?, and 78.3 percent of all their resi­
dential mortgage loans outstanding, respectively. The secular trend 
has been toward conventionals and away from government underwritten 
mortgages. 
%ee (l6) for an overall assessment of the commercial banking 
Industry upon the housing market. 
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not important in the CB analysis because little use is made of this 
technique* Most commitments made are of a short-term nature and will 
be taken down within thirty days. These intermediaries do make use 
of longer term commitments in supplying constxiiction loans to builders 
(17) but this phase of their operation has been excluded from consid­
eration. 
In view of the small percentage of CBs total assets held as resi­
dential mortgages, there exists a sizable potential for loan eoqiansion 
in this area; however, no assessment is made of what may evolve* Instead, 
it is implicitly assumed the industry will continue to function in the 
future as it has in the past.^ The milieu in which the CB operates 
dictates that its portfolio contain more assortment than its nonbanking 
rival. For this reason, the analysis that follows is more subject to 
error than that undertaken in the previous two chapters. 
Inflow of funds 
The primary sources of loanable funds available to CBs are the 
demand and saving deposits of their customers. Some researchers (e.g., 
Ul, 59, 62) have attençted to segregate these two deposits and assess 
their impact separately. This approach may have been appropriate in 
the period prior to the 1960's but the emergence of scientific port­
folio management has peitaps rendered this technique obsolete. The 
thesis subscribed to in this paper is that the CB manager regards as 
inporbant not so much the source of his funds but their volume. That 
^This may be an unrealistic assumption if the recommendations 
of the Hunt Commission (39) are implemented. 
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Is; the funds are agglomerated into a pool and loans made therefrom. 
Without a doubt, the banking entrepreneur does make some assessment 
of the permanency of funds but does not segregate them according to 
source. 
The approach used to analyze deposit inflows will be to enter 
the funds into the regression analysis by source and assess their 
ingwrtance; then, pool the deposits and observe their joint affect. 
Since the CB manager is likely to take some note of permanency, these 
two inflows may be weighted differently. Generally, various combina­
tions of weighted*^oled, unweigbted<^ooled, and segregated will be 
attempted and that combination performing best will be chosen. Regard­
less of the final form, the relationship between inflows and the depen­
dent variable should be positive. 
The banking industry does have access to the secondary mortgage 
market via their government underwritten mortgages but the probability 
of this substantially influencing their supply behavior is thought to 
be limited. The justification of this position is the minuscule role 
played by the govsnunent underwritten Instruments in the typical CB 
portfolio. The fate of the Fanny May-Ginny May variable in the CB 
equation is expected to be the same as it was in the SLA equation, 
namely, insignificant. If, however, the une^qpected occurs, the sign 
of the coefficient should be negative. 
Since CBs cannot be members of the FHLBS, advances from Federal 
Home Loan Banks have no place in the supply equation* Banks may obtain 
advances and discounts from the Federal Reserve System but these are 
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short-texn in nature and usually obtained to cure a specific disequilib­
rium malaise, e.g», deficient reserves* No serious thought is given to 
including these fonds because of their short-term nature and the long-
term character of mortgages. A similar criticism could be levied against 
including inflows from the Federal Funds market* 
Repayments and prepayments are a source of loanable funds bat 
unfortunately no accurate repayments data for CBs exist* Even though 
this exclusion is not unique to this analysis, iinig considered an 
inherent weakness* Its omission is probably not as damaging to CBs as 
it would be to the nonbank financial intermediarLes because the typical 
banking firm has a more diversified portfolio and mortgage repayments 
constitute a small part of their total inflow of funds*^ Nevertheless, 
accurate repayments data would probably lead to a more reliable supply 
equation* 
Expected mortgage market conditions 
The Meltzer monetary stringency index and the Saint Louis Fed 
monetazy base measure will be used as the proxy variables to assess 
the e^qpected monetary conditions* These two measures look at the same 
phenomena and will not both be included in the same regression equation; 
instead, the variable perfvising the best. If either, will be utilized* 
In the previous two chapters, it was established that the signs of 
these variables are indeterminate* The complexities of the substitute-
complement nature of the CB portfolio makes it even more hazardous to 
^For a discussion of the inporbance of repayments to financial 
Intermediary's mortgage credit supply, see (2<)« 
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hypothesize their signs in the present analysis* Additionally, simul­
taneity of the independent variables remains a burdensome problem which 
could mask the affect of the monetary variable. Expectations could also 
lead to an tmforeseen outcome* The best solution of the sign ambiv­
alence is probably to allow the regression results to supply the answer* 
Loan profitability 
A composite credit term for CBs will be constructed in the usual 
manner by using the weighted interest rates on mortgage loans, the loan-
to-value ratios, and the aisortization length of the loans* The expected 
sign of the coefficient is positive as has been true for SLAs and )66s* 
The portfolio diversity of the typical CB will probably lead to an 
unlagged credit term as it did in the I6B equation* The first-difference 
form of this variable is expected to be the most significant because 
it more accurately reflects relative returns* 
The relative profitability of a mortgage loan depends upon the 
bank's opportunity cost of making the loan* This opportunity cost is 
measured by the retum on conpeting portfolio assets, e*g*, the return 
on a state or local bond* This opportunity cost concept can be reflected 
by looking at the difference between the retttm on mortgage loans and 
other types of investment instruments* Ceteris paribus, the larger the 
difference, the more likely the CB is to supply mortgage funds* An 
examination of the aggregate CB balance sheet shows that the most likely 
portfolio competitors for mortgage loan funds are U*S* Government bonds, 
coxporate securities, and obligations of state and local governments and 
political subdivisions* A priori, it seems reasonable to suppose these 
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items are sabstitutes and their return, nhen subtracted from the mortgage 
loan rates, should have a positive sign. There is, however, the possi­
bility of a complementaiy relationship associated with any of the above 
investment items; nevertheless, the above items are eoqpected to have a 
positively signed coefficient if th^ are statistically significant. 
Since the Interest rates associated with mortgage loans and the 
other three portfolio items listed above are likely to move together, 
nilticollinearity may be encountered and supply its usual coi^lications* 
Unfortunately, there is no statistical l^erdemain to circumvent this 
difficulty but the reader should bear in mind its possible existence. 
Further considerations 
The seasonal movements in the raw data will be con^pensated for 
by entering the usual seasonal dummy variables in the regression equa­
tions. The signs of these variables cannot be predicted but their 
pattern ^ ould be similar to those observed in the SIA and 16B analysis. 
There is a definite upward secular drift of the dependent variable. 
This trend is apparent when the raw data are observed and is even more 
evident if the two major downturns are excluded from the series. This 
is compensated for by introducing a linear time trend variable into 
the r^ression analysis. The sign of its partial regression coefficiait 
should be positive. 
The above analysis of the commercial banking industry is summarized 
in the generalized Equation $.1. In the generic equation the demand 
and time deposits were entered in a weighted-pooled fashion but the 
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$.1 " Cg + (wiDDt * + CgFGP^ + + c^CT^ 
" * ®6(V^c>t + °7^V^8l)t + ^ 8^1 + ^ 9^2 
+ c-]qS^ + c-i^T +u where 0<w^,w2<1 
empirical results may prove this procedure undesirable»^ The independent 
variables of Equation $*1 are escpected to display the following signs: 
ci>0; CgKO; C3IOJ c^>0; c^>0; c^>0; c^>Oj Cg|0; c^|0; 
The coefficient of the monetary variable, is indeterminate because 
of the complex nature of the CB portfolio* The coefficients associated 
with the rate differenced variables, through Cy, are hypothesized to 
be positive because thqy are thought to be substitutes; however, this 
may prove false and their signs will be negative* 
The generic form of the estimation equation includes all reasonably 
likely independent variables to explain mortgage credit supplied by CBs* 
The exclusion or inclusion of any variable will be based on its perform 
ûiance in the regression equation* Equation 5*1 will now be estimated 
by the usual least squares regression analysis* 
Empirical Results 
The estimation equations derived from the generic Equation $*1 are 
not as straightforward as those of the other two nonbank intermediaries * 
The complication is rooted in an apparent intercorrelation of the rate 
differenced variables plus some suspected autocorrelation in the residuals* 
^Ih Equation 5*2, w^ + Wg " 1 and 0<w-j< 1j thus, Wg » 1 - » 
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All complications aside, the equation perfomdng best vis-a-vis the 
usual criteria is shown below as Equation 5,2# All the coefficients 
are signed as expected except which was elected to be negative as 
5.2 - 966 + .0WtS(.67TlP + .33DI:^ )^ _2 + 12081ACTJ -
(1.66) (2.10) (3.27) {U.13) 
+ L39(lm-ig)t_i - 283S^ + IllSg + I88S3 + 33.IT 
(2.09) (3.73) (1.51) (2.U7) (3.25) 
- .82 
D-W - 1.70 
SEE - 218,0 
it was for SLAs and MSBs. The SEE is approximately twenty percent of 
the mean value of the dependent variable which is larger than expected 
but not excessive considering the complex CB portfolio and the violent 
contractions in 1966-67 and 1969-70* The D4f statistic does not indicate 
the presence of serial correlation; however^ neither does it document 
it absence. The method of presentation in this section will be to 
discuss in turn the three general categories of variables influerioing 
supply. 
The only inflow of funds variable achieving significance in Equation 
5.2 is the weighted-pooled version of time and demand deposits.^ The 
two period lag and the particular weights used were derived by s^arately 
entering the two variables as a polynomial distributive lag function in 
These two deposit variables are in net flow terms even though 
delta signs are not appended to them. Refer to Appendix B for a cong)lete 
description of each. 
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the estimation equation»^ When demand and tine deposits were entered 
separately but simultaneously, one or both of the variables were insig­
nificant; if the two variables were not entered simultaneously, they 
were significant. Such an occurrence points to intercorrelation among 
the variables. To alleviate this problem, the weighted con^site out­
lined above was incorporated. Considerable ad hoc experimentation 
using various lags and weights was carried out but those shown in 
Equation $.2 performed the best; therefore, it was concluded that the 
polynomial distributive lag technique used was satisfactoxy. 
Since mortgage repaynœnt data are not available for CSs, an attempt 
was made to incozporate a proxy variable* The variable used was the 
seasonally unadjusted installment credit repaid to all commercial banks. 
The variable's coefficient was not significantly different from zero 
nor was it consistently signed. Other proxies for repayments met a 
similar fate. 
The Fanny May-Ginry May secondary market variable was also insig­
nificant. This derives from the fact that CBs hold a relatively small 
amount of federally underwritten mortgages in their portfolios. The 
advent of the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation may make the sec­
ondary market an important source of funds for CBs, but, unfortunately, 
^Following the technique outlined by Almon (U), a second degree 
polynomial with a four period lag and tied to zero on both ends gave 
the best results. The coefficients associated with the change in time 
deposits was 2.$ times as large as those associated with the change in 
demand d^wsits. The mean lag for time deposits was 2.36 periods whereas 
that of demand deposits was 1 #8 periods. The time deposits equation had 
a considerably higher coefficient of determination (0.73) than did the 
demand deposits version (0*58) • The lags and weights used also seem 
propos on an intuitive lUsis. Silber (59) also got similar weights. 
90 
only tine can provide the answer. 
The Meltzer index of monetaiy stringency, the proxy for expected 
mortgage market conditions, is highly significant in Equation $.2. 
There was concern about this variable being coUinear with the time 
trend; however, such does not appear to be the case. Equation 5*3 
was the result when the monetary base measure replaced the Meltzer index. 
5.3 if « - 800 + .102(.67T]f + .33DD^). _ + 12885ACT+ + 2986MB. . 
(1.13) (5.51) (2.77) (2.00) 
+ ^ 87(im-lg)t_i - 358S^ + iiOSg + 299S3 - 8.05T 
(2.01) (3.87) (O.UU) (3.28) (0.9lt) 
-2 
r - .72 
D-¥ - 1.]i2 
SEE » 273.0 
The monetaiy base variable is statistically significant and signed 
opposite the Msltzer index variable. It appears the MB variable and 
T are coUinear in Equation 5.3 which makes probability statements 
about their coefficients inçjossible and apparently causes chaos ajsong 
the other variables. The addition of the monetary base variable leads 
one to suspect the resulting equation is less reliable than Equation 5.2. 
Not only does the coefficient of multiple determination decrease sub­
stantially but the constant term reverses polarity, the D-W statistic 
becomes dangerously low, the coefficient of the deposits variable doubles 
and its significance increases markedly, and the time trend takes on the 
wrong sign as well as becomes not significant. Malticollinearity may 
also exist between the deposit variable and MB. Even though computed 
partial regression coefficients may be unbiased when nulticollinearity 
exists, their standard errors will have a tendency to be high; this 
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dilemma can lead to indebezninancy- about their statistical significance. 
For the above reasons, the monetary base variable is excluded from 
further analysis and Equation 5*3 is judged less reliable than the 
previous estimation equation* 
As an experiment, both of the above measures of monetaiy conditions 
were excluded and total excess reserves of all Federal Reeerve System 
members were substituted. The excess reserves variable failed to reach 
an acceptable level of significance regardless of the form in which it 
was entered, i.e., lagged, unlagged, differenced and lagged, etc. This 
result does not invalidate the practice of using the volume of excess 
reserves as a measure of monetaiy stringency or ease, it simply fails 
to document their inportance in explaining mortgage credit flows by CBs.^ 
The current quarter, first-differenced form of the conçosite 
credit term is significant in Equation 5.2. The importance of this 
value in explaining supply attests to the significance of including 
all measures of the credit terms. Credit rationing can occur in more 
than one way and the conçwsite term points out the trade-offs among the 
rationing instruments. 
The only other loan profitability variable included in Equation $.2 
is the difference in the mortgage and the long-term government rates s 
This variable performed best when lagged one quarter. The lag was 
determined by the regression analysis and the author knows of no logical 
or economic reason for its existence. The (i^-ig) variable was included 
^ Huang (35) discusses the use of excess reserves as a measure of 
monetary policy in a housing study. 
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because, of the three rate differenced variables associated with CBs, 
it performed best when entered s^arately* Due to high uulticolHn-
earity, all the variables could not be included similtaneou s]y. When 
entered together, the standard error of the equation and that of each 
independent variable increased, and their coefficients were not signif­
icantly different from zero* When recorded separately, the order of 
their significance, from high to low, was (i^-ig), (ij^-i^), and (i^-ig^); 
however, the latter two were not statistically significant. Parenthet­
ically, all rate differenced variables had the largest t-statistic when 
lagged one quarter. 
The linear time trend should be included because when it was 
eliminated from Equation $*2, the equation's eocplanatoiy power pro-
foundly deteriorated (ÏÏ of 0.71 and SEE of 373). The seasonal dunmies 
perfoiroed as cjçected with the exception of S^, This result clashes 
with that observed from SLAs and ïGBs in the previous chapters but 
agrees with Silber's findings (^9, p. 97). This anomaly is not con­
sidered important aid is mentioned only to point out a uniqueness of 
CB operation. 
Portfolio complexities and other immeasurable cooplications have 
made the GBs move difficult to analyze than the noabankLng inteimediaries= 
The results obtained in this exposition compare favorably with those 
obtained other researchers; consequently, there is no need for an 
apology of the less than Utopian results. The operation of CBs is clut­
tered with innumerable factors lAich are neither measurable nor amendable 
to rational economic analysis; mortgage loan operations of CBs, to the 
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detriment of housing researchers, are not atypical»^ 
Equation Performance and Forecasting 
Table $.1 di^lays the performance of Equation 5«2 over the sample 
period. The tracking power of the equation is not as good as desired 
but is acc^table considering the ccmplexity of CB portfolio decisions. 
The peaks and troughs of the actual data series are traced but sons of 
the other ttimiiig points are missed* Various other variables thought 
to be relevant were tried in Equation $.2 to improve its predictive 
power, but all failed either due to genuine insignificance or because 
multicolUnearity was masking their iinporbance. The tentative con­
clusion of this writer is that CB operations are exceedingly conçlex 
and a single linear equation is unable to capture this corplexityo 
A forecast of the dependent variable was performed for the last 
two quarters of 1972. These predictions appear in Table $.2. The errors 
are larger than we would have liked, but considering the complexities 
of CBs, th^ can be tolerated. Other intermediary mortgage credit 
flow estimates have also yielded poor results for CBs. As can be seen 
by observing Table the mortgage lending volume of CBs has been 
extremely fickle. This is probably because mortgage funds forthcoming 
from CBs are contingent upon the demand of other borrowers and investors. 
The CB is an intermediary primarily devoted to the credit needs of the 
business sector and CB funds flowing into mortgage credit are those 
^Adams (1, 2) provides a jocular presentation of the irrational­
ities of some commercial banking practices. 
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TABLE 5.1 
Estimated, actual and residual values of 
(In millions of dollars) 
Quarter Actual 
(From Eq, 5*2) 
Estimated Residual 
196U:1 1*18 3lt1 77 
2 856 712 iWt 
3 682 lOUt -362 
h 501 622 -121 
1965:1 1:55 IM 11 
2 995 859 136 
3 1191 939 252 
it 813 7U9 6it 
1966:1 1*35 520 -85 
2 978 819 159 
3 669 1105 -106 
k U07 617 -2liO 
1967:1 lit 76 -62 
2 597 691 -9h 
3 1152 1ii02 -250 
a 1003 1030 -27 
1968:1 515 363 152 
2 956 1107 -151 
3 1138 880 256 
li 1182 851 328 
1969:1 869 787 82 
2 1230 1033 197 
3 799 785 11; 
h 2li2 367 -125 
1970:1 
-5 -5i 1*6 
2 282 383 -101 
3 527 U59 68 
11 322 559 -237 
1971:1 703 858 -155 
2 1920 1973 -153 
3 2117 2032 85 
h 172I; l5ZtO 181* 
1972:1 1933 15U0 181* 
2 28U5 2350 1*95 
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remaining after basiness needs are fulfilled* This i^enomenon gives 
rise to the mortgage credit market acting as a balance wheel of the 
general econony and commercial banks^ by dint of the sizable mortgage 
funds they loan, accentuates these countercyclical movements. These 
highly capricious movements cong)licate any attezg>t8 to e]q)lain ration­
ally mortgage credit supply behavior of CBsj thus, our results from 
Equation 5=2 above are less than ideal but as good as can be e^^cted. 
TABLE 5.2 
Forecasted values of based 
on Equation 5*2 
(In millions of dollars) 
Quarter Actual Estimated Residual 
Percent 
error 
1972:3 3192i 2598 596 18.5 
1972:U 2806 2U39 367 13.0 
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CHAPTER VI. 
THE SHORT-RUN DETERMINANTS OF MORTGAGE CREDIT 
SUPPLIED BY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES 
The last major group of financial inteimediarles to be considered 
in this study is Life Insurance Companies (LICs) # There will be no 
attenpt to classify these intermediaries by type of organization, class 
of customer, extent of diversification, etc#; they are treated as an 
industiy supplying a homogenous product. Of the four financial inter­
mediaries being analyzed during this saaple period, only CBs are larger 
than LICs in teims of total assets. But in terms of total residential 
mortgage loans outstanding, LICs are the smallest of the fcur»^ The 
portfolio of the typical LIC includes government and corporate securities 
as well as real estate mortgage loans* Their investment diversity is 
much greater than SLAs and 16Bs but probably not as complex as CBs* 
Prom 1966 forward, LICs have been increasing their residential 
mortgage lending but, generally, at a decreasing rate whereas the other 
three intermediaries have not consistently followed this trend. The 
insurance companies appear to be moving away from residential property 
Ipor balance sheet items and the record of mortgage activity of 
LICs, see (U7)* During 1972:U total assets of SLAs eroeeded those of 
LICs for the first time. 
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and into nonresidential and commercial loans;^ however, there is some 
evidence that this downward trend is presently being reversed. Never­
theless, the secular trend of the change in residential mortgage loans 
outstanding daring the time interval spanned by this analysis has un­
questionably been downward. Residential mortgage loans accounted for 
about thirty percent of the total assets of LICs In 1965 but had de­
creased to approximately twenty percent by the end of 1971. Since the 
LICs hold a relatively small portion of their total assets as resi­
dential mortgages, there is a substantial potential for expansion; 
however, this potential is not an item of concern in this esqposition. 
In the interval covered by this stu(^y, LICs have tended to sub­
stitute conventional mortgages for federally underwritten ones. For 
example, in 1965, FHA, VA, and conventional instruments accounted for 
^proximately twenty-three, eleven, and sixty-six percent, respectively, 
of total residential mortgage loans outstanding by LICs. At the begin­
ning of 1971; the ratios had changed to seventeen; eighty and seveiïty-
five percent, respectively. 
The analysis of LICs will be similar to that of the other inter­
mediaries. The one characteristic of LICs s^arating them from the 
other financial institutions is their heavy reliance upon forward commit­
ments. A general discussion of the hypothesized independent variables 
follows; then the espixlcal results will be presented and analyzed. 
^LICs are also moving away from l-^o-U family residential units 
and toward mltiple-family structures. 
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Supply Variables 
The objective of this chapter is to develop an equation to explain 
the net change in residential mortgage loans outstanding of all LICs* 
This variable is taken to be the volume of residential mortgage credit 
supplied by LICs during the quarter. Even though this supply variable 
has been decreasing through time, it is still of sufficient magnitude 
to influence substantially the volume of credit flowing into the housing 
industry. 
Intuitively, the volume of mortgage credit supplied by LICs should 
be determined by the same general types of variables which determined 
that of other financial institutions. Following the motif established 
in the previous chapters, the four general classes of variables listed 
for SLA.S and I6Bs will be analyzed on an intuitive level and then ac­
cepted or rejected on the basis of the regression results. Again, any 
simultaneity problems are considered to be of a second order magnitude 
not seriously biasing the results. 
Inflow of funds 
At year-end 1971 > only one LIC was a member of the FHLBSj therefore, 
advances from this system should not influence the credit supply behavior 
of LICs. Federally underwritten mortgages constitute only about twenty-
five percent of all residential mortgages held at the end of 1971; there­
fore, the secondaiy market activity of Faniqr Kay-Ginny May is likely to 
have no measureable influence on supply activity of LICs. If the sec­
ondary market is important, it should be negatively signed because of 
the reasons e:qx)unded in previous chapters. 
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The inflow of funds from mortgage repayments should have a sub­
stantial positive impact upon the residential mortgage credit supply 
behavior of the insurance industzy* These data are not available for 
all Lie s but it does exist for a sanple of the whole which accounts 
for about eighty percent of the industry's assets ($6). This repay­
ments variable has been most important for the other nonbanking finan­
cial intermediaries and no exception is expected for LICs» The volume 
of repayment—especially pr^ayment s—are likely to be influenced by 
other included variables, e.g., mortgage interest rates, but this 
simultaneity is not deemed in^rtant and will be ignored. 
The remaining inflow source is that of premium payments and return 
on investments J This source is analogous to deposits at the other 
intermediaries. A proxy for the nonrepayments inflow will be necessary 
since no explicit data series are available. The proxy to be utilized 
is the net change in total assets of all LICs minus the net change in 
policy loans and premium notes outstanding. This proxy is esqpeefced 
to influence positively the supply behavior of these intermediaries. 
The sign of this variable may be troublesome because assets have sec­
ularly increased while the dependent variable has generally declined; 
hence, the relationship is likely to appear negative. This, of course, 
alien to prudent investment behavior and mast be dismissed if we assume 
^Premium payments account for seventy-five percent and investment 
earnings twenty-one percent of the total income of all LICs in 1970 
(it?, p. 58). 
p 
Jaffee (Ul) used a similar proxy to measure "deposits" at LICs. 
His variable was life insurance reserves and other liabilities less 
policy loans. 
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rational economic behavior.^ Hopefully, the time trend will play its 
proper role and compensate for the entire downward drift of aggregate 
supply. 
Commitiaenbs 
Life Insurance Coii^>anies make extensive use of the forward commit­
ment process; thus, it seems likely that past commitments ^ ould influ-
2 
ence current mortgage credit supply behavior. LICs have a unique 
advantage over the other mortgage credit supplying institutions, viz., 
they can more accurately predict their inflow and outflow of funds. 
The relative certainty of fund flows allows them to commit monies fur­
ther in advance. For example, according to the life Insurance Association 
of America (27, p. 2); 
The turnover period ... for mortgage and real property commitments 
out stan ding, averaging 15 months during 1971, only about 1^ months 
ahortei.* than in 1970, with the greater part of the contraction 
(about one month) traceable to increased cancellations. 
Jaffas, for ens, has ssçirically dcsusantsd the importance of this vezy 
long commitment stnicture.^ 
One might argue that as the industry grows it becomes less 
interested in residential mortgages and therefore reduces its relative 
holding of the instruments. The opinion of this writer is that more 
assets spell more residential mortgages, ceteris paribus; unfortunately, 
other forces are operating to cause the rssidestial sortgages to diminish 
in importance to the LIC. Jaffee (1*1 ) did obtain a statistically 
significant positve coefficient for his "deposit" variable, so there 
is some hope. 
^Both Silber (59) and Jaffee (Ul) have found commitments very 
inçx>itant in influencing the volume of funds LICs provide to the mort­
gage market, 
^Ih his credit supply equation he has a distributive lag structure 
of new commitments going back seven quarters, see (l;1)o 
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Since the loan coninitnents are made for such a long time in the 
future, it is expected that recent conmdtments will not influence current 
supply behavior. At least not in any consistent way. The sign of the 
commitments variable should be positive as it was for MSBs, In view of 
the conplicated nature of LIC commitments, a distributive lag structure 
is probably the best way to express this variable. The only deviation 
from Jaffee's analysis will be to exclude recent commitments if thoy 
are not significant. The volume of advance commitments any LIC is willing 
to make mast necessarily depend upon the trend in other included vari­
ables, and to increase efficiency a separate commitments equation prob­
ably should be constmcted. As has been repeatedly pointed out, such 
an approach would doubtless add more complication than clarity; conse­
quently, some error is tolerated to insure siiqalicity. 
Expected mortgage market conditions 
The e^qpected mortgage market conditions should be properly reflected 
by monetary conditions. The Meltzer index and the monetary base measure 
will again be used as the variables measuring monetary influences. 
There is some doubt about these variables being of measureable impor­
tance in Lie activity. This arises because of the long-term commit-
msnts of these institutions. Comndtmsnts are based on future expected 
monetary conditions; these «jqjected conditions may or may not materi­
alize. Hence, the relationship between current supply activity and 
present monetary conditions is likely to be haphazard at the very best. 
To complicate the picture, LICs are probably more interested in principal 
security than income security because of their long-term, fixed dollar 
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liabilities* This phenomenon may lead to seemingly unorthodox invest­
ment behavior* ^ toto, the expected mortgage market conditions are 
thought to be inplLcitly included in commitments and the monetaiy indices 
will probably prove uninçîortant in explaining stçply b^avior* 
Loan profitability 
A C0nç)0site credit term index was constructed as previously out­
lined. This variable is expected to influence positively mortgage credit 
supplied by LICs* No doubt the variable will have to be first-differenced 
to reflect relative changes in profitability before it will be statisti­
cally significant* 
The balance sheet of the life insurance industry shows the primary 
investments to be mortgages, corporate securities, government securities, 
and policy loans in the order of their importance. Policy loans almost 
tripled daring the period of this study and in 1971 thçy exceeded govern­
ment securities in importance. This substantial increase has been 
attributed to the general rise in interest rates on other forms of 
borrowing (U7j p* 90). Policy loans must be made by LICs when customers 
request them; consequently, their volume is largely independent of 
investment policies of LICs. Even though policy loans are made from 
funds wuieu ïîOulu otuôrwisô bô iavcBted by LICs, they are not coziâidôrëd 
to conçete with mortgage loans on an interest return basis because their 
rate has consistently been below that of mortgage laons* The volume of 
policy loans are considered in the dqwsit inflow variable above; there­
fore, no e3q)licit variable including their interest rate is deemed 
necessary. 
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The balk of the corporate securities are in bonds, debentures, 
and notes of greater than one year maturity* A variable representing 
the difference in the residential mortgage rate and the Aaa corporate 
bond rate will be included in the regression equation. The two most 
Ijiçwrtant domestic government securities held are U.S. Treasury and 
state and local obligations. The rate on these securities will be 
differenced from the mortgage rate to form two additional variables. 
Their relationship, either substitute or complement, will be deter­
mined by the sign of their coefficient in the regression analysis. 
No doubt the above mentioned interest rate variables will be 
collinear and one or more of them excluded from the analysis. If^ in 
fact, LICs are more concerned with principal rather than income security, 
interest rate variables may prove uninçKsrtant in explaining mortgage 
credit supplied. The interest rate is likely to be the determining 
factor, if and only if, all other considerations are equal. 
Further considerations 
Seasonal dumny variables and a linear time trend are included to 
condensate for cyclical and secular fluctuations, respectively. The 
time trend should display a negative coefficient because of the decline 
in the dependent variable during the period of this -studys No particular 
polarity pattern is hypothesized for the seasonal duranies. 
From the above a priori analysis, generic Equation 6.1 is formu­
lated to explain the residential mortgage credit supplied by the life 
insurance industry. Some of the variables will probably need to be 
lagged and/or differenced to be significant ; others will probably be 
lOli 
6.1 = dg ^ <J,D1 4. OJRJ 4. + di^crj , dçKP^ ^  d^MM^ 
1*0 
+ ^ 8(V^c)t •'^9^V^sl)t +dl0^i + diiSg 
+ di2S2 + d^jT + u where 0<w^< 1 
excluded on the basis of the t-sfcatistic. The signs of the coefficients 
are expected to be as follows: 
d^>Oj d2>0j dj>0; d|^>0; d^<Oj d^fOj d^^Oj dg=Oj d^lOj 
d^QïïOj d'^2§0j 0# 
The w^'s should all be positive but the more recent commitments are 
not e3q)ected to be statistically significant. Equation 6.1 will now 
be estimated and the variables rejected or accepted on the basis of 
the regression results. 
Empirical Results 
Generic Equation 6.1 was estimated by ordinary least squares 
and all the hypothesized variables failing to achieve significance 
were excluded from the analysis. Equation 6,2 is the end result of the 
estimation since it performed best with respect to the usual measures, 
6,2 = -358 + .92Rt-i+ .66(EwiCj.i) + 5771^^.^+ hhl 
(0,96) (3,0U) (3.il6) (2.8k) (2,25) 
- 386(i^-i^)^_^ - 2i;.5S, - 133S2 - I39S3 - L8.2T 
(2.18) (0.5k) (2,89) (3.06) (k,i5) 
ÏÏ^  « ,85 where w, = O.16, Wcf° 0.23, w, = 0.23 
D-W = 1.67 
SEE » 137,0 Wy = 0,25, and wg = 0.13 
The signs of the coefficients conform to those hypothesized above and 
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estimation Equation 6,? esqjlains eighty-five percent of the "variaction 
in the residential mortgage credit supply behavior of LICs, The D-W 
statistic is lower than desired because it does not rule out the possi­
bility of positive serial correlation; however, neither does it confirm 
its existence. The SEE is $137 million which is about eighteen percent 
of the average value of the dependent variable. Ideally, the SEE could 
be lower but considering the portfolio diversity of LICs, eighteen 
percent is not extremely large. The result obtained in Equation 6.2 
will be explained by analyzing the generic Equation 6,1 and giving 
the reasons for excluding or including a particular variable. 
As was expected, mortgage repayments appear to be veiy important 
in Equation 6.2. The significance of the lagged value of this variable 
is not readily explainable because there is no apparent reason for such 
behavior by LICs. The lagged value was found to be more iuportant 
than its unlagged counterpart and it was chosen solely on the badis 
of the regression results. It seems logical to assume that LICs can 
predict accurately their repayments volume and commit new funds accord­
ingly bKt apparently there is soiss lag involved. This unexpected result 
could be based on the lengthy commitment structure or a wait and see 
attitude about policy loan activity. The unlagged value of this vari­
able was correctly signed and its coefficient was approximately the same 
(0.95) but the standard error was considerably higher; therefore, it 
was not as desirable as the lagged version.^ 
^The t-statistic of the unlagged repayments was 1 There would 
probably be little hana done by using the unlagged as opposed to the lagged 
version but frcm a forecasting standpoint, a known value is preferable 
to an unknown one. 
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The proxy variable for the "deposits" inflow, change in total 
assets minus the change in policy loans outstanding, failed to be signif­
icant in its lagged or unlagged form. This was a disappointment because, 
intuitively, nonrepayment inflows would seem to be important in eiqplain-
ing supplyWhen the deposits variable was included in the regression 
equation its coefficient was consistently of a negative sign but never 
significantly different from zero. This may or may not be a result of 
the secular decline of the dependent variable but it made little differ­
ence when the time trend was excluded. The above outcome, plus Jaffee's 
marginal results for this variable, points to its unimportance, at 
least in its present form. 
As expected the Fanqy May-Ginny îfeiy secondary market variable was 
not significant. This result was hypothesized because of the relative 
uninportance of federally underwritten instruments in the LIC portfolio. 
This result may be altered as the new secondary market in conventionals 
gains inqjortancej therefore, any future research should at least consider 
this variable. 
The commitment variable is correctly signed and statistically 
significant in the estimation equation. As hypothesized, the recently 
made corandtmeaits do not aid in the explanation of current mortgage 
credit supplied by LICs. This result evolves from the fact that very 
few short"^erm commitments are made ly the industry• The commitment 
variable in Equation 6.2 does not include any commitment data during 
^The size of the "deposits" coefficient in Jaffee's analysis 
indicates the variable's importance is marginal at most. 
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the immediately preceding quarters.^ The weights (w^'s) associated 
with the lags are based on the results from a distributive lag analysis 
of the variables using the Almon lag technique* The results shown in 
Equation 6.2 are the same as those of the Almon lag analysis; the present 
2 
method of presentation was chosen because it was more straightforward. 
The current through the three quarter lagged values of the variable 
were insignificant when tried on an individual or a composite basis. 
A distributive lag function which included these variables was clearly 
inferior to the one used. An e:q)eriment was performed by individually 
including the lagged values of the commitment data in Equation 6.2. 
The variables were not consistently signed until the lourth quarter; 
the lagged variables remained positively signed and statistically valid 
_2 through an eight quarter lag. The R 's of the resulting equations 
peaked in the analysis using the seven quarter lag.^ 
^This result differs from that of Jaffee's because his commitment 
term included the current through a seven quarter lag. Furthermore, 
his weights declined as the lag increased. Such a result is suspicious 
because of the large weights given to recent commitments. This structure 
neither conforms to that found in this analysis nor the commitments 
policies of LICs documented by the LIAA (27); however, such an approach 
was necessary for Jaffee's simulation model. 
'^The only difference in the two methods is that the Almon technique 
will cause the weights to change through time whereas weights assigned 
in Equation 6.2 are permanent through time. This limitation is justi­
fied since it will be easier to forecast when the weights are fixed. 
%he values for the through equations were 0.776, 
0.816, 0.823, 0.827, and 0.769, respectively. Notice that these are 
almost perfectly correlated with the weights used even though the two 
values were derived independently. 
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The monetarists measure of monetary policy, the monetary base 
variable, performed better than the Meltzer index bit neither were 
important. The first-difference form of the monetary base measure 
consistently had a positive sign but was never significantly different 
from zero. The Meltzer index vas neither consistently signed nor sta­
tistically different from zero. This finding does not prove that LICs 
are uninterested in monetary conditions; it only points out that monetaiy 
movements as perceived l?y LICs are not being properly measured ly these 
variables or th^ are implicitly included in other independent variables. 
Regardless of the cause of their uninportance, the monetary measures 
were excluded from the estimation equation because th^ failed to 
improve its predictive power. 
The first-differenced, one quarter lagged form of the conposite 
credit term is included in Equation 6.? because to omit it iirç>aips the 
quality of the equation. The coirposite credit term has been important 
for all residential mortgage credit supplying intermediaries, albeit 
in slightly different foims, and apparently LICs are no exception. It 
only seems reasonable that all the mortgage credit terms should be 
inportant and the cosçosite term used in the above analysis is the 
vehicle for their inclusion. 
Opportunity cost is also important in mortgage lending decisions; 
this can be reflected by considering other substitute and conçlement 
portfolio it«ns. The corporate and U.S. Goveimment bond rates, when 
differenced from the mortgage rate, were inçîortant in explaining supply 
in Equation 6.2. These rates differenced variables performed best when 
lagged one quarter. Even though LICs hold a substantial quantity of 
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state, local, and political subdivision bonds, the rate differenced 
variable associated with these failed the significance test and was 
excluded as an independent variable. 
The positive sign associated with the federal government rate 
variable implies that these instruments and residential mortgages are 
substitutes* The negative sign associated with the corporate bond rate 
is indicative of complementsThere is, of course, a possibility for 
the opposite association between the above instruments but the signs of 
the regression coefficients do not support such a relationship* 
The lie s estimation equation includes only lagged independent 
variables; therefore, accurate short-teim forecasts of the dependent 
variable should be possible. This should be true even though the SEE 
is relatively high. My multicoUinearity among the variables in 
Equation 6,2 should not restrict the forecasting potential as long 
as the interrelationships continue to exist. And there is no reason 
to assume that LICs will substantially alter their behavior in the 
future. 
Equation Performance and Forecasting 
The estimated and residual values obtained from Equation 6*2 are 
contained in Table 6.1 along with the actual values of the dependent 
variable. 3h general, the estimated values track the actual series 
^It has been said (59, p. 100) that portfolio items having similar 
risks will be substitutes whereas ones having dissimilar risks will 
be coBçlements. %is dictum does not appear to be verified by the 
regression analysis of LICs* 
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TABLE 6.1 
Estimated J actual, and residual values of 
(Ih millions of dollars) 
Quarter Actual 
(From Eq. 6,2) 
Estimated Residual 
196ii:1 770 9L9 -179 
2 861 1033 -172 
3 983 989 -6 
k 1526 1535 -9 
1965:1 1030 1090 -60 
2 883 975 -92 
3 917 952 
-35 
li 1l7k 1W5 59 
1966:1 112U 1022 102 
2 1060 865 195 
3 1076 832 2hh 
h 1107 1263 -156 
1967:1 962 939 23 
2 513 626 -113 
3 201 U05 -20U 
h 799 899 -100 
1968:1 383 L95 -112 
2 356 122 -66 
3 LT"! lùiG J » 
k 1020 799 221 
1969:1 li26 390 36 
2 L20 501 -81 
3 L50 531 -81 
U 789 723 66 
1970:1 590 531 59 
2 555 613 -58 
3 377 29h 83 
h 818 731 8U 
1971:1 295 375 -80 
2 
-15 -89 7U 
3 236 277 -hi 
U 786 795 -9 
1972:1 2 1:26 -li2U 
2 72 -71 110 
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but there are unexpected divergences in the two series. The complicated 
portfolio of LICs and the secular decline of the dependent variable 
doubtless hobbles the equation's general performance; however, the 
equation tracks more than adequate and should render useful forecasts 
of the endogenous variable. 
The last two quarters of 1972 were estimated and the results appear 
in Table 6,2, The estimated value for 1972:3 is well within tolerance 
but the 1972:U forecast is too low. This under prediction arises because 
of the prodigious increase in the dependent variable during 1972sU» The 
estimation equation did give a substantial increase for the period but 
due to the averaging characteristic inherent to regression analysis, 
the estimate was far short of the mark. The equation will doubtless 
adjust to the substantial shift in the following time period unless the 
dependent variable again fluctuates wildly. The results obtained from 
Equation 6,2, when combined with the estimation equations of the above 
analyzed intermediaries, should serve as a basis for forecasting aggre­
gate residential construction activity. This task is the basis of the 
chapter to follow. 
TABLE 6,2 
Forecasted values of M"*" 
based on Equation 6,2 
(In millions of dollars) 
Quarter Actual Estimated Residual Percent 
error 
1972:3 260 289 29 10 
1972:% 1UU5 980 U65 U7 
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CHAPTER VII. 
AGGREGATE MORTGAGE CREDIT SUPPLIED AND 
RESIDQITIAL HOUSING CQISTRUCTION 
The volume (or value) of construction activity undertaken in the 
residential home building industiy is but one step removed from the 
mortgage credit market. For example, during the period under investi­
gation the increase in residential mortgage debt outstanding at the 
four primary intermediaries as a percentage of value of new residential 
construction activity ranged from a low of fifty-one percent in 1966 
to a high of eighty-two percent in 1961; and 1971* These data along 
with the total new housing starts, exclusive of mobile home shipments, 
are shown in Table 7*1* There appears to be a similarity of movement 
between changes in mortgage debt at the selected institutions and both 
value of new construction and new housing units offered. It can be 
cogently argued that causality runs from mortgage credit to construction 
value and new starts because financing mast come before, or at the latest 
simultaneously with, actual construction.^ Due to the substantial cost 
of the average home, advance assurance of long-term financing is a 
necessary prerequisite for most potential buyers. The contractor, builder, 
or developer must be reasonably sure a market exists before he undertakes 
^ Oftentimes the intermediary provides construction funds with the 
intention of permanently financing the units when they are marketed by 
the builder. For a discussion of the causality direction from mortgage 
credit to housing starts, see (35, p* 122$). 
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construction activity. Thus, indirectly the availability of mortgage 
credit spars the builder to meet the demand of potential homeowners*^ 
The upshot of this chain of events is that once mortgage credit flows 
are estimated, we are in a favorable position to estimate construction 
activity. If mortgage credit forthcoming can be estimated, forecasting 
housing starts is a logical corollary. 
TABLE 7.1 
Change in outstanding residential mortgage debt, 
value of new residential construction, 
and new private housing starts 
Change in debt 
outstanding: Value of new Debt as 
residential residential percent New 
property construction of const. units 
Year^ (bil. of $) (bil. of $) exp. (thous.) 
I96U 23.0 28.0 82 1529 
1965 21 .7 27.9 78 1U73 
1966 13.0 25.7 51 1165 
1967 16:1 25.6 63 1292 
1968 17.2 30.6 56 1508 
1969 17.8 33.2 5U 1167 
1970 16.6 31.9 52 lU3li 
1971 35.2 U3.1 82 2052 
^Source: Federal Reserve Bulletin 
In the previous ch^ters, each of the primary mortgage credit 
scQjplying inteiroediaiy groups has been analyzed and an equation devel­
oped to forecast the short-run supply of residential mortgage credit 
There are, of course, errors of judgement made which cause gluts 
and shortages as well as a certain amount of outright speculation. The 
vacancy rate of new homes, both nationally and locally, is the barometer 
which keeps the construction activity in tune with actual demand. 
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from each* Table 7.1 shows that a large percentage of the fonds for 
residential structures come from these internediaries; thus, the supply 
of credit from these institutions will serve as a prory for all funds 
flowing to residential structures. The objective of this chapter is to 
forma late equations to e^qjlain residential housing construction activity» 
The heart of these equations will be the summation of the mortgage 
credit supplied by the above analyzed financial institutions* The 
statistical method used will again he least squares multiple regression 
but the volume of mortgage credit supplied during the time period will 
now be an independent variable in the regression analysis. The dependent 
variables will be indicators of residential housing activity, either 
starts or value of new construction. 
Relationships of the Various Intermediaries 
Prior to incorporating aggregate mortgage credit supplied by the 
four above mentioned intsrrssdiariss, it raist be shown that the activities 
of one group do not appreciably influence the operation of the others. 
To assess interdependence, two-stage least squares was used on the 
primaiy estimation equations fomailated in the previous four chapters. 
Each equation was reestimated with the dependent variables of each 
equation serving, in turn, as an ind^endent variable in the equation 
being analyzed. For example, the SLA estimation Equation 3.3 was 
reestimated using if, and M^, one at a time, as independent variables.^ 
^It would have been better to include siimiltaneously all three 
of the mortgage credit supply variables as independent variables but 
the required conçwter time would have been prohibitively expensive. 
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If these new independent variables are insignificant and the estimation 
equations are not materially altered^ this points to independence of 
the estimation equations* There are four intermediaries which mist be 
analyzed two at a time; therefore, we have a total of twelve two-stage 
least squares regressions to analyze to exhaust all possibilities*^ 
This two-stage analysis did not indicate the presence of interdependence 
because in each case the t-statistic associated with the intermediaxy 
independent variable was insignificant and the two-stage results did not 
deviate substantially from the ordinary least squares findings* The 
largest degree of interdependence seems to exist between SL&s and CBs* 
If one were to hypothesize an interrelationship between any two of the 
above groups of intezuediaries, I6Bs and SlAs would probably be chosen 
because of their primary «phasis on supplying funds to prospective home­
owners; however, the two-stage results do not document a similarity of 
credit supply operations*^ Ih none of the two-stage equations was the 
explanatory power of the equation superior to those of the ordinary 
least squares equations derived above* The negative outcome of the two-
stage analysis fails to document the interdependence of the estimation 
^Only the two-stage version of the primary estimation equation 
was fonailated. 
^When was included in the SLA. equation, its coefficient was 
-0*58 and had a t-stati^ic of -1 *U8* When was included in the CB 
equation, its coefficient was 0*13 %dth a t value of 1 *01* 
3The variable in the SIA equation had a coefficient of 0*59 
but the t-statistic was only 0*7Uj the variable in the !BB equation 
di^layed a partial regression coefficient of 0*03 and a t value of 1 *30* 
For an analysis of the mortgage credit cycles of the four intermediaries 
and how they differ, see (1U)* 
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equations previously forimlated. If the two-stage analysis would have 
shown TTutual dependence, the task here would have been simplified since 
the mortgage credit supplied by one intennediary could have been used 
as a proxy for the credit supplied by all. It is not being claimed that 
all Intermediaries act independently in their mortgage credit supply 
activities all the time, but only that their interdependency is negligible 
from a statistical stan^int. 
Since the two-stage least squares analysis undertaken above did 
not in^îly a substantial degree of interrelationships between the four 
credit supplying industries, it is appropriate to combine the four 
suqaply equations into one to obtain a proxy variable for total credit 
supplied to the residential mortgage market. This is accomplished by 
simply defining a new variable, which equals if + + if + 
The supply equations of the above chapters can be used to estimate the 
mortgage credit supplied by the individual intennediaries and the sum­
mation of these estimates serve as a measure for total intennediary 
credit supplied. These estimated values will be denoted by an asterisk; 
thus, rf* - M®* + + î?** + 
Measures of Residential Housing Activity 
There are numerous measures which could be used to assess changes 
in the supply of residential housing but probably the two most commonly 
used are new private residential housing starts (PIE) and the value of 
^Silber (59, 62) used a similar approach to total mortgage credit 
supply estimation. 
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private residential construction put in place (CPP), These two series 
were chosen because FBS is a physical measure of residential housing 
activity whereas CPP is a monetaiy measure. When price changes are taken 
into account, the two should be similar and Amctional]y related to the 
same variables. Assuming it is correct that mortgage credit availability 
is a requisite for additions to residential housing, it should be possible 
to explain PIE and (PP by considering intermediary credit supplied, 
The HiS variable will be analyzed first and then the CPP series will 
be examined. An attempt will be made to estimate these variables by 
using ordinary least squares multiple regression analysis. 
A cursory look at the PBS series indicates that construction 
activity wanes in the fourth and first quarters—the cooler months— 
and intensifies in the second and third quarters—the warmer months. 
Any regression equation designed to explain PHS must compensate for this 
seasonal pattern. The durany scheme previously employed is apropos. 
The seasonality pattern of the raw pHS data should yield a positive 
coefficient for the second and third quarters and a negative coefficient 
2 for the remaining quarters. 
Since no basic demand variables are being considered in this 
exposition, the only other variable needed to estimate PHS should be 
. Since is in current dollars and the cost of residential housing 
has been rising, to both builders and homeowners, we must deflate the 
^The exact descriptions and sources of these data series are given 
in Appendix 6. 
^The fourth quarter will be implicitly incorporated as it was 
previously. 
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credit supply variable to compensate. The deflator chosen is the Boeckh 
construction cost index of residences (B).^ The coefficient of (M^/B) 
should be positively signed and highly significant. The above analysis 
can be summarized as generic Equation 7.1. 
7.1 PHS = eg + e-] + 62^^ + 6^82 + e^S^ + u 
The initial estimation of Equation 7«1 over the sarqile period is 
_2 
shown as equation 7.2. The R is sufficiently high but the standard 
7.2 PIS = 181.7 + .01021 - 23.85^ + SG.jSg + 7.9S^ 
(7.2) (8.6) (1.67) (U.OO) (0.57) 
= .987 
D-W = .26 
SEE = li5.8 
error of the estimate of I|5,800 units is higher than desired. The D-W 
statistic implies positive correlation among the residuals which means 
the error terms are not independently distributed. An examination 
of the residuals indicated they were, without exception, negative prior 
to 1968:1 and always positive thereafter. This pattern indicates that 
a structural change took place between 1967 and 1968. An examination 
discloses no major event to account for such a change but numerous 
minor changes did occur. No single minor change was probably capable 
of generating the structural shift but when all are taken in concert, 
can explain the change. Some of the minor forces occurring were: (l) 
in 1968 Fanny Ifey was privatized and Ginny May was established; (2) 
the Housing Act of 1968 established a national housing policy for the 
sunmaiy description for this index is given in Appendix B. 
^For a discussion of the damage caused, see (23, pp. 1*9-69)• 
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U.S. calling for twenty-six million new and rehabilitated units ty 1978; 
(3) mobile home shipments increased; (li) the rate of inflation of housing 
as measured by the BoecWi index increased rapidly after 1968:^ {$) the 
FHLBS policy since has been more conducive to obtaining needed 
advances; and (6) in May of 1968 FNMA adopted a forward commitment 
2 program in contra-distinct ion to its prior over-the-counter market, 
There are other occurrences which influenced, both directly and indi­
rectly, the relationship of PIE and deflated but the above are suffi­
cient to see that a structural change in 1968 was highly probable.^ 
A single Eho transformation was performed on the variables of 
Equation 7*2 bat the autocorrelation was reduced only minimally. Repeated 
Rho transformations may have freed the equation of the bothersome auto­
correlation but to pursue this procedure would have hobbled forecasting 
because of the added conplexity. Hence, a dumiqy variable was incorporated 
to account for the shift. This was selected because of the clear-cut 
nature of the shift vhich occurred in 1966; The dursy variable (D) 
takes on the value zero prior to 1968:1 and the value one thereafter. 
Vlhen the durany was added and Equation 7*2 reestimated, the autocorrelation 
problem appears to be solved. The new results are shown as Equation 7*3 
^FrcE 196!;:1 to 1967:1; the Bosckh index increased from 0*866 to 1*029 
but from 1968:1 to 1971 :U the increase was from 1.03b to 1.375* 
^The uncertainties of the over-the-counter program have been 
eliminated, and with substantial forward commitments in hand, loan 
originators have not tended to cut back on lending as thqy often did 
prior to 1968 (58, p. 77). 
%or a discussion of structural change in the mortgage credit 
market, see (32, 33, 37, p* h3h, 6U). Jaffee (Li, pp. 35-7) also had 
to include a dummy variable to account for 1968 in his siimlation model. 
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and will be used as the primary estimation equation for PKB. 
7.3 PBS = 1U1.03 + .OU3U5(M'^/B) - 25.61 + 53.O6S2 + 9.928. 
(10.95) (17.92) (3.71) (7.9U) (1.17) 
+ 7L.77D 
(9.83) 
f = .997 
D-W - 1.85 
SEE = 22.09 
Equation 7.3 is a marked inproveraent over Equation 7.2 because 
of the higher t values, the significantly lower SEE, and the apparent 
absence of autocorrelation among the residuals. All the variables 
are properly signed and changes in PiB are almost perfectly explained. 
By first estimating if from the individual intermediaiy equations and 
then substituting into Equation 7.3 a reasonably accurate short-term 
forecast of PIE should be possible. 
The value of private residential construction put in place is a 
financial variable as is Mp; therefore, any structural change in mortgage 
credit is likely to influence both equally and there should be no need 
for a dumny variable as there was in the PHS equation. The GPP series 
is divided by the Boeckh index to make the deflated mortgage credit 
supply variable a common component of both residential housing activity 
equations. The deflated CPP series was estimated over the sample period 
and the results appear in Equation 7.U. 
7.U CPP/B - iili38.1 + ,S2kO^/Q) - 768,k6&j + 9I.9IS2 + 6^2.67S3 
(20.9) (12.W (6.W ) (0.79) (5.5) 
f = .997 
D-¥ = 1.59 
SEE = 383.8 
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The estimation equation conforms to expectations except the seasonal 
dummy for the fourth quarter has a positive coefficient of 3U»88« This 
outcome is not considered major, especially since the coefficient asso-
_2 
ciated with Sg may not be significantly different from zero. The R is 
exceedingly high, the SEE is approximately $38^ million which is less 
than five percent of the average value of the dependent variable, and 
the D-W statistic does not indicate the presence of autocorrelation 
among the error terms* Equation 7»k should give accurate short-run 
estimates of CPP/B when used to forecast outside the sanple period. 
Equation Performance and Forecasting 
Equation 7*3 vas estimated for the period 1961i;1 through 1972:2 
using the actual values for M^/B. To forecast PFB from this equation, 
must first be estimated from Equations 3*3, U«2, 5*2, and 6.2. 
To assess the tracking power of Equation 7 «3 over the sanple period, 
the estimated value for the total dexlated mortgage credit supplied by 
the intermediaries, was substituted for M^/B in the equation. 
The results of this estimation appear in Table 7*2* The size and pattern 
of the residuals indicate that the substitution of for if did not 
disrupt the tracking power of Equation 7*3* 
The final test for the efficacy of the PHS equation is to forecast 
outside the sample period* Since the estimated values for mortgage 
credit supplied by each intermediary has been made for 1972:3 and 1972:1;, 
is available and a forecast of PHS for these two quarters will be 
made* The resulting estimates appear in Table 7*3 along with actual 
PŒ and the estimation errors. The forecasts are well within the 
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TABLE 7.2 
Estimated, actual, and residual values of PHS 
from Equation 7 «3 when replaces if 
(In thousands) 
Quarter Actual Estimated Residual 
196U:1 335 332 3 
2 U77 U60 17 
3 U08 um -6 
h 359 380 -21 
1965:1 293 312 -19 
2 h66 151 17 
3 Loo Loi -1 
h 350 359 -9 
1966:1 283 303 -20 
2 Loi Loo 1 
3 296 293 3 
h 216 237 -21 
1967:1 218 223 -5 
2 382 377 5 
3 375 370 5 
h 333 323 10 
1968:1 293 312 -19 
2 Ià1 U55 -IL 
3 îill 397 IL 
b 36U 372 -8 
1969:1 32h 335 -11 
2 1*62 U77 -15 
3 379 389 -10 
li 302 303 -1 
1970:1 255 255 0 
2 388 395 -7 
3 loi 387 IL 
h 389 371 18 
1971:1 381 370 11 
2 59it 613 -19 
3 573 579 -6 
h 506 U83 23 
1972:1 $05 U78 27 
2 661 676 -15 
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acceptable margin and Equation 7*3, periodically updated, should continue 
to give accurate short-term predictions of private residential housing 
starts # 
TABLE 7.3 
Actual, estimated, and residual values of PHS 
for a period outside the sangle span 
(In thousands) 
Percent 
Quarter Actual Estimated Residual error 
1972:3 638 $99 39 6.0 
1972:4 55U 557 -3 0.5 
The methodology employed to estimate PIB from was also used 
to estimate CPP/B. Equation 7.U was utilized and the results for the 
sample period appear in Table 7*U* As can be observed from this table, 
the residuals are usually a small percent of the actual values. CPP/B 
was estimated for the last two quarters of 1972; this data as well as 
the actual values appear in Table 7*5* The estimates are reasonably 
accurate and compare favorably with the results obtained for the FrS 
variable. 
It has been the objective of this cheqpter, and actually the primary 
purpose of this exposition, to forecast residential housing starts. 
This has been accomplished via Equation 7#3» It is fully realized that 
to make long-term projections an assessment of basic demand variables 
would be necessary. The short-run technique used above concentrates 
strictly upon financial variables and should be updated as frequently 
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TABLE 7.1 
Estimated J actual, and residual values of CPP/B 
from Equation 7*U when r^laces 
(In millions of dollars) 
Quarter Actual Estimated Residual 
r- 
CM 
1 617U 8lW 
81|39 
7476 
6282 
7732 
82lt8 
7809 
-112 
U08 
191 
-333 
1965:1 
2 
3 
U 
5837 
79L5 
8298 
7382 
6039 
7626 
8091; 
7556 
-202 
319 
20h 
-17U 
1966:1 
2 
3 
k 
5783 
7301 
707li 
55U5 
5925 
7010 
6791 
6079 
-112 
291 
283 
-53U 
1967:1 
2 
3 
h 
U21U 
5706 
7111 
6711 
U968 
6732 
7715 
7112 
-75U 
-102b 
—6 oit 
-ItOI 
1968:1 
2 
5222 
6976 
5135 
6770 
87 
206 
à35 
195 h 
(pu«J 
6997 
f •:?' 
6802 
1969:1 
2 
3 
h 
5513 
718U 
733k 
6292 
5422 
7038 
7016 
5972 
91 
1]i6 
288 
320 
1970:1 
2 
3 
h 
li788 
6135 
66Ii6 
69U3 
W67 
601.9 
7019 
6792 
31+1 
86 
-373 
151 
1971:1 
2 
3 
k 
5811 
8133 
9081 
8802 
5831 
8676 
93Wt 
81L8 
-23 
-51i3 
-263 
65U 
1972:1 
2 
7hh9 
9195 
6535 
9k35 
91 It 
-2li0 
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as actual data allows; this will insure that the technique remains 
viable and capable of making accurate predictions. 
TABLE 7.5 
Actual, estimated, and residual values of CPP/B 
for a period outside the sample span 
(In millions of dollars) 
Quarter Actual Estimated Residual 
Percent 
error 
1972:3 9960 9576 36h 3.9 
'!972:h 9601 9038 563 6.0 
Some of the variables in the individual intermediary estimation 
equations can be or are controlled by various legal and regulatory 
agencies. This inplies that these controllable variables can be used 
as policy instruments to prompt desired action in the residential housing 
sector. This is sometimes a conplicated undertaking which deserves 
substantial consideration; therefore, these policy implications will 
be the topic of the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER VIII. 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Since 1968 the nation has had a formal housing goal; it is the 
desire of the Executive Branch of the government to realize this objec­
tive by 1978,^ While there are numerous obstacles, political as well 
as financial, standing in the way of achieving the goal of a decent 
home for eveiy american citizen, rmch concern has been expressed about 
financial feasibility.^ Particularily, will there be sufficient mort­
gage credit naturally forthcoming to realize the goal by 1978? Obvi­
ously, questions arise concerning other resource availability, includ­
ing manpower, materials, and land, but these nonfinancial a^ects of 
the problem are matters of only peripheral concern in this tractate.^ 
The studies assessing the naturally forthcoming mortgage credit 
needed to finance the American housing dream have concluded there is 
likely to be a deficiency unless drastic changes are made in the mort­
gage credit market (16, 66), Other researchers (e.g., 28) contend the 
^It is to be noted, however, no official study of the nation's 
resources and their allocation was made and no priorities were estab­
lished « For a critique of the 1968 HUD Act see (15, 20), 
^Based on the record since I968, it appears the goal is not being 
avidly pursued by the housing authorities and the legislators of this 
country irregardless of its feasibility. 
^Meltzer (50, pp. k3-S) believes these nonfinancial matters to 
be of utmost importance. 
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HUD Act of 1968 grossly underestimated the need for housing while some 
contend there is no housing deficiency presently and consequently no 
need for a federal policy bolstering the housing sector.^ Given that 
the consensus opinion of financial shortage is correct, the question 
to be answered is how should this gap be alleviated? 
Due to ceilings of some mortgage rates, state usury laws, rate 
ceilings on interest rates payable by some intermediaries, etc., we 
see the housing Industry taking the brunt of a shortage of investment 
funds. In view of the recent major downtums in residential construction 
in 1966 and 1969, and the formal housing goal of the econoity limed in 
the HUD Act of I968, all indications are that the activities of federal 
government credit agencies such as FNM, ŒMA, FHLMC, and the FHLBS 
will be expanded significantly if a capital shortage develops. Paren­
thetically, if a surfeit is expected, the agencies should be encouraged 
to moderate their participation. The difficulty encountered is how 
itnch tc expand—or contract—and which agency or combination of agencies 
to mobilize to acconpli^ this task. Given that there exists only a 
finite number of dollars to put into the housing sector, which federal 
credit agency gives the most output (mortgage credit to the housing 
sector) from a given input? In effect, which channel of bolstering the 
housing sector is the most efficient in terms of output of housing? 
A related problem is how the general capital market will react 
when a federal government credit agency raises funds to buttress the 
^Eenshaw (^5) has been one of the latest to espouse this maverick 
view. 
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housing sector.^ Are the buyers of agency debentures the same as the 
suppliers of funds to financial intermediaries (U5)? If so, Peter is 
being robbed to pay Paul and the slice of the capital pie going to the 
housing sector is unchanged. Unfortunately, this area of mortgage 
finance has been eschewed and what ençirical research is offered is 
tenuous. For the purpose of this e^osition, we shall put aside this 
more basic question and concentrate on what evolves given that the 
federal credit agencies have made funds available to the housing sector 
through the financial intermediaries outlined above. In essence, we 
desire to Judge the efficacy of the federally ^nsored credit agencies 
given they do engage, either directly or indirectly, in the residential 
mortgage market. 
Following the precedence of the published literature, we shall 
attençjt to assess the effectiveness of the FHLBS advances to member 
associations and the EHMA.-GNMA. activity in the secondary mortgage market. 
There are basically two aspects which should be considered: (1) whether 
the agencies were contra- or pro cyclical during the stuc^y period, and 
(2) which of the two programs has the most impact on residential housing 
activity. There has been conflicting research on the second point and 
most of the attention here will dwell on this controversy. Before con­
clusions on this matter are drawn from the present research, a brief 
overview of the past research and ensuing controversy will be presented. 
^For a stu^y of this problem, see (31, pp* 37-ii2, 32, pp. 190-200)» 
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A Review of Past Analysis of FHLBS Versus FNMA 
There are numerous studies attempting to assess the efficacy of 
federal credit intermediaries in the mortgage market, but our review is 
limited to those studies considered in Chapter II plus the work of 
Schwartz ($8). These five researchers cover the spectrum of opinion 
which has been offered in this controversy. There will be no attempt 
to assess the accuracy of these studies or to compare one with the 
other 
Brady (8) utilized r^ressicn analysis to explain housing starts 
and finds that FHLBS advances increase conventionally financed single-
family housing starts while FNMA purchases increase FHA-VA starts. The 
magnitudes are: a one billion dollar increase in FHLBS advances (1958 
dollars) raises conventional starts at a seasonally adjusted annual rate 
of 37,000 units in the current quarter while the same increase in FNMA.-
C2ÎMA. purchases raises FHA-VA financed starts by 33,000 units at annual 
2 
rates. When ÏTOÎA.-<}NMA purchases were entered into the equation explain­
ing conventional starts, th^ had a n^ative partial regression coeffi­
cient. Mien explaining total private housing starts in a single equation 
only FHLBS advances proved to be significantly positive. Brady esti­
mated that a one billion dollar increase in advances would raise starts 
^A conparison would be meaningless since the various researchers 
concentrated on a different time span and incorporated different methods. 
^The t-statistic value associated with FNMA-GaMA is 1.7 which is 
lower than desired but is significant at the ter» percent level. 
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at in annual rate of lU5>000 unit s 
Hu-mg (35) also used regression analysis to explain housing starts 
and, in addition, be estimated the flow of mortgage credit. He finds 
that FHLBS advances increases the number of conventional financed housing 
starts and the supply of conventional credit.~ His analysis also shows 
that RIMA, purchases raise VA financed starts and the flow of VA mortgage 
credit but does not influence either FHA or conventional starts. Like­
wise, FHLBS lending influences only the conventional sector of the market. 
liJhile the initial impacts of both RJMA. and FHLBS activities are similar 
in magnitude to Brady's, Huang's equations contain lagged dependent 
variables so that an increase in FNMA purchases or FHLBS advances raises 
starts in the long-run by more than in the short-run. 
Jaffee (lil) does not attençt to explain housing starts but instead 
estimates a structural model explaining mortgage commitments and mortgage 
flows by the four major financial institutions in the mortgage market 
The inpact on the mortgage market of FHLBS advances and FNMA. purchases 
is derived by simulating the impact of FHI£S lending and FNMA activity 
on the mortgage supply behavior of the intermediaries. The results are 
^Tbis is for the starts series which excludes mobile homes but 
does include multiple-family dwellings, i.e., the HTT series. 
^The t-statistic associated with this variable was 1.51 in the 
starts equation and 1.76 for the value-measure equation) the t-statistic 
in the mortgage credit equation was 0.22; thus, these results raise 
some question about significance. 
^By virtue of the fact that mortgage credit is only slightly 
removed from housing starts, the research being considered is pertinent 
to the controvert under discussion. 
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as follows: a one billion dollar purchase of mortgages by FNMA, leads 
to a decline in private mortgage holdings of $U60 million after four 
quarters and a more than one billion dollar decline after eight quar­
ters.^ A one billion dollar increase in. FHLBS advances leads to a 
gradual increase in mortgage credit flows up to $830 million after 
four quarters but declines to $8lO million after eight quarters. Jaffee's 
conclusion with reject to federal credit intermediaries is (Li, p* $9)î 
It thus appears that FHLBB policy actions, "by routing funds to the 
mortgage market via a private inteM»diaiy, are significantly more 
effective than ïTîMA. policies which directly supply the mortgage 
market. 
Schwartz (58) argues, based on the sinple correlation coefficients 
between FHLBS advances, FNMA. purchases, housing starts, and all other 
mortgage flows, that FNMA. activity is more contracyclical than FHLBS 
activity. His judgement of FHLBS policy is (58, p. 70): "Prior to 
1966, advances moved with no strongly discernible pattern, and to the 
extent any pattern existed it tended to be procyclical and seeming]y 
perversely so at times." Since 1966, Schwartz argues, the record of 
the FHLBS is mixed; some years they follow a procyclical policy and 
others a contracyclical one. " On the other hand he commends the FNMA. 
Somewhat contrary to a priori reasoning, the FNMA. purchases 
influenced CBs most negatively after both four and eight quarters and 
Î63s least negative after four quarters but next to most after eight 
quarters. The decline in CBs and I6Bs was $-.19 and $-.07 billion 
after four quarters and $-.1*8 and $-.26 billion after eight quarters, 
respectively. 
2 He points out that sometimes the FHLBS followed the policies 
they did not by design but because of political expediency and/or adverse 
behavior of member associations© 
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for its contracyclical behavior, e^ecially since I&y 1968, 
Silber (6l ) develops a reaction function framework for analyzing 
FHLBS and FNM activities at stabilizing the volume of mortgage credit 
with the inç)licit view towards stabilizing housing activity» Ih effect, 
he sets out to determine whether the FHLBS and FNMA. have, indeed, used 
their policy tools to implement their objectives during the period 
1960;1 through 1970:U» He concludes from his empirical findings that 
FHLBS advances act to stabilize housing starts at least as far as starts 
are influenced by credit conditions (6I, p. 1U)» Furthermore, the FHLBS 
was only concerned with offsetting the inpact of credit conditions on 
housing starts and this advance policy does not take e^glicit account of 
ÎÎJM purchases, i.e., FHLBS advances are apparently not coordinated 
with FNMA. secondaiy market activity. He finds basically the same thing 
to be true of FNMA. activity (6l, p. 18), Even though the FHLBS and 
FNMA. were contracyclical over the sample period, their activity was 
motivated differently by the same phenomena and this accounts for their 
uncoordinated action. He concludes (61, p. 19); 
FNMA. is most concerned with the mortgage rate since its activities 
are related most directly to the mortgage market. The FHLBS is more 
concerned with saving flows since its impact on mortgage credit and 
housing operates through the savings and loan associations. 
Silber feels that since the FHLBS advances and wiMA purchases are 
influenced by the same general phenomena, even though not to the same 
degree, and ai^ housing starts equation including these two policy 
variables is likely to suffer from malticollinearity problems; there­
fore, he feels the results of Bra^y, Huang, and Jaffee should be rejected 
since both FHLffi advances and FNMA. purchases were entered sinHiltaneouslye 
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He likewise rejects Schwartz's suggestion that only FNMA. was contra-
cyclical.^ 
In other work (60) Silber found that a one billion dollar increase 
in FHIBS advances increased housing starts by h9,600 units after three 
quarters and the sarne increase in FNMA purchases raised starts by W,000 
units after three quarters. He further contends the market for FHA-VA 
mortgages is not really independent of the conventional mortgage market, 
and vice versa; therefore, FNMA. purchases should be included in the 
equation for conventionally financed starts and the FHLBS variable 
2 
ought to appear in the equation for federally underwritten starts. 
Cyclical Behavior of the FHLBS and the FNMA-GNMA 
In view of the fact that advances and secondary market activity 
influence SLAs and ÎCBs respectively, only these two intermediaries 
will be considered in assessing these federal credit programs. It is 
fully realized that sczstinss the tncvsrvsnts of funds are beyond the 
control of the administrative bodies of these agencies because of inde­
pendent behavior of the intermediaries and/or political considerations. 
The counterbalancing nature of these agencies will be judged over the 
entire sanple period and it may be that they act contrary to their usual 
^It is this writer's contention that Silber did not, nor could 
he, document his imlticollinearity problem to any rigorous d^ree. 
2 Silber has recommended this be acconçlished treating FNMA. 
and FHLBS as one federal credit program variable. 
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behavior at times.^ Additionally, the cyclical movements of credit 
funds will be conpared to the regular inflow of funds to these inter­
mediaries, namely, deposits and repayments, in judging their counber-
2 
balancing efficiency. 
FFT.RÇ; advances 
The primary purpose of the FHLBS advances is to regulate the 
supply of mortgage credit to members so as to avoid building booms and 
excesses in residential construction activity as well as to permit 
members to meet expanding demand not matched savings inflow. This 
contracyclical posture dictates that the flow of advances should mod­
erate when savings inflow increase and vice versa# The job of the FHLBS 
is complicated by the fact that members cannot be forced to accept 
advances nor can th^ be prevented from repaying past advances if th^ 
so desire; however, they do have some control via direct surveillance 
and interest rates levied for advances s The FHLBS should have a contra-
cyclical influence if they encourage borrowing when inflows are dimin­
ished and restrict advances when inflows are plentiful. Their sector 
stability role is somewhat simplified by the fact that most advances 
are not tendered on a commitment basis and SLAs, their primary borrower, 
do not usually make a substantial volume of forward commitments. These 
^Ifhat sometimes appears to be improper strategy may be warranted. 
For example, in a period of economic slack and decreased savings inflow, 
the mortgage market may be anply supplied with funds; therefore, a 
purely ad hominem argument of contracyclical behavior is improper. 
^Other problems arise when credit programs are assessed but thqy 
will not be analyzed herein. For example, what iiig>act does monetary 
policy or the interest elasticity of loanable funds have upon these 
institutions and contrariwise? 
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phenomena allow a faster response to changes in saivings inflows.^ 
A single correlation of advances, saving deposit inflows, and the 
repayments to SlAs indicate that PHIRS advance activity has been contra^ 
cyclical to the regular inflows. The siiiçle correlation coefficients 
appear in Table 8.1 below. When was used instead of D® as it is in 
Equation 3.3, the sisQ^le correlation coefficient remained basically 
unaltered. 
TABLE 8,1 
Correlation matrix of 
inflows to SIAs 
^ 
1 «00 ——— —— 
— ,^8 1.00 ———— 
-.lit ,$9 1.00 
While the correlation matrix shows a contracycHcal policy on the 
average^  a closer examination of the data yields a different picture. 
Prior to inidr-1968 the ÏHUBS policy appears to be procyclical except 
during part of the savings inflow downturn in 1966-67. Since early 
1969, the ÎHIBS policy has been overwhelmingly contracyclical and this 
strong relationship no doubt dominated in the correlation matrix above. 
The regression analysis of the previous chapters would probably be 
improved if only data since 1968 were used but, unfortunately, the 
It also calls for a pool of relatively liquid reserves on the 
part of the IHLBS and the proper volume to man «tain for emergencies 
is a thorny problem: if too large the fEI£S ni^t be criticized but 
if too small they would be inadequate and again criticism might arise. 
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sattple period is too short for a reliable examination. The general 
assessment of the FHLBS advances policy is that no obvious pattern 
emerges until early I969 when a contracyclical propensity is adopted 
and maintained. 
FNMA.-CTMA activity 
The primary objective of the FÏ1MA.-GNM is to act as a buffer for 
the federally underwritten mortgage credit market, increasing their 
activity whan other suppliers depeurt or indicate their intention to 
depart from the mortgage market. Their activity should subside when the 
supply of mortgage funds are ample. A correlation matrix of the inflow 
of funds. Table 8,2 below, indicates that FNM-GNMA activity is inverse 
to deposit inflows but directly related to repeyments. When FGP is lagged 
TABLE 8.? 
Correlation matrix of 
inflows to KGBs 
FGP^ 1 .00 —— ———— 
—.20 1 «00 ——~ 
.60 .Oli 1.00 
one quarter as it appears in Equation b.2, the correlation coefficients 
are all positive but the one associated with is only 0.009. From 
Table 8.2 it may be concluded that FNMA-ŒM. policy was procyclical 
when repayments were considered but the relationship with deposit inflows 
is nebulous; the relationship appears contracyclical when all values 
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are the same quarter but no discernible policy appears when is 
used. The coordination of FTIMA.-GKMA. activity is coniplicated because 
since May 1968 a forward coranitinent program has been used by these 
agencies, KSBs, regularly employ forward connitments, and originators 
of mortgages are reluctant sellers to FNMA because of the stock pur­
chases and other costs associated with the transactions. These complica­
tions doubtless cloud the efficiency of the agency but they cannot be 
explicitly accounted for in a surface stuc|y such as this one. 
A quarter by quarter assessment of FNMA.-GMM/V activity and the 
same quarter deposit inflows shows that prior to I969 there was no 
consistent pro- or contracyclical policy. Since I969 the secondary 
market activity of FNMA-GNMA. has been contracyclical even though the 
sinple correlations of the entire sample period appearing in Table 8.2 
shows the opposite. The similarity of cyclical behavior of FNMA.-GNMA 
and the FHLBS is fortuitous because it allows a couparison of their 
iijpact- upon the residential housing sect or Since the objectives of 
the two are basically the same and their activity has been parallel, 
any bias in the analysis should equally influence the two and a conpar-
ison of their influence should be possible ty using the regression 
results of the previous chapters. This comparison is the subject of 
the next section. 
No mention of volume or importance has been made because the 
markets covered by these agencies are of different sizes. It has been 
inplicitly assumed that the influence of the agencies is linear and 
volume is unimportant. 
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FHLBS Advances and Housing Starts 
B^uation 3*3 above shows that the relationship between mortgage 
credit supplied by SIAs and FHIBS advances is, on the average, a direct 
one. A one billion dollar increase in advances will cause to increase 
by $280 million in the same quarter, ceteris paribus» The $200 million 
of 12,166/B units in FHS. Since the Boeckh index has been consistently 
increasing over time, the number of new starts a given dollar voJnme of 
advances will "buy" has been decreasing. In 1972:3, a one billion dollar 
increase in advances would have led to 8,187 additional housing starts 
in the current quarter. Since the present investigation is oriented 
toward the short-run, no attempt was made to simlate the iiqpact in 
future time periods. No doubt present quarter advances will influence 
future activity but since the multiple regression results failed to 
verify a statistically measurable impact, the comments made here are 
applicable only to the current quarter.' FHI£S advances were analyzed 
as if they had an influence only upon SIAs* This selective analysis 
arises because SLAs form the bulk of the memherekip of the FHI£S. Addi­
tionally, the simple correlation and the two-stage regression results 
indicate that SLAs act independently in their credit supply behavior, thus, 
not affecting other suppliers. Other intermediaries besides SIAs make 
conventional loans and may also be members of the FHZJBS; hence, FHTJS 
for no other reason, associations are likely to decrease 
their borrowing rate as their total indebtedness to the FHI£S increases; 
therefore, current advance policy is likely to influence future borrow­
ings as well as repayments of past borrowings. 
when incorporated into Equation 7*3, causes an increase 
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advances may Influence their behavior, either direct]y or indirectly. 
This influence, if it exists, was not captured by the above regression 
analysis, consequently nothing can be said about its magnitude or 
importance. 
^y utilizing Equation 7«U it can be seen that a one billion dollar 
increase in advances will cause CPP to increase by $1^6.72 million. 
V/hien ACPPyi^PHS is computed, the resulting quotient is approximately 
$18,000 which is veiy close to the average loan size made by SlAs (S7). 
This indicates that the equations are realistic as well as able to 
yield relatively accurate results. 
Since SlAs make predominatly conventional loans, their activity 
can be taken as a proxy for the conventional sector of the mortgage 
market. This approximation allows a comparison of the results obtained 
here and those of the studies reviewed above. The present analysis 
seems to support those researchers who argue that increases in FHLBS 
advances has a stirrlativs influence upon the housing sector and, there­
fore, can be used as a policy tool to moderate the residential housing 
cycleNo comparison as to volume is attempted because the analysis 
here is by institutions whereas previous research has been by loan type. 
The conclusions we draw here are that FHLBS advances directly 
influence SLA mortgage credit supply activity and this, in turn, influ­
ences private housing starts, especially conventionally financed ones. 
While FHLBS advances may influence the behavior of other mortgage credit 
supplying intermediaries, it is not of a measurable magnitude in the 
1 Brady (8, pp, 5U-63 and 11, pp. 155-^7) provides exaitoles of how 
forecasting models can be converted into policy models. 
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above analysis; therefore, any assessment of the impact of advances 
upon these non-SLA, institutions would be sheer ^peculation. 
FNMA-GNMA Activity and Housing Starts 
The secondary mortgage market activity of FNMA-GNMA. was statis­
tically significant only in the MSB equation. The FGP variable was 
significant only when lagged one quarter; thus, current quarter changes 
will influence the immediately following quarter's value of M^. The 
FGP variable entered the ÏBB mortgage credit supply Equation li»2 with 
a negative coefficient. This implies that as FNMA.-GNMA increase their 
activity, the lending volume of fGBs moves in the opposite direction, 
Tho activity of MfMA-ŒMA probably influences I6B supply activity both 
djrectly and indirectly, A direct influence arises because MBBs are 
likely to moderate their mortgage lending activities when such lending 
appears relatively unprofitable and this is precisely the instant when 
FKI-ÎA.-C2ÎÎ-ÎA. sûist Support the market by buying if they are to be contra-
cyclical, There is also an indirect influence because MSBs and FNMA-
GNMA are no doubt coirpetiting for funds in the capital market 
According to Equation b*2, a one billion dollar increase in FMk-
GNMA. purchases would result in a reduction of M^^^ of eighty-eight 
million dollars, When this decreased mortgage credit supplied is entered 
^This offsetting influence has also been the subject of criticism 
against the FHLBS (U5)* Such asyninetric reactions to ïTîMA-GNMA and FHLBS 
activities are possible, given the different sectors of the mortgage 
market affected by each, FNMA-GNMA. buys mortgages which have the nation­
wide market. The offsetting reactions by private financial institutions 
can occur rather quickly. The mortgage loans made by SLAs with FHLBS 
advances probably reach relatively isolated demands for mortgage credit. 
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into Equation 7*3, the resulting decrease in PHS is 3,82^/6 units. In 
terms of 1972:3 housing starts, a one billion dollar increase in g 
would result in 2,575 fewer starts. This inverse relationship supports 
those researchers who contend that FNMA-GNMA. activity actually thwarts 
housing activity.^ 
This apparent defeating influence of ETOIA.-GNMA may actually be 
moderated because no doubt some of their purchases of mortgages comes 
directly from 16Bs. To this extent, the adverse influence is offset. 
The exact magnitude of such offsetting behavior is not measurable from 
the above analysis but it can be said that unless it is approximately 
10,800 starts (about $200 million), FNM-GNMA. activity will be less 
2 
stimulative than FHLBS lending. Such a quantum offset is unlikely; 
therefore, it seems proper to conclude from the, above analysis that for 
the period studied, FHLBS lending has more of an inpact upon residential 
housing starts in the short-run than does a similar dollar volume of 
^"NMA-GNMA. secondary market purchases. In fact, the evidence indicates 
that the latter's activity may have been self-defeating. 
Jaffee is perhaps the strongest proponent of this position but 
Brady's work also partially confirms this result; however, to the extent 
that ®B supply activity is a proxy for the federally underwritten 
sector of the market, these results differ from those of Brad's. 
2 Mortgage companies, which originate but normally do not invest 
in mortgage loans, have accounted for from seventy-five to nearly ninety 
percent of the amount of mortgages sold to FNMfl., with the higher pro­
portions within this range recorded in the past few years (32, p. 192). 
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CHAPTER EC. 
SUMMARÏ AND CONCLUSIONS 
It has been the objective of this paper to investigage the resi­
dential mortgage credit market by segregating supplying intermediaries 
and linking physical or financial residential construction activity to 
these credit flows. The approach has been short-term; consequently, 
only financial variables have been explored. It has been concluded 
from the above regression results that the short-run fluctuations in 
mortgage credit flows have been aiqjlained adequately to allow the 
physical volume of housing activity to be accurately forecast for short 
periods of time into the future. The approach employed in the above 
analysis has been sinçlistic in that the conplex interactions have not 
been fully investigated. This shorbcoming is a problem associated with 
all research in the housing sector and arises mainly because of the 
paucity of reliable data. In recent years the various agencies and 
financial intermediaries associated with the mortgage credit market 
have taken concerted action to remedy this deficiency. As better data 
become available the present research can be updated and some of the 
incalculability deriving from the short sample period overcome. 
The first step in this research was to analyze the determinants 
of the volume of mortgage credit each intermediary would supply. It 
was found these intermediaries are influenced Iqr the same basic variables, 
but not equally so. Also each intermediary has its own lending idio-
1Ii3 
^ncrasyj consequently, there is some variation of variables in the supply 
equation of each group. There were no unalterable attempts to keep 
the intermediary supply equations symmetrical ty including the same 
variables irrespective of their statistical significance. Ifc may be 
that too much emphasis was put upon statistical significance and not 
enough on intuitive deduction; however, we have adopted the position 
that intuitive appeal may be misleading when working with forces as 
capricious as portfolio adjustments of institutions guided by human 
behavior. 
The best supply equation of each group of intermediaries was 
combined to estimate a proxy for the total mortgage credit supplied to 
the residential mortgage market. This estimate in turn was eitployed 
as the primary independent variable in the housing starts and the value-
of-starts equations. The estimates during the sançle period and the 
forecasts outside the sarple span derived from the equations were 
reasonably accurate. Our results conçiare favorably with other research 
even though the above analysis has not been along the lines of a formal 
model. 
The supply equations of the intermediaries ^ecializing in mort­
gage credit, SLA.S and îBBs, were used to judge the efficiency of two 
federal programs designed to moderate housing cycles. Our conclusion 
was that the FHLBS advances appear to stimulate housing while FNMA.-GNMA. 
secondary market activity does not; in fact, it seems FNMA-GNMA have 
the opposite influence of what thQr are attenç>ting. This outcome exists 
even though both federal programs have been contracyclical with inter­
mediary inflows since I969. This efficacy of the federal credit programs 
lUU 
is based on a static, short-run analysis and a long-term analysis might 
substantiate a different conclusion. The results we obtained support 
some previous researchers but refutes others. It appears the FHLBS 
advances are clearly superior to the FNMA.-GNMA. activity in stimulating 
housing production in the short-run; the verdict of the long-run cannot 
be answered from the above analysis. The short-term was chosen for 
this analysis because we wished to assess the inçiortance of financial 
variables. The basic demand variables are needed to assess the long-
run impacts of a particular housing policy and it is felt poor data 
reliability and constant structural changes in the housing sector make 
this type of analysis marginal. 
It is felt the connection between financial variables and housing 
activity has been demonstrated in this surface study. No attempt was 
made to formulate a conplete model of the mortgage credit market because 
of the lack of good data on the demand side and the uncertainty of the 
success of financial variables. It seems that a logical step to take 
in the future research along this line is to construct a conçlete model 
of the mortgage credit market concentrating on the supplying inter­
mediaries and financial variables. There is a need for research to 
investigate the possibility of treating some of the exogenous variables 
in this research as endogenous and estimating them separately. This is 
a major undertaking and is likely to be frustrating because of the 
complex nature of financial intennediaries and their portfolio arrange­
ments and rearrangements. 
We, along with many others, feel there is a need to moderate the 
cyclical swings in housing. Unfortunately, the policy makers cannot 
iU5 
implement the necessary monetary and fiscal policies to attain this goal 
until the housing cycle and how it is interrelated to other sectors of 
the economy is fully understood. The above research implies that the 
control of residential construction is rooted in the control and manage­
ment of the financial intermediaries» Recommended changes in the depos­
itary institutions are now being considered but little thought is being 
given to the inpact upon the housing sector. This nonconsideration of 
housing is indicative of the inçxîrtance usually afforded to this sector 
of the econonçr. This relegation is doubtless a function of the fewness 
of resources employed in the past to understand the housing sector. 
More and better research is needed to outline measures to stabilize 
housing production. Until there is more research pointing the way to 
stability, the U.S. housing sector is likely to continue meandering along 
a similar course in servitude to the remainder of the econony. 
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APPENDU A. 
SQUATIONAL OUTLINE OF REVIEWED MOBEIS 
The major equations of the research reviewed in Chapter II are 
listed below. A brief explanation of the variables are also given to 
aid in the interpretation of the equations. Since Jaffee's equations 
utilized different sample periods, we have listed these below each 
equation. Biang's equations are from two different periods; thus, the 
date of the research is given directly below the equations. 
Brady's Model 
ICNFR58 - W.206 + .398B - 3.21 IC + .862LVC + .002FHLBS - .1^331 
(U.6) (5.U) (k.O) (7.5) (7.5) (6.8) 
» .862 
D-w - 2.U3 
SEE - .68k 
KTT = -1*330.6 + 52.52m - li3li.3IC + 70.6ULVC + .•ili5î'HLBS - U7.85T 
(2.7) (3.9) (3.0) (3.U) (2.6) (k.2) 
" .5693 
D-W - 1.1*9 
SEE » 123.6 
HFED - 120.5 - 29.9IFHA + .033AFEDP + 8.229B - 11.257T 
(1.9) (1.9) (1.7) (3.9) (5.9) 
f - .67 
D-W - .79 
SEE • 22.99 
HC - -720.93 + 20.9UB - 2UI.8IC + 22.09LVC + .037FHLBS - 33.UT 
(1.9) (6.2) (6.9) (It.U) (2.7) (7.0) 
- .875 
D-W - 2.26 
SEE - 29.83 
HM - -1U3U.8 + 1.l82HnB + 11i.257T 
(5.2) (2.6) (8.0) 
» .616 
d-w = 1.617 
SEE - 97 .U 
A description of the notations used by 6ra47 follows: 
AFKDF net acgiisition of federally underwritten mortgages ly 
FNm-GNm. 
B Boecldi index of residential construction costs. 
FHLBS net quarterly change in Federal Home Loan Bank advances 
outstanding, seasonal adjusted. 
HC number of conventionally financed housing starts at 
seasonally adjusted annual rates, single-family dwellings 
only. 
HFES number of federally underwritten bousing starts at 
seasonally adjusted annual rates. 
HM number of aaltiple-family housing starts at seasonally 
adjusted annual rates, private nonfarm. 
HTT HC + HFED + HM. 
HTOS HC + HFED. 
IC, IFHA true interest rates on conventional and FHA mortgages, 
respectively. 
ICNFR58 value of the HTT series in 1958 dollars. 
LVC loan-to-value ratio on conventional mortgages. 
T linear time trend. 
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Haang's Model 
TIB - -lU95t).0 + 1U21.0RM_, - 2U5.1iRS_^ - 1276.0RL_2 + 373.1MB 
(1.19) (1.38) (.901) (1.66) (8.21) 
+.333SA_2 + 1U.71FHLR_^ - .183FNM 
(5.3U) (U.19) (.382) 
- .93 
D-W -1.35 (date: 1971) 
S • -202U0.0 + 6380.01 - 2171.01^2 * 2.281R^^ + .U87S^ 
(3.5) (3.5) (1.71)" (U.li5) (3.5) 
^ - .725 (date: 1960) 
« -977.0 + 369.5RGM_-, - 160.3RS_^ - 538.8RL_2 + 73.73MB 
(l.ltl) (2.10) (2.08) (3.02) (5.60) 
+ .000902SA.3 + .207FHUI_^ + .191FNM& 
(.0517) (2.17) (1.03) 
- .65 
D-W - .87 (date: 1971) 
OB « -13360.0 + 995.9RCM_^ - 125.2RS_i - 690.3RL_2 + 290.6MB 
(U.61) (1.11) (.569) (1.12) (7.80) 
+ .3U5SA_^ + 1.196FHLN_i 
(6.32) (U.05) 
- ,937 
D-W » 1.U8 (date: 1971) 
A description of the notations used by Biang follows: 
CMS, @6 total supply of residential mortgage credit made for 
conventional mortgages and federally underwritten mort-
gages, reqwctlvely. 
FHm net advances of the FHI£S to the member associations, som 
of monthly figures, in Dillons of dollars. 
1^6 
RfMà net purchases Iqr the R0& and the ŒQ1& of FHA.-insared 
and VÂ-gnaranteed mortgages in the secondaiy market, in 
millions of dollars. 
if RM average weighted market yield of all types of home mort­
gages, in percentage points. 
i^, RL market yield on recently issued iaa rated corporate 
bonds, in percentage points. 
MB source base plus reserve adjustmeixts, in billions of 
dollars. 
reserve position of the member banks, or excess reserves 
less borrowings from FRBs, in billions of dollars. 
BGM estimated market yield on conventional mortgage loans 
made, in percentage points. 
R01 weighted average of market yields on fHA and VÂ loans 
made according to amount of loan, in percentage points. 
RS open market mon^ rate of U-6 month commercial ps^r in 
New York, in percentage points. 
S gross flow of FM-insurad, VA-guaranteed, and conventional 
nonfarm residential mortgage loans, in millions of dollars. 
S^, SA net increase in savings deposits at selected institutions, 
in millions of dollars. 
T16 total residential mortgage loans made under FHA insurance 
and VA guarantee plus the estimated total extent ion 
of conventional mortgage credit, in millions of dollars. 
Jaffee's Model 
- =152 - .83DDM + .118Z5® + .262® + .19A® .625R® - ,2991^^ 
^ (.U7) (7.1) (2.0) (3.U) (1.7) (5.3) (3.7) 
R^ « .995 «0 * «39 w, • .05 sample periods 1957:2 
D-W » 1.73 *1 • .27 w% = .01 through 1968:U 
SEE » .103 *2 ' "-.01 
p • .71*1 w^ • .10 6 
157 
= -.779 - .2BkJm + .33li^ + .1l5D^ + .1<0R^ - .32M*^ 
(2.1) (3.1;) (6.1) (3.2) (cntr) (3.5) 
+ .lAo^Vj^oo"^ 
(iS.o) 
« .969 - .27 w, • .10 saaçle period; 1960:2 
D-W « 2.16 *1 • *22 • .06 through 1968:L 
SEE • .066 w. - .18 - .03 
*3 - .Ik ^ 
AM° - .0051111° + .072I;t,TD° + .Ol6|:w,(TD%)(EM-RL) - .ITÔM". |T0 i 1*0 J" ** I 
(0.77) (3.8) (3.5) (3.3) 
^ • .9U Vq • .lli w- • .21; sample period: 1955:1 
D-W = 1.81 v, = .22 wV = .25 through 1966:1; 
SEE - .128 v' - .26 Wp - .23 
p - .632 V- « .2U w. " .18 
•7^ - .111 - .10 
= -.757 - + ,089SS^ + .029D^ + .251- .053%^^ 
(2.2) (U.I) (0.96) (2.3) (1.5) (2.5) 
+ .991gWiNC^^ 
(15.5)' 
R^ " ,972 Wq - .17 w, = .13 sample period: 1955:1 »  
D-W " 2,06 wY " .17 = .11 through 1968:1; 
SEE • .089 w- » .16 = ,08 
p - .121 - .15 W7 " .OU 
A description of the notations used tgr Jaffee follows: 
C commercial banks 
I life insurance companies 
M mutual savings banks 
S savings and loan associations 
FHLBB advances to SL&s. 
D^, i=6^M^I deposits at the 1th inbermediaiy. 
Sd^, KjMjI deviation of current d^osit flow from a four 
quarter moving average at the ith intermediajy. 
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£0^ demand deposits less required reserves on demand 
deposits at member commercial banks. 
DOM danoiy variable taking the value one 1968:1 to 
1968:1| and zero elsewhere. 
M^, i"S,M,I,C mortgage stock at the ith intemediaiy. 
i"6,M,I gross mortgage flow at the i^ intennediaiy. 
Aff net change in commercial bank mortgage holdings. 
NC^ new commitments of UCs. 
i-6,M outstanding stock of commitments at the ith inter­
mediary. 
i*6,M,I rroayment of outstanding mortgages at the ith 
intermediary. 
RLj RM commercial loan and mortgage rates, respectively. 
T}Jp time deposits less required reserves on tijne d^osits 
at commercial banks. 
Silber's Madel 
M® - .279D® - I69.6if^i^ + - 20.6Si + W.TS^ + 618.88? 
(3.67) (1.U8)" (9.8)' (.01*5) (.935) (1.U7)^ 
+ 207.6s, 
It 
i.hhh) 
R - .99 
D-W « 1.60 
SEE » 186.3 
Hho = .65 
M" = -2058 + .16UD^ - 239.0(icb-lm) + l!t5.2(igy-i^) + .063£S 
(2.1i7) (2.6U) (2.13) (1.79) (3.3) 
+ .865M*i 
(15.U)" 
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R - .99 
D-¥ - 1.67 
SEE - 8lM 
Rho • .1*2 
—2086.6 + .02811)° + .0U7TD° + .8h6*f, 
-I 
(1.79) (2.15) (3.92) (19.2) 
R - .99 
D-W - 1.72 
SEE - 271.1 
Rho - .31* 
If"- - 2815.7 + .059A^ - 292.5(igy-y + 2L0.0(igb-ig,) - 61.717 
(i.ij2) (1.96) (1.25) (1.37) (1.68) 
+ 5L0.9CM_2 + 891)^1 
(3.18) (15.U) 
R - .99 
D-W - 2.31 
SEE - 280.2 
A description of the notations used by Silber follows: 
c cciûûôrciâl banks 
1 life insurance conçanies 
s savings and loan associations 
u mutual savings banks 
A^ level of LIC assets. 
CM 2 outstanding commitments of LICs lagged two quarters, 
Ir, i=g,u deposits at the ith intemediaiy. 
demand deposits at all commercial banks. 
(ig^-ig^) interest rate of coiporate bonds mimis the mort­
gage rate, 
(ifjj^b) interest rate chai^ged for FHLBS advances. 
(i b-iji) interest rate of government bonds minus the mort­
gage rate. 
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IV loan-to-value ratio of mortgages held by life 
insurance companies. 
i«Sjl,u,c total mortgage loans outstanding at the ith inter-
mediaiy, 
AM change in total mortgages outstanding at IGBs. 
S^, i=1,2,3,b seasonal duimqy variables for the ith quarter. 
TD° time deposits at all commercial banks. 
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APPENDIX B. 
NOTATION, SYMBOL DEFDJITIONS, AND DATA SOURCES 
All data were collected for 196^:1 through 1972:2 and those vari­
ables lagged in the regressions were collected the same number of quarters 
prior to 196^:1• The data were derived in one of three ways* (1) com­
piled by the author, (2) taken from the Data Resources Institute data 
banks, or (3) taken from the national housing market data bank of the 
Federal Home Loan Bank BoardUnless stated otherwise, all data are 
unadjusted and all interest rates are expressed in percent. 
Notation 
Superscripts; identity specific intermediary 
b consaereial banks 
1 life insurance conçanies 
s saving and loan associations 
u mutual savings banks 
T aggregate, defined specifically below 
* estimated 
Subscripts: identify period of lag; current period denoted as t. 
Others identified below. 
^ first difference of variables, e.g., AZ = 
This data bank was originally compiled by Brady (9). 
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Siymbol Definitions and Source 
A change in total advances outstanding supplied by 
the fH[£S and held by all members of the fHLBS. 
Derived from monthly data supplied in the Federal 
Reserve Bulletin. In millions of dollars. 
BoecWi construction cost index of resid.ences. 
Derived ftrom monthly data supplied in Construction 
Review. 196? • 1.00. 
change in outstanding residential mortgage loan 
commitments for the ith intermediary. For LICs 
the data were obtained"from Forward Investment 
Coaanitments of Reporting Life Ihswance Coapanies. 
The reporting lids represent about eighty percent 
of the industry's assets. The data for SIÂS and 
KSBs were derived from monthly series listed in the 
Federal Reserve Bulletin. The MSB values are for all 
savings banks in ifew tork state and serve as a proay 
for all MSBs. All values in millions of dollars. 
CPP 
CT^, i"b,l,s,u 
dummy variable taking on the value zero prior to 
1968:1 and the value one thereafter. 
change in deposits at the ith intermediary. It is 
the change in saving capitaTheld by all insured 
SLÂ.S and the change in total deposits at all MSBs. 
The SIA values were derived from monthly data 
supïûied by the îïUSB and the MSB values were 
conçjuted from the monthly series reported in the 
Federal Reserve Bulletin. 3n millions of dollars. 
B 
C^, i»l,s,u 
private residential construction put in place. 
The data were adapted from monthly series reported 
in the Survey of Current Business. In millions of 
—"WL mmrnm 'I H i  
dollars. 
conçosite credit terra index for the ith intermediary. 
Derived by coz^uting a conventional, TSA., and 7A 
weighted index of interest rates, loa»-to-value 
ratios, and amortization lengths and then dividing 
the product of the weighted l/V and lA into the 
wei^ted interest rate. Interest rate and l/V 
are expressed in percent and the lA denominated in 
years. Conçonents of the indices were supplied by 
the ÎHIBS, and the weights were determined by using 
the volume of conventional, IHA., and VA mortgages 
held by the ith intermediary. 
D 
D^ , i"8,U 
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DC^ change in demand deposit8 at all commercial banks. 
IhcladeB only those demand deposits which are a 
component of the money saj^ly* Adapted from daily 
figures reported in the Federal Reserve Bulletin. 
]h millions of dollars. 
PGP secondary mortgage market purchases of the Federal 
National Mortgage Association and the Government 
National Mortgage Association minus their sales. 
Data prior to 1968:3 relates to the secondary 
market activity of the old FNMA. Data derived 
from monthly listings in the Federal Reserve 
Bulletin. In millions of dollars. 
1^ interest rate on Aaa corporate bonds. Adapted from 
monthly data listed in the Federal Reserve Bnn«tin. c 
1 interest rate of long-term (greater than ten years) 
U.S. Government bonds. Ada^ed from monthly data 
supplied in the Federal Reserve Bulletin. 
1 interest rate on conventionally financed new homes, 
™ FHLBB series5 effective rates. It reflects fees 
and charges as well as contract rates and an assumed 
prepayment at the end of ten years. Takbn from the 
Federal Reserve Bulletin and Brady (9). 
Igl yield on Aaa state and local government general 
obligation bonds. Adapted from monthly data 
reported in the Federal Re serve Bulletins 
LA. length of amortization period of a mortgage and 
expressed in years. Data stqpplled by the FHLBB 
and Brady (9). 
I/V loan-to-valne ratio of a mortgage loan. Expressed 
in percent • Supplied by the FHLBB and Brady (9) • 
> 14)^1^=*% change in total residential mortgage leans 
standing at the 1th intermediary. SLA data were 
adapted from monthly series supplied ty the FHLBB. 
)6B data supplied by the National Association of 
Mutual Savings Bapks. CB data includes loans held 
by nondeposlt trust companies but not bank trust 
departments and were adapted from monthly series 
in the Federal Reserve Bulletin. LIC data adapted 
from monthly listings in the Federal Reserve Bulletin, 
All vaines in millions of dolîâra7~~ 
if !^ + if + M® - ^  , 
lôli 
+ rf** as derived from the prinaxy 
aapply equations for each intemediazy. 
AMB change in the St. Louis Fed*s monetaxy base maasure. 
In millions of dollars. Taken from the Ikta 
Resource Ihsbitute data bank. 
MI Hsltzer index of monetary stringency, Coiqpated as 
follows: the rate of interest on new issues of 
three month U.S. Government bills, calculated as 
the average rate on new issues, multiplied by one 
minus the ratio of free to total reserves of the 
New York and Chicago Central Reserve City Banks. 
The componenb parts of the index were taken from 
the Federal Reserve Bulletin. Also see Bra^y ( 9 )  •  
total private residential housing starts. Taken 
from Construction Reports, Housiy Startst U.S. 
Department of Connerce, Bureau of the Census 
(C20 series). In thousands of units. 
net mortgage repayments, scheduled and unscheduled, 
to the i^ intermediaxy. SIA data taken from 
monthly series supplied ty the FHI2B. 166 data 
is for all 16Bs in New York state and was scqoplied 
hy the Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System. 
Lie data are for reporting LlCs and were obtained 
from Record of ^ surance nhvestments and Economic 
and Investment Report which were issued hy the 
Tn?5 jkssrsnce AooGciatissi of Asserlca. AH values 
in millions of dollars. 
seasonal dummy variables for the first, second, and 
third quarters, respectively. The dun^ variables 
take on a value of one in the appropriate quarter, 
a minus one in the fourth quarter, and a zero in 
the remaining two quarters. The value of one was 
arbitrarily chosen. 
a linear tine trend which is tied to zero at the 
b%inning of the series. Dicremental stqps of one 
unit were arbitrarily used; however, any linear 
trend will serve as adequately. 
change in time deposits of all commercial banks. 
Excludes those deposits due to domestic commercial 
banks and U.S. Government. Source is the Federal 
Reserve Bulletin. In millions of dollars# 
PHS 
R^, i»l,s,u 
S<|, S2, S^ 
T 
TD^ 
